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Introduction 
Understanding how economic systems interact with ecosystems requires models that 
include geospatial heterogeneity. Integration of economic and ecological systems is vital 
for sustainable development, especially with respect to climate change, food security and 
the management of common property resources. Advances in remote sensing and 
geographic information systems have created a wealth of data applicable to economics, 
but it is challenging to incorporate high-resolution, global data in existing economic 
models. In this thesis, I integrate geospatial data with economic theory to analyze 
important environmental problems. 
The next three chapters describe the techniques I use for modeling geospatially-explicit 
economic systems and apply them to current environmental challenges. Chapter one 
addresses the tradeoffs between food production and environmental protection. I address 
the question of how we can optimally feed a growing population (requiring a 100% 
increase in calorie production by 2050) while minimizing the loss of carbon storage 
(which is important for mitigating climate change). I use high-resolution, gridded global 
data to give geospatial specificity to the results of the optimization. The framework I 
present in this chapter includes only one production choice and one environmental good, 
but it is more broadly applicable to multiple goods and multiple ecosystem services. This 
chapter also shows how using geospatial data can increase the policy relevance of an 
analysis. For example, instead of claiming that tropical forests are in general very 
valuable, using geospatial data allows for the more precise claim that this specific 10 
kilometer patch of forest is better kept as forest than cultivated. Spatially explicit 
information like this can help construct more specific policies, such as food-for-carbon 
swaps or identifying which parcels ought to be protected first given a limited 
conservation budget. 
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Chapter two presents a microeconomic model of spatial foraging that addresses how 
humans gather goods on a spatially heterogeneous landscape when transport costs are 
non-negligible. The general problem of foraging arises when multiple agents located in 
space compete for resources that are characterized by their location. I use agent-based 
simulation methods to account for agents that must move over the landscape subject to 
terrain and road networks, depletion by rival agents and spatial heterogeneity with a large 
number of agents (10 million). The model is applicable to several topics in environmental 
economics, including fuelwood collection and fisheries management, but also more 
general economic topics such as housing, employment search, transportation, pollution 
and urban economics.  
Another contribution of chapter two is that it makes several methodological advances that 
allow for spatially-explicit agent-based simulation on extremely large systems. These 
advances are of two types: first, I present data creation methods that allow for high 
resolution data to be created globally, relying on satellite-derived data products and 
spatial downscaling techniques to estimate environmental and social indicators, such as 
population density or spatially defined wages. Second, I identify computational methods 
(and implement them in a software application) that allows for fast calculation of agent 
interactions and movement of space. I discuss the data storage types necessary for this 
along with a method of vectorizing the calculations to enable computation of extremely 
large systems (with as many as 10 billion agents).  
Chapter two concludes an application of the spatial foraging model in which I assess how 
villagers in Tanzania gather firewood from forests. Firewood collection is a useful 
example because the need for a spatially explicit model is clear. Transportation costs of 
firewood are very high relative to their value and firewood in almost always collected by 
agents foraging for their own consumption. For instance, Fabe and Grote (2013) report 
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that 97.5% of household in Tanzania use firewood as their main fuel, but only 13% of 
firewood is purchased. I define behavior rules in the simulation based on a 
microeconomic agricultural household production model (Singh et al. 1986, Bardhan and 
Udry 1999) apply them to high-resolution geospatial data for Tanzania. I iteratively 
simulate individual agents’ foraging actions and observe the value of firewood obtained. 
The estimates obtained from this method match existing estimates of firewood collection 
while providing more detail about where the firewood is collected. 
The empirical application presented in chapter two is useful to practitioners of ecosystem 
serve estimation. Calculating the ecosystem service value of non-timber forest products 
(NTFPs) has been difficult in practice due to computational and theoretical problems. 
Existing estimation approaches identify the abundance of NTFPs on different forest types 
but do not explicitly state how agents gather the firewood. The approach I use accounts 
for how these gathering decisions interact with the abundance of NTFPs to determine the 
ecosystem service value. 
The final chapter in this thesis presents a theoretical model that that incorporates 
reciprocity in a utility maximization model to analyze common-property resource 
dilemmas. This model, which I refer to as the commons reciprocity utility model, allows 
agents to make interpersonal comparisons of utility in order to reward cooperators and 
punish detractors. Extending traditional utility theory in this way is useful to describe the 
wide-spread observation that individual economic agents do not always free-ride and do 
not always fall for the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990). Although 
this chapter is primarily focused on theory, I provide two environmental examples to 
illustrate how it can be applied (including full details in Appendix 2). First, I discuss how 
international negotiations on climate change can be modeled in this framework by 
describing each nations’ decisions to meet their emissions abatement targets in reciprocal 
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terms. Specifically, nations will reward other nations who do meet their abatement goals 
and will punish those who do not. I provide a numerical example of this situation that 
shows increased levels of abatement, higher than the prediction of strong free-riding. 
Second, I apply the commons reciprocity utility model to a forest commons to explore 
how agents’ decisions to engage in sustainable forestry or to clear-cut the forest depends 
on the reciprocal relationships of nearby agents. This example is preliminary, but shows 
how the model can be applied to the agent-based simulation techniques introduced in 
chapter two.   
At the deepest level, the goal of this thesis is not to present a complex system of models, 
but is to answer the question of “how ought we live?” As humans harness an ever-greater 
portion of available energy and focus it into ever-more complex arrangements, the 
question of understanding our place in our environment grows more challenging. It 
requires modeling economic behavior in conjunction with the geospatial landscape on 
which we act. It is my hope that the methods presented here help condense the nebulous 
connections among economic and ecological systems into useful bits of truth.  
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Abstract 
Feeding a growing and increasingly affluent world will require expanded agricultural 
production, which may require converting grasslands and forests into cropland.  Such 
conversions can reduce carbon storage, habitat provision, and other ecosystem services, 
presenting difficult societal tradeoffs.  In this paper we use spatially-explicit data on 
agricultural productivity and carbon storage in a global optimization procedure to find 
where agricultural extensification should occur to meet growing demand for food while 
minimizing carbon emissions from land-use change.  Optimal extensification saves 
approximately 6 billion metric tons of carbon compared to a business-as-usual (BAU) 
approach with a value of $1.06 trillion (2012 U.S. dollars) using recent estimates of the 
social cost of carbon.  This type of spatially-explicit geospatial optimization can be 
expanded to include other ecosystem services and other industries to analyze how to 
minimize conflicts between economic development and environmental sustainability.   
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Introduction 
One of the primary challenges of the 21st century will be to meet growing demand for 
agricultural output while preserving essential ecosystem processes on which both long-
term agricultural production and human well-being depend. Growing demand for food, 
feed, fuel, and fiber has led to conversion of natural grasslands and forests and reduced 
the flows of many important non-marketed ecosystem services, such as carbon storage, 
water filtration, and habitat provision (MA 2005). In the tropics, which are especially 
important for carbon storage and habitat for biodiversity, 55% of new agricultural land 
came from conversion of forests (Gibbs et al. 2010). Agriculture is responsible for 92% 
of the annual global water footprint (Fallenmark 2003; Hoekstra et al. 2012) and uses 
90% of rock phosphate. Despite this, nearly one billion people are food insecure, 
meaning they regularly fail to consume enough calories to lead an active healthy life 
(FAO 2012). Due to rising population and incomes, the FAO projects global food 
demand from to 2000 to 2050 to grow by approximately 70% (Alexandratos and 
Bruinsma 2012), while others have projected as much as 100-110% (Tilman et al. 2011).  
Agricultural production can be increased through intensification (higher yields with more 
fertilizer, pesticide and water inputs, multiple cropping, shorter fallow periods and 
improved seed varieties) and extensification (expanding on to more hectares). 
Intensification is expected to play the major role in meeting expanded demand. FAO 
forecasts that 80% of the future increase in global agricultural production will be met by 
intensification (70% in developing countries) (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012, p. 126). 
It is possible in biophysical terms that all of the increase in demand could be met by 
intensification, especially through closing “yield gaps” between high productivity regions 
(e.g., North America) and low ones (e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa) (Foley et al. 2011). Others 
argue that intensification has already brought us to “peak farmland,” and that we can 
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begin returning land to a natural state (Ausubel et al. 2012). However, numerous social, 
political and economic constraints make it unlikely that all of the increase in demand will 
be met through intensification. Low yield regions often suffer from political instability, 
lack of infrastructure, and the inability of poor farmers to invest in fertilizers, equipment 
and other inputs, all of which constrain intensification. Moreover, the rate of increase in 
crop yields has been declining. While the average annual increase in global yields 
between 1961-2007 was 2.92% for wheat, 1.91% for rice, and 2.47% for maize, the FAO 
predicts yield increases of only 0.86% for wheat, 0.63% for rice, and 0.83% for maize 
between 2005/2007 and 2050 (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012, p.106). Climate change 
may also reduce future yields (Lobell et al. 2011, Schlenker and Roberts 2009). Even 
when it is possible to intensify, it may be more profitable for farmers to extensify instead.   
In this paper we use geospatial optimization techniques to identify where extensification 
should occur globally to minimize the negative impacts of extensification on the 
provision of ecosystem services.  We illustrate the approach with an analysis of tradeoffs 
between extensification and carbon storage because we have readily available global data 
on carbon. The general approach can be extended to include other forms of natural capital 
or ecosystem services with the main constraint being the availability of suitable global 
data. Our results show that optimal extensification, taking into account both food 
production and carbon storage, preserves dramatically more carbon storage than 
business-as-usual (BAU) extensification scenarios.  
Prior spatially-explicit studies analyze tradeoffs between agricultural production and 
multiple ecosystem services at local or regional scales (e.g. Egoh et al. 2008, Goldstein et 
al. 2012, Nelson et al. 2008, 2009, Polasky et al. 2008, 2011), or national scales (Ando et 
al. 1998, Bateman et al. 2013, Lawler et al. 2013). Fewer studies analyze spatially-
explicit tradeoffs globally (Nelson et al. 2010, West et al. 2010). We extend the West et 
al. (2010) global analysis of tradeoffs between crop production and carbon storage by 
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using an optimization approach capable of estimating the maximum possible amount of 
carbon stored consistent with increased crop demand. We then value the increased 
storage using estimates of the social cost of carbon.  In addition, we translate production 
of 175 different crops into production of consumable calories rather than utilizing dry 
harvest weight.  Our work provides a spatially-explicit counterpart to global agricultural 
analyses using national level data (e.g. Hertel and Warren 1999, Taheripour et al. 2007, 
Hubert et al. 2009, Rosegrant et al. 2001, 2008, 2009).  
We use global high-resolution spatial data for 5x5 minute grid-cells (approximately 
10x10km near the equator) on crop cultivation (Monfreda et al. 2008; Ramankutty et al. 
2008) and carbon storage (Ruesch and Gibbs 2008) to identify and locate the tradeoffs 
between crop cultivation and carbon storage. We derive a biophysical indicator of crop 
advantage (𝐶𝐴) by calculating the ratio of total calories produced to the loss of carbon 
stored for each grid-cell with extensification: 𝐶𝐴 =
𝐶𝑌
Δ𝐶
 where 𝐶𝑌 represents caloric yield 
per grid-cell aggregated over 175 crops using the current mix of crops grown (Monfreda 
et al. 2008), and Δ𝐶 is the tons of carbon storage lost (including aboveground, 
belowground and soil carbon) per grid-cell when a cell is converted from grassland or 
forest into cropland. To calculate carbon storage loss per unit area, we compare carbon 
storage in potential natural vegetation to carbon storage in crops. Carbon storage in 
potential natural vegetation and the methods for calculating crop carbon are from West et 
al. (2010) (see Methods and Supporting Information for details).   
We use the 𝐶𝐴 score for grid-cells to minimize the loss of carbon storage while meeting 
increased food demand.  The global optimization routine ranks all grid-cells by crop 
advantage (𝐶𝐴) and extensifies crop production in the cell with the highest 𝐶𝐴 score 
subject to constraints on feasibility of extensification. We continue to extensify in the 
highest ranked remaining cell until future food needs are met (see Methods and 
Supporting Information for details).  
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We limit where cultivation can expand by excluding grid-cells in which less than 5% or 
over 95% of the area is cultivated. Grid-cells above 95% are assumed to be fully utilized 
for crop production at present. Grid-cells below 5% typically include areas not suited to 
crop production such as deserts without irrigation, high altitude areas, latitudes too far 
north or south to grow crops, and protected natural areas. Areas such as the Amazon or 
Congo Basin have grid-cells that would be productive but currently have no observed 
cultivation due to lack of infrastructure, access to markets or other factors. However, 
these areas are extremely rich in carbon and therefore have low 𝐶𝐴. We ran sensitivity 
analyses that allowed expansion into these cells, but they were not chosen for crop 
production by our optimization routine.  
In grid-cells between 5% and 95% cultivation, we increase the proportion cultivated 
according to the following rules. If the current proportion cultivated is less than 15%, we 
extensify by a factor of 4. Otherwise, we close 75% of the gap between current 
cultivation and 95% cultivation. The reason we do this is because we lack spatial 
resolution to reflect heterogeneity within the grid-cell. Even in grid cells where the land 
is highly productive and generates high crop yields, there will be portions of the grid-cell 
that have steep slopes, poor soil, or are developed land, and therefore are unsuitable for 
crop expansion. The Supplemental Information provides an example of how this type of 
spatial heterogeneity could limit extensification on an example grid-cell. Our analysis 
assumes the mix of crops chosen on each grid-cell will stay constant into the future. We 
make this assumption both to avoid data and computation problems in calculating crop-
specific effects, but also because our analysis is focused on the general tradeoff between 
agricultural production and carbon storage. In the supplement, we provide results from 
our sensitivity analysis that tests these assumptions. 
The results of this optimization procedure are compared to a business-as-usual (BAU) 
simulation. We define BAU as increasing the share cultivated of each grid-cell by the 
  
 11 
 
percent necessary to meet increased food demand. BAU increases are subject to the same 
feasibility constraints and limits as in the optimal simulation but ignore carbon storage. 
We explore different definitions of BAU in the Supporting Information.  
We focus our analysis on a future scenario in which we must produce 100% more 
calories than in 2000 (in line with estimates from Tilman et al. 2011) with 25% coming 
from extensification and 75% coming from intensification gains. We also analyzed 
changes in overall demand for crops and the proportion of increased production coming 
from extensification versus intensification (see Supporting Information).   
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Results 
We identify areas with the largest crop advantage (Fig. 1.1).  Grid-cells with the highest 
𝐶𝐴 score produce 300,000 calories per ton of carbon storage lost with crop expansion. 
Areas that are currently heavily farmed, including the Corn Belt of the U.S. Midwest, 
parts of Western Europe, the Nile Valley, the Ganges River Plain, and much of eastern 
China, have very high 𝐶𝐴 values.  Much of the tropics have relatively low 𝐶𝐴 both 
because of low crop yields and high carbon storage values. Areas with no color have no 
observed cultivation. 
 
Figure 1.1: Crop Advantage (CA). Ratio of aggregate calories produced divided by carbon 
storage on each 5x5 minute grid-cell. Red values indicate areas where crop cultivation is 
comparatively advantaged over carbon storage. 
Crop Advantage (calories per ton of carbon storage) 
  0                                                               300,000                                                 500,000 
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We then identify which grid-cells are optimal for extensification to meet expanding 
demand for crops while conserving as much carbon storage as possible.  We compare the 
optimal solution with the BAU solution to highlight areas in which it is optimal to 
concentrate agricultural expansion (Fig. 1.2). Many areas with the highest 𝐶𝐴 values are 
already heavily cultivated and have little available land for further extensification.  In the 
optimal solution, extensification increases at the edges of currently intensively farmed 
areas.  The optimal solution has greater extensification on the edges of the U.S. Corn 
Belt, parts of Western Europe and eastern China.  The center of the U.S. Corn Belt, the 
Nile River Valley and much of the Ganges River Plain are little changed because little 
land is still available for extensification.   
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Parts of Eastern Europe, the Ukraine, Russia, and several pockets in Southeast Asia are 
extensified more heavily in the optimal solution than in BAU. Much less extensification 
occurs in the Philippines, Indonesia, Southern India, parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Central America where crop advantage (𝐶𝐴) is low.  
An advantage of our geospatial optimization approach is that it can assess land-use 
changes at many levels of aggregation from the global scale down to individual 5x5 
minute grid-cells. To illustrate more detailed regional patterns, we show 𝐶𝐴 and optimal 
extensification for two specific regions: the U.S. Corn Belt and Southeast Asia (Fig. 1.3). 
Figure 1.2: Comparison of extensification in the optimal solution versus BAU. Both the optimal and 
the BAU simulation produce 100% more calories and assume 25% of the calories come from 
extensification. Blue and green shading indicate areas where less extensification would occur under the 
optimal solution compared to BAU.  Red and yellow shading indicates areas where more extensification 
would occur under the optimal solution compared to BAU. 
Proportion of grid-cell preserved from extensification 
  -0.5                                                               0                                                                  0.5 
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At higher resolutions, we see in more detail that optimal extensification occurs along the 
edges of currently intensively cropped areas in the  U.S. Corn Belt and several rich river 
valleys in Southeast Asia, such as the Mekong Delta and Red River in Vietnam, the 
Irriwaddy River Basin in Myanmar, and the Chao Phraya River Basin in Thailand. 
Conversely, fewer new hectares are cultivated and more carbon is stored in most other 
areas in the optimal solution compared to BAU. These are areas where soils are less 
productive or the topography is less suited to cropping.  
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Figure 1.3: Crop advantage and extensification in optimal and BAU simulations for the U.S. Corn 
Belt (left) and S.E. Asia (right). Fig. 3a and 3b: Crop Advantage. Fig. 3c and 3d:  Difference in 
extensification in optimal versus BAU simulations. 
 
Crop Advantage (calories per ton of carbon storage) 
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By concentrating extensification in areas with high crop advantage, much more carbon 
storage occurs under the optimal solution as compared to BAU extensification. Large 
amounts of carbon storage are preserved in Indonesia and other parts of South East Asia, 
India, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central America. Areas with greater extensification under 
the optimal solution show reduced carbon storage, but the losses are far less than the 
gains elsewhere (see Supporting Information for detailed comparison). On a global level, 
optimal extensification results in preserving 5.89 billion metric tons of carbon compared 
to BAU. This figure rises if more demand must be met through extensification. For 
example, with 50% of demand met through extensification, optimization results in 12.08 
billion metric tons of carbon saved (see Supporting Information). 
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Economic Valuation 
Increasing carbon storage in terrestrial systems can reduce the amount of atmospheric 
𝐶𝑂2 and potentially reduce damages from climate change.  Using results of a survey of 
232 published estimates of the social cost of carbon for different discount rates (Tol 
Figure 1.4: Net Carbon Storage Change. Tons carbon storage preserved per grid-cell under optimal 
solution versus under BAU. Blue and green indicate areas where larger amounts of carbon storage occur 
under the optimal solution versus BAU while yellow indicates that less carbon is stored under the optimal 
solution (areas of greater extensification).  
  Net Carbon Storage Change (tons per grid-cell) 
  -15,000                                                         0                                                           15,000 
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2009), we find that the value of the additional carbon stored in the optimal versus the 
BAU scenario ranges from $0.44 trillion to $1.30 trillion in 2012 U.S. Dollars (Table 
1.1).  
Table 1.1: Value of Carbon Storage Saved while Producing 100% more Calories 
Pure Rate of Time 
Preference 
0%  1%  3%  
Social Cost of Carbon (2012 
dollars) 
$221  $181  $75 
Value Saved in Base 
Scenario  
(in trillions 2012 dollars)  
$1.30 $1.06 $0.44 
Values for the social cost of carbon are the mean value for the fitted distribution in 
Tol (2009), adjusted to U.S. $2012.    
 
Discussion 
Given the large projected increases in demand for agricultural crops, it is likely that at 
least some of this increase will have to be met by expanding the amount of land devoted 
to agricultural production.  Agricultural extensification comes at the expense of natural 
habitats (forests and grasslands) that provide carbon storage and many other ecosystem 
services.  In this paper we show that by finding the best locations to extensify and the 
best locations to conserve natural habitats, we can meet increased crop demand while 
maintaining far higher levels of carbon storage than following a business-as-usual 
expansion.  To minimize the loss of stored carbon with extensification, the expansion of 
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cultivated hectares should be concentrated on the extensive margin of areas that are 
currently heavily cultivated, as these areas tend to have the highest crop advantage (i.e. 
the greatest increase in crop production per unit loss of stored carbon). Following the 
optimal strategy would conserve an estimated 5.89 billion metric tons of carbon in natural 
environments by 2050, with an estimated social value of $1.06 trillion at $181/ton C, 
compared to a business-as-usual scenario.  
In this paper, we considered only agricultural extensification and one form of natural 
capital, carbon storage, but the optimization principles we employed are general and can 
be extended to include multiple types of natural capital and ecosystem services, as well as 
considerations of agricultural intensification.  Modeling the tradeoffs from intensification 
requires estimating the increase in yield with intensification and the impact on natural 
capital and ecosystem services. For example, how does increased application of nitrogen 
fertilizer affect yields, water quality, and greenhouse gas emissions? Modeling 
approaches for inclusion of multiple ecosystem services has advanced rapidly over the 
past few years (Kareiva et al. 2011).  Analysis of the impact of land-use choices to 
maximize a bundle of ecosystem services has been done at regional (e.g., Goldstein 2012) 
and national scales (e.g., Bateman et al. 2013). To date, lack of consistent global data sets 
has hindered application of high-resolution analysis at global scales.  But work on global 
data sets also is advancing rapidly (e.g., Mueller et al. 2012). Our approach could be 
expanded to incorporate other data sets on ecosystem services and integrated with models 
such as InVEST (Natural Capital Project 2013) that calculate estimates of the provision 
of a number of ecosystem services as a function of land use and land management 
choices. In general, it should be possible to solve for the combination of optimal choices 
of extensification and intensification to find how best to increase agricultural production 
while maintaining the highest valued bundle of ecosystem services.  Doing so would 
require information on grid-cell costs of intensification as well as the implicit values that 
society places on the relative importance of various ecosystem services.  If a broader 
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array of ecosystem services and a broader set of actions (intensification and 
extensification) are analyzed, it is likely that the total social value from optimization 
compared to BAU would be many times greater than found here. 
This analysis makes a number of assumptions about the rate of growth in future demand 
for crops and the proportion that can be met by intensification and extensification, as well 
as how much extensification can occur in various grid cells due to sub-grid-cell 
heterogeneity. Each of these assumptions can be altered and the optimization recalculated 
(we illustrate the effect of changes in many of these assumptions in the Supporting 
Information). Moreover, our analysis does not model how optimal extensification choices 
depend on broader economic factors such as transport systems and trade barriers. Our 
approach is, however, easily able to incorporate such complexities by defining additional 
scenarios or constraints for analysis. Even without explicit inclusion of economic factors 
such as these, our model does implicitly account for them because the observed 
production data we used reflect agent decisions based on transport, trade and other such 
factors. Additionally, future climate change will likely influence yields and the provision 
of other ecosystem services and change the optimization results. Each of these changes 
will affect the quantitative results but not the overall conclusion of the importance of 
optimizing extensification choices. 
Nonetheless, showing what is possible and actually achieving it are not the same thing.  
Like West et al. (2010), Foley et al. (2011), and others, this paper shows what is feasible 
in biophysical terms. We show how careful consideration of both carbon storage and crop 
yield can maximize carbon storage while meeting agricultural production goals, subject 
to assumptions about sub-grid-cell heterogeneity that may limit extensification options.  
Moving closer to desirable outcomes—ones closer to the frontier—requires attention to 
institutional, political, social and economic factors, because billions of people must 
change what they are doing. These changes will require recognition by political leaders 
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and the general public of the value of carbon storage (and other ecosystem services). 
Otherwise, there will be little push for carbon policies such as establishing a price for 
carbon storage, and therefore less incentive for landowners to incorporate carbon or value 
of other ecosystem services into their decision-making.  Without this, we are likely to see 
a trajectory much closer to business-as-usual than the optimal path.   
As an example of national policy redirection, Brazil has incorporated the value of 
preventing deforestation in the Amazon and elsewhere into its national Forest Code. The 
rate of deforestation in Brazil has been reduced by 83% since 2004 (Tollefson 2013). 
This reduction was achieved primarily by the creation of new protected zones and stricter 
enforcement of land-use regulations. Our analysis can help build on such successes by 
more precisely identifying areas that are good candidates for protected status. 
Methods 
Defining Crop Advantage 
The crop advantage measure for each grid cell is defined as the marginal benefit of 
extensifying land in different locations and is defined for each 5’ by 5’ grid-cell with 
geospatial coordinates (𝑥, 𝑦), as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑥𝑦 =
𝐶𝑌𝑥𝑦
Δ𝐶𝑥𝑦
                                                    (1) 
where  𝐶𝑌𝑥𝑦 is the per-hectare calorie yield in each grid-cell and Δ𝐶𝑥𝑦 is the per-hectare 
carbon storage loss that would occur if the grid-cell was converted from forest or 
grassland to cultivation. 𝐶𝑌𝑥𝑦 was calculated by combining data from the EarthStat 
dataset (Ramankutty et al. 2008, Monfreda et al. 2008) with FAOSTAT (2013) values on 
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caloric content of each food group. We calculated the per-hectare calorie yield of each 
xy-th grid-cell, 𝐶𝑌𝑥𝑦 as: 
𝐶𝑌𝑥𝑦 =∑𝑌𝑖𝑥𝑦 ∗ 𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑦 ∗ 𝐶𝑖                                    (2)
175
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑥𝑦 is the dry weight in tons per hectare of the i-th crop, 𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑦 is the fraction of 
crop area planted to crop i, and 𝐶𝑖 is the caloric content of the i-th crop per ton. 𝐶𝑖 is 
calculated as: 
𝐶𝑖 = (
𝑆𝑖 ∗ 365
𝑄𝑖
)                                             (3) 
where 𝑆𝑖 is the variable from FAOSTAT’s Food Balance Sheet dataset named “Food 
supply (kcal/capita/day)” and 𝑄𝑖 is FAOSTAT’s “Food supply  quantity (kg/capita/yr)”. 
Finally, we increase 𝐶𝑌𝑥𝑦 on each grid-cell according to our assumption of how much 
intensification will increase yields. This process created a gridded map of worldwide per-
hectare calorie yield. We calculated per-grid-cell calorie yield by multiplying the per-
hectare calorie yield by the amount of hectares present in each grid-cell, which we used 
for calculating aggregate calorie production. When summed globally, per-grid-cell 
calorie yield matches the FAO’s estimate of total caloric production.  
To calculate the change in carbon storage (Δ𝐶𝑥𝑦) with extensification, we use the method 
from West et al. (2010). We subtract the amount of carbon storage (aboveground and 
belowground) in potential natural vegetation (𝑃𝑁𝑉𝐶𝑥𝑦) and one-quarter of the soil carbon 
associated with potential natural vegetation (𝑆𝐶𝑥𝑦) from crop carbon (𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑦) that would 
exist on the grid-cell if it was fully extensified:  
Δ𝐶𝑥𝑦 = 𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑦 − 𝑃𝑁𝑉𝐶𝑥𝑦 − .25 (𝑆𝐶𝑥𝑦)                       (4) 
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Data on potential natural vegetation carbon comes from West et al. (2010), which used 
carbon values from the tier 1 methodology of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (Ruesch and Gibbs 2008), applied to potential natural vegetation data 
(Ramankutty and Foley 1999).  To estimate soil carbon loss, we used gridded data on 
global soil organic carbon density (measured as kg Carbon/m2 to a depth of 1 meter) 
from IGBP (1998) interpolated to match the resolution of the data from Monfreda et al. 
(2008) and Ramankutty et al. (2008).  
To calculate the carbon stored in each of the 175 crops, we assumed crop carbon storage 
of annual herbaceous crops is equal to their annual net primary productivity (West et al. 
2010), calculated as: 
𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑦𝑖 =
𝐷𝐹𝑖 ∗ 𝐶 ∗ 𝑌𝑖𝑥𝑦
𝐻𝐼𝑖 ∗  𝑅𝑖
                             (5) 
Where 𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑦𝑖is the crop carbon of the i-th crop on the xy-th grid-cell, 𝑌𝑖𝑥𝑦 is the yield of 
the i-th crop on that cell, 𝐷𝐹𝑖  is the proportion of dry matter of the yield for crop i, C is 
the carbon content of dry matter (0.45 g C per g dry matter), 𝐻𝐼𝑖is the proportion of 
aboveground biological yield that is economically valued for crop i, and 𝑅𝑖 indicates the 
proportion of the i-th crop that is belowground biomass. Carbon stocks in woody crops 
was calculated as in Gibbs et al. (2008). Summation over each of the 175 crops gives 𝐶𝑥𝑦, 
the total carbon that that would be stored in the grid-cell’s crop cover if the grid-cell was 
fully converted to cultivation (assuming the same proportional crop mix as in 2000). 
Finally, we converted Δ𝐶𝑥𝑦 to be the change in carbon per hectare extensified. 
Assuming that annual NPP is equal to a crop’s biomass likely overstates the amount of 
stored carbon in crops because the biomass only stored carbon part of the year. In the 
context of identifying which areas are better left natural, this assumption makes our 
conclusions and estimation of saved carbon conservative. Accounting for crop carbon, 
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however, has very a very small impact on the overall results because the amount of 
carbon able to be stored in crops is much less than the amount of natural carbon storage 
in most locations.  
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Chapter 2: Agents on a Landscape: Simulating Interactions in 
Economic and Ecological Systems 
Introduction 
Understanding how human behavior affects ecosystems, and vice-versa, requires 
consideration of spatial heterogeneity. Models of human behavior in economics, 
however, are not easily applied to situations with many heterogeneous locations and a 
large number of individuals. Non-spatial approaches give powerful insight into human 
behavior on a broad set of topics, such as modeling financial markets or intellectual 
property, but can fail when spatial aspects are a key part of the phenomenon in question. 
Environmental problems, for example, often require an explicitly spatial approach to 
understand because environmental impacts occur at a particular place.  
In this chapter, I present a model that uses agent-based simulation to identify how 
individuals act on a heterogeneous landscape to gather spatially-defined goods. I consider 
the case where both agents and goods are defined by high-resolution, gridded spatial data, 
and where agents must move over a non-uniform landscape characterized by terrain and 
road networks to gather the goods. In this context, agent decisions depend on the 
configuration of the landscape, resulting in divergent behavior even at extremely small 
spatial resolutions (such 500 meters in the data I use). To account for this, I present a 
method that uses high resolution data and simulation with many (millions) agents, all of 
which have different opportunities and outcomes depending on their specific location on 
the landscape at each moment in time. Modeling this level of complexity results in a 
system of equations that is difficult to solve (even with numeric solution, this level of 
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complexity often cannot be solve with current computing power and existing solution 
methods). Thus, I also present computational methods capable of handling this modeling 
environment by using efficient computation. 
I root the agent-based simulation in this chapter on microeconomic theory by deriving 
behavior rules from the production and utility maximization decisions individuals make 
in a household production model (such as in Bardhan and Udry, 1999). However, each of 
the agents in the simulation are allowed to have different parameters on their production 
function, determined both by their physical proximity to the gathered good, but also by 
the depletion of that good from nearby agents.  
I illustrate the general foraging model with an application that uses data on how villagers 
in Tanzania collect firewood from forests. Careful identification of location is particularly 
important to understanding firewood collection decisions of rural households in 
Tanzania. Firewood in Tanzania is consumed by 97.5% of household, yet only 13% of 
firewood is purchased (Fabe and Grote 2013). The majority of firewood is supplied by 
subsistence foraging behavior and is rarely bought or sold on the market. Additionally, as 
will be discussed in the data section, collection of firewood is very time-consuming, and 
thus it is important to consider the opportunity costs of time spent foraging. The primary 
reason there does not exist a complete market for firewood is that firewood has very low 
value per kilogram and thus high transport costs make it uneconomical to transport very 
far to reach markets. 
To describe and apply the model, this chapter begins by describing the many existing 
approaches to modelling spatially-explicit behavior and how the model in this chapter 
builds on these approaches. Second, I will describe the general modeling framework, 
including how I define the agent, the passage of time, behavior rules and the definition of 
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equilibrium in this type of model. Third, I will discuss the data I use for the empirical 
application of the model with emphasis on how data can be created for any location on 
the globe. Fourth, I describe particular methodological approaches I used to make the 
simulation computationally feasible with many agents and high resolution. Finally, I 
conclude by showing detailed results on foraging behavior in Tanzania, along with 
analysis of alternate policies and consideration of how the results are sensitive to 
modeling parameters. In addition to the work presented in this chapter, I include an 
extensive supplemental methods section in Appendix 3. This appendix formally defines 
the mathematical notation I use to describe utility-maximizing agents that move over a 
network of grid-cells. Additionally, I discuss in more depth the algorithms I used to 
calculate optimal travel routes and other computationally intense aspects of the 
simulation.  
Existing Literature and Contribution 
This chapter builds on a broad base of existing work, including literature on spatial 
competition of firms, urban and regional economics and agent-based economics (along 
with their applications in ecology, economics, geography and land-use change modeling). 
One of the first analyses of economic behavior with consideration of explicit space is the 
Hotelling model of spatial competition (Hotelling 1929). Hotelling analyzed the strategic 
interaction of firms when they choose a location in linear space and when their revenue is 
based on their relative closeness to consumers. Many subsequent analyses made 
important extensions on Hotelling’s modeling, including different types of negotiation 
models (Hamilton et al. 1989), agglomeration (Gabszewicz and Thisse 1986; Gupta et al. 
1997) and transportation costs with non-convexity (Stahl 1982). These analyses 
incorporate microeconomic theory into space-based conceptions of competition, which is 
a fundamental aspect of this chapter. More generally, Hotellings’ and subsequent work 
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provides a theoretical basis for understanding economic behavior in which the location of 
agents can be endogenous and affects the agents’ choices. 
Analyses in urban economics that identify how production decisions are affected by 
proximity to spatially defined goods (or other spatial aspects, such as information 
externalities) provide a more direct theoretical basis for this chapter. The seminal 
publications in urban economics are Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), Mills (1972), Anas et 
al. (1998), which are themselves based on the von Thunen’s (1826) central place theory. 
Closely related research in economic geography also considers location while considering 
the connections between cities, regions and international trade (Krugman 1998; Fujita et 
al. 2001; Fujita and Krugman 2004).  
A subset of these literatures that is particularly relevant to this chapter addresses the value 
of open space and how open space arises in different spatial configurations. Specifically, 
Yang and Fujita (1983) model the formation green-belts around cities, while Anderson 
and West (2006) consider how this affects residential property values. Recent analyses 
along these lines typically employ sorting models (as in Klaiber and Phaneuf 2009) and 
are solved by maximizing spatially located objective functions subject to constraints 
derived from the search model, employing mathematical optimization techniques (and 
solved in GAMS), such as Tajibaeva et al. (2008, 2014). One advantage of this literature 
is that many analyses are explicitly 2-dimensional in their choice sets. Previous analyses, 
such as Krugman (1995), use 1-dimensional linear descriptions of space. While this 
approach is extremely useful and is simple enough to allow for analytic solutions, it is 
difficult to apply directly the insights from 1-dimensional models to specific policy 
questions, such as green space management.  
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Another subset of urban economics that directly informs my research focuses on land-use 
change. Recent work (Robertson et al. 2007; Irwin 2010; Evans et al., 2011) assesses a 
variety of economic factors that drive land-use change, including how agriculture affects 
land-cover change. Other work in this area directly considers how projected land-use 
changes might impact ecosystem services (Polasky et al. 2011; Lawler et al. 2014), or 
how we can identify the optimal configuration of land-use given tradeoffs between 
development and conservation (Polasky et al. 2008). These models, as well as 
bioeconomic models (Sanchirico and Wilen 1999; Costello and Polasky 2008), are useful 
when describing how human systems and ecological systems interact on a specific 
landscape. 
The solution method I use, agent-based simulation, has been employed before in many 
applications, including many analyses that simulates human behavior in order to predict 
land-use change (Robinson et al. 2007, Filatova et al. 2007; Filatova et al. 2009). I draw 
methods from these  and other publications in ecological modeling and geography on this 
toping, including An et al. (2001, 2005); Berman et al. (2004), Crooks and Castle (2012), 
and Cabrera et al. (2012). 
Agent-based simulation methods have been applied to topics more broad than just land-
use change. Economics has long used agent-based modeling as an approach to 
incorporate heterogeneity or special specificity into models (as reviewed by Tesfatsion 
and Judd, 2006). More recently, Magliocca et al. (2012) construct an agent-based model 
to analyze how suburban development districts and agricultural land owners interact to 
predict which areas will be developed. Some of the newest work utilizes agent-based 
simulation to assess human-ecosystem interactions between hunting and subsistence 
agriculture (Iwamura et al. 2014). One of the best example of an agent-based simulation 
that addresses environmental and economic issues is from Schreinemachers  and Berger 
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(2011). In their work, the present a software package called Mathematical Programming-
based Multi Agent Systems (MP-MAS). These approaches are summarized in Matthews 
et al. (2007). Finally, this chapter is based on literature that has combined many of the 
methods above to simulate how human behavior is affected by the provision of 
ecosytstem services and sustainability (e.g. Berman et al. 2004), including analyses that 
use 2-dimensional gridded data on non-timber forest products (Damania et al. 2005).  
Aside from explicitly spatial models, I also base my analysis on economic models of 
household behavior that allow for individual households to produce their own product, 
which they may consume themselves (such as the agricultural household production 
model of Bardhan and Udry, 1999). 
My work contributes to these literatures by modeling environmental-economic 
interactions that include many heterogeneous agents, spatially-dependent decisions that 
require high-resolution data to specify along with computational and data methods 
necessary to enable this work. I include several methodological approaches that increase 
realism when defining how agents move through space, such as calculating travel routes 
not by distance, but with optimal route-finding algorithms. Additionally, I present several 
methods based on interpolation to create high-resolution demographic data in locations 
where this type of data does not exist. I use a 2-dimensional representation of space that 
both covers a large area (all of Tanzania) and derives its spatial detail from remote-
sensing data sources. Thus, although this work is primarily theoretical, the data used and 
the outputs created (such as those shown in the empirical application) are directly 
relevant to land-use managers and conservation planners. 
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Model Description 
The foraging model I present in this section defines the four elements that comprise my 
agent-based simulation model (additionally, each element is defined formally in 
Appendix 3): the landscape network, the passage of time, the agent and behavior rules. 
This section describes each of these parts of the general model and incorporates examples 
from non-timber forest product (NTFP) collection in Tanzania to illustrate the importance 
of each element. 
The Landscape Network 
The landscape definition I use augments standard data on land-use, land-cover (LULC) 
by combining the data with a travel network and foraged-good regrowth functions on 
each grid-cell. Additionally, the network definition I use allows for connections between 
multiple functional units within the landscape. For example, grid-cells in this framework 
can be defined for sub-state units, such as counties or voting precincts, but also non-
politically defined units such as farms, factories, watersheds, markets or households. In 
the Tanzanian example of the foraging model, each grid-cell is characterized by a travel 
network (defined from road, river, terrain and other inputs) as well as the abundance of 
firewood. 
Network definitions of landscapes similar to this have been used extensively in 
transportation and civil engineering literature (for instance, Rodrigue et al. 2013) or in 
physics applications (Barthelemy 2011). Additionally, air pollution distribution models 
for PM2.5 (WRF/Chem, for instance), use variable grid-cell definitions that can be 
formalized as grid-cell networks as described here. In addition to defining the network, I 
also present (in Appendix 3) a method for normalizing the landscape network into nested 
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matrices to allow for vectorization of computation and efficient computation. Fig. 2.1 
illustrates the definition of grid-cells and their application to a landscape. The image on 
the bottom right of Fig. 2.1 represents a grid-cell network for a farm landscape in Iowa. 
 
Figure 2.1: Example Geospatial Grid-Cell Network 
I define the landscape by 
creating a set of cells (such as 
the cell to the left) connected in 
a network that covers the 
landscape. 
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Two Conceptions of Time 
Throughout this analysis, I refer to the passage of time with two different concepts: the 
iteration step (subscripted 𝑠) and the time period (subscripted 𝑡). One time period 
comprises many iteration steps. The reason for this differentiation is to distinguish 
between the actual passage of time and the iteration method I use to make the simulation 
possible. Within this framework, cells may only change when transitioning from time 𝑡 to 
𝑡 + 1, except as the result of an agent action, (e.g. deforesting the cell or planting a crop) 
while the agent may change between either steps or time periods. An example of a 
change that a cell may make over time without the action of an agent is the regrowth of 
trees in a forest cell.  
Additionally, I define the action order, a list of agents ordered by when they can make an 
action relative to other agents. During each time period, the first agent in the action order 
makes one action in step 𝑠, followed by the second agent in the action order in step 𝑠 + 1. 
This process continues with new steps until the end of the action order list is reach, at 
which point the simulation loops through the full action order list again, repeating until 
no valid agent actions exist.  
Having a time-step smaller than the full time period is necessary to simulate agent 
competition and also is a mechanism to increase fidelity of the simulation (though at the 
cost of computation speed). It is possible that biases arise based on how the action order 
is defined, but in most cases the bias approaches zero as the size of the step decreases. 
For example, if we define an action order in which agents may forage firewood from a 
forest, if we choose a large step size in which each agent is allowed to satisfy their full 
demand on their first action, then the results will be very sensitive to the order in which 
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actions happen. However, we limit the amount an agent can forage during each step to 
ever smaller quantities, the results become less sensitive to the initial ordering. 
I denote these two conceptions of time with sets 𝑆 and 𝑇. Set 𝑆 contains the action order 
and the definition of what may be done within one iteration step. Set T assumes time 
progresses from 𝑡 = 1 to 𝑡 = 𝑇 and includes the full set of what may change between 
time periods (forces exogenous to agent actions, such as forest regrowth).  
The Agent 
The set of agents, 𝐴, is described by an attribute table consisting of a agent identity 
column (unique for each agent) and corresponding columns of agent attributes. This data 
type is different than the cell networks because the agent identity is not tied to a fixed 
location as it is for a cell. Rather, the cell network is a space through which agents move.  
Although agents do not have fixed locations, agent locations and attributes can be 
aggregated, at a given time and step, to create a matrix that describes a static moment 
(this process is at the heart of the computational methods used in the simulation). To be a 
valid agent, 𝑎𝑖∈𝐼, the agent attribute table must denote the agent’s geographic location at 
every time period and iteration step defined by reference to a cell within a valid 
geospatial cell network and steps within the time structure. Additionally, the agent 
attribute table may include additional attributes, such as per-agent demographics, current 
assets, other location references like work location and house location, or relationship 
status with other agents.  
Fig. 2.2 below illustrates the definition of two example agents using the cell network we 
defined above. In the top image of Fig. 2.2, each agent is plotted on top of the 
corresponding grid-cell that defines their location along with the agent ID used in the 
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agent attribute table in the bottom of Fig. 2.2. The example in Fig. 2.2. describes only one 
moment in time because the agents will move through the network and will have agent 
attributes that will change (such as the attribute for how much firewood they are currently 
carrying). 
  
Behavior Rules: Household Production and Utility Maximization 
At each iteration step in each time period, agent actions are determined by a set of 
behavior rules, 𝑅. The simulation approach I use in this section derives behavior rules 
1 
2 
Agents placed 
on cell network 
by location 
Agent attribute table 
Figure 2.2: Agents Defined on a Grid-Cell Network 
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from traditional economic analysis. Specifically, my approach is similar to the 
agricultural household model used extensively in development economics (Singh et al. 
1986, Bardhan and Udry 1999). I allow each agent at each iteration step to choose to 
allocate their labor to leisure, foraging or wage work. I extend the agricultural household 
model by making their marginal gains from forage and wage (and thus also their labor 
choices) depend on their location within the network and the depletion actions of nearby 
rivals.  
I solve the model iteratively, allowing each agent at each iteration step to make their 
utility maximizing choice. Specifically, the agent follows a max-marginal-gain behavior 
rules that specifies how agent considers the marginal gain they would get from expending 
one step’s worth of labor on each of their possible labor choices. The agent then does 
whichever action maximizes this gain. For example, if the marginal gain from foraging is 
higher than from wage work or leisure, then the agent will spend the full simulation step 
foraging (note that simulation steps will be defined sufficiently small such that this 
assumption does not affect the results). If after foraging from one grid-cell the agent still 
has available labor, they may spend it on another action, continuing until the labor they 
have in the current step is depleted.  
Ignoring the per-step decisions for a moment, the choice each agent faces in each full 
time period is depicted in the maximization below. Intuitively, the agent maximizes their 
utility in the time period by choosing to allocate their labor to gathering firewood, to a 
wage generating activity (which generates money to purchase a firewood substitute) or to 
leisure. Their choice is constrained by the foraging production possibilities, a budget 
constraint and the amount of labor they have available to allocate on each activity. 
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max
𝐿
𝑖
𝑔
, 𝐿𝑖
𝑤, 𝐿𝑖
𝑙
𝑢𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝐿𝑖
𝑙) =  𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝛽𝑖
𝑐
𝐿𝑖
𝑙 𝛽𝑖
𝑙
 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜:           𝑔𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖
𝑔|𝑁𝑖, 𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖)                                
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖
𝑔 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑏 − 𝑐𝑖
𝑠 
𝑔𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖
𝑔 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑠 
𝑝𝑏𝑐𝑖
𝑏 = 𝑝𝑤𝐿𝑖
𝑤 + 𝑝𝑠𝑐𝑖
𝑠 
𝐿𝑖
𝑔 + 𝐿𝑖 
𝑤 + 𝐿𝑖
𝑙 ≤ 𝐿 
In this framework, each agent is endowed with labor, 𝐿, which they may allocate to 
gathering a spatially defined good, to wage work and to leisure, 𝐿𝑖
𝑔, 𝐿𝑖
𝑤 , 𝐿𝐼
𝑙  respectively. 
Each agent’s utility function is calibrated with a scalar, 𝛼𝑖, and Cobb-Douglass exponents 
𝛽𝑖
𝑐 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑙 = 1 so that utility is concave in both consumption firewood and in leisure. Each 
agent is able to use labor, 𝐿𝑖
𝑔
, to produce the gathered good, 𝑔𝑖, which is affected by the 
agent’s location in a network, 𝑁𝑖, as well as the gathering actions of other agents, 𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖. 
We see here one of the main ways my approach differs from traditional economics 
insofar as the production function defined is determined by the spatially heterogeneous 
distribution networks unique to each agent and the actions of rival agents to change the 
production function. These components in 𝑓(∙), 𝑁𝑖 and 𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖, will be discussed in more 
depth below. Once produced, the gathered good can either be consumed, 𝑐𝑖
𝑔
, or sold, 𝑐𝑖
𝑠. 
Agents may purchase the gathered good as an alternative or supplement to their gathering 
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behavior, such that total consumption of the gathered good, 𝑐𝑖, is the sum of 𝑐𝑖
𝑔
 and the 
quantity purchased of firewood and firewood substitute, 𝑐𝑖
𝑏. The purchased good is 
bought at price 𝑝𝑓
𝑏 from the money income of the agent, 𝑤𝑖. Income is earned either by 
selling the gathered good at price 𝑝𝑓
𝑠 or working for wages at price 𝑝𝑤.  
I simplify the model further by assuming that agents do not sell any of the firewood they 
have gathered due to transport costs and distance to markets (but I retain that they may 
buy firewood or its substitute), so that 𝑝𝑓
𝑠 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑖
𝑠 = 0. Additionally, assume agents 
spend their full budget each time period and all of the endowed labor is allocated to one 
of the three possible choices. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter (which will 
be expanded in the data section), the assumption that agents do not sell their firewood 
holds quite broadly in Tanzania. With the simplifications above, the problem becomes:  
max
𝐿
𝑖
𝑔
, 𝐿𝑖
𝑤, 𝐿𝑖
𝑙
𝑢𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝐿𝑖
𝑙) =  𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝛽𝑖
𝑐
𝐿𝑖
𝑙 𝛽𝑖
𝑙
 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜:           𝑐𝑖
𝑔 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖
𝑔|𝑁𝑖, 𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖)                                
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖
𝑔|𝑁𝑖, 𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖) + 𝑐𝑖
𝑏 
𝑐𝑖
𝑏 = (
𝑝𝑤
𝑝𝑏
) 𝐿𝑖
𝑤 
𝐿𝑖
𝑔 + 𝐿𝑖 
𝑤 + 𝐿𝑖
𝑙 ≤ 𝐿 
Which simplifies further to: 
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max
𝐿
𝑖
𝑔
, 𝐿𝑖
𝑤, 𝐿𝑖
𝑙
 𝛼𝑖 (𝑓(𝐿𝑖
𝑔|𝑁𝑖, 𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖) + (
𝑝𝑤
𝑝𝑏
) 𝐿𝑖
𝑤)
𝛽𝑖
𝑐
𝐿𝑖
𝑙 𝛽𝑖
𝑙
 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜:           𝐿𝑖
𝑔 + 𝐿𝑖 
𝑤 + 𝐿𝑖
𝑙 ≤ 𝐿 
The full profit function the individual faces combines the wages they receive and the 
firewood they gathered, valued at the price of the firewood substitute: 
Π∗(𝑝𝑤, 𝑝𝑏 , 𝐸𝑖
𝐿) = 𝑝𝑏𝑓(𝐿𝑖
𝑔|𝑁𝑖, 𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖) + 𝑝𝑤𝐿𝑖
𝑤 
Fig. 2.3 below graphs one example agent’s labor allocation choice and specifies an 
example production function, profit function and a utility indifference curve at the 
optimized labor allocation choice. In this particular case, the indiviual forages for the 
majority of their fuel needs (𝑔𝑖
∗) but supplements firewood with purchased fuel (𝑐𝑖
𝑏∗), 
shown as quantities on the vertical axis. The labor decisions made by this agent are 
shown on the horizontal axis. Note that the horizontal axis also plots the negative value of 
leisure so that utility is represented with a flipped indifference curve between the 
gathered good and leisure. 
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This basic model could be solved for equilibrium by taking first order conditions, as in 
the traditional approach. 
I now consider the addition of spatially heterogeneous production and competition. 
Consider first the production decisions an agent faces when on a heterogeneous landscape 
but while temporarily assuming there are no competing agents. Above, I denoted the 
production function as subject to a term 𝑁𝑖 that represents the distribution grid-cell 
network as viewed from the i-th position. Using the network and normalization methods 
discussed earlier, 𝑁𝑖 can also be represented as a set of geospatial grid-cell matrices. Two 
𝑓(𝐿𝑖
𝑔|𝑁𝑖, 𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖) 
Π∗(𝑝𝑤 , 𝑝𝑏 , 𝐸𝑖
𝐿) 
𝑢 𝑖(𝐿𝑖
𝑔 , 𝐿𝑖
𝑤, 𝐿𝑖
𝑙) 𝑔𝑖, 𝑐𝑖 
𝐿𝑖
𝑔, (−𝐿𝑖
𝑙) 
𝑐𝑖
∗ 
𝑔𝑖
∗ 
𝑐𝑖
𝑏∗ 
𝐿𝑖
𝑔∗
 𝐸𝑖
𝐿 
𝐿𝑖
𝑤∗ 𝐿𝑖
𝑙 ∗ 
𝐸𝑖
𝐿 − 𝐿𝑖
𝑙 ∗ 
Figure 2.3: Conceptual Model of Household 
Production and Consumption Decisions 
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key matrices in this set are the firewood abundance matrix and the net-profit matrix. In 
the methods section, I will define precisely how net profit is defined, but for now it is 
useful to simply say that the net-profit depends both on how much firewood is present in 
each grid-cell and also the travel costs incurred getting to that cell from the center of the 
matrix.  
In the upper-right of Fig. 2.4, I show an example net-profit matrix. In this example, there 
is a high-quality forest in the northwest and a lower-quality forest in east-southeast. In 
both cases, the forests have diminishing net profit available on the sides furthest from the 
center of the matrix (the agent’s location) because foraging from these cells will incur 
additional travel costs. When it is the i-th agent’s iteration step, the max-marginal-gain 
behavioral rule discussed above implies the agent will gather from grid-cell 𝑁1,1 where 
the net profit is 6. After a cell has been foraged, assume its remaining value is zero. 
Assume further that the step-size in this example is defined so that an agent may only 
deplete one grid-cell per step. Thus, in this case, the agent gets a marginal value on this 
step equal to 6. This value is plotted in the blue line, which represents the marginal 
product of foraging, and also the orange line, which represents the production function. 
On the agent’s next turn, they will choose to forage either on 𝑁0,1 or 𝑁1,0, will gain a 
marginal value equal to 5, and will increase total production to 11. This process will 
iteratively continue, one action per iteration step, until the agent has no remaining grid-
cells with positive net profit (zero-profit, market clearing conditions will be discussed 
below). 
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The production function described here ignores the non-production activities the agent 
may do. At each iteration step in the full decision framework, the agent chooses to 
allocate labor to 𝐿𝑖
𝑔, 𝐿𝑖
𝑤 or 𝐿𝑖
𝑙 , based on whichever has the highest marginal value. The 
marginal value from 𝐿𝑖
𝑔
 is derived from 𝑁𝑖 as described above, while the marginal values 
from leisure and purchased fuel depend on the shape of the agent’s utility function and 
the prices of wage labor and fuel. Intuitively, given concave production and concave 
utility from leisure, this means in the initial iteration steps of a time period, the agent will 
alternate between producing firewood and enjoying leisure. Eventually, at least in the 
example above, diminishing returns will cause the agent to switch to wage labor for the 
final units of fuel consumed. This process is depicted in Fig. 2.5 where each blue arrow 
indicates the action chosen on the s-th iteration step.  
𝑓(𝐿𝑖
𝑔|𝑁𝑖, 𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖 = ∅) 
𝑔𝑖, 𝑐𝑖 
𝐿𝑖
𝑔, (−𝐿𝑖
𝑙) 
Figure 2.4: Generating a Production Function 
from a Net Profit Geospatial Grid-Cell 
Matrix given no Competition 
𝑁𝑖 = 
𝜕𝑓(𝐿𝑖
𝑔
|𝑁𝑖,𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖= ∅ )
𝜕𝐿
𝑖
𝑔   
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The iterative process by which the agent moves towards the maximized point allows for 
events to happen in between each decision step and agent takes. The main type of inter-
step event I include is depletion of the forest by other agents. The production function 
defined above assumed no competing agents were present, but we can extend the process 
to multiple agents (see Appendix 3).  
Situations in which agents compete with each other may lead the max-marginal-gain 
decision rule to suboptimal allocations. For instance, agent 1 may have predicted that 
agent 2 would want to forage from the contested cell and would thus choose to forage 
there earlier. This type of strategic behavior can easily be included in agent simulation by 
𝑔𝑖, 𝑐𝑖 
𝐿𝑖
𝑔, (−𝐿𝑖
𝑙) 
Figure 2.5: Max-Marginal-Gain Choices 
between Leisure, Production and Wage 
Earning over Multiple Iteration Steps 
𝐸𝑖
𝐿 
1 2 3 4 6 7 8 
𝑢𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝛽𝑖
𝑐
𝐿𝑖
𝑙 𝛽𝑖
𝑙
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using modified decision rules (such as doing the best-response action in a Nash 
equilibrium). In many applications though, this becomes computationally impossible 
when millions of agents are considered simultaneously and does not present large 
deviations from the naïve max-marginal-gain decision rule. Thus, in this project, I 
assume there is no strategic interdependence between agents and instead address the issue 
by comparing base results to sensitivity analyses that do address interdependence.  
Definition of Equilibrium 
The results of this simulation are characterized by inter-temporal and intra-temporal 
equilibria. Because the application used in this chapter focuses on sustainable harvest 
rates, I describe here only the intra-temporal equilibrium, using a conception similar to 
the Ramsey (1928) approach.  
To define equilibrium, first define a zero-profit zones for each agent 𝐵𝑖 =
{𝑁𝑖 ∀ 𝑖 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑖(𝐸𝑖
𝐿|𝑁𝑖, 𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖 = ∅) > 0}.  
The zero-profit boundary 𝐵𝑖 is the set of all grid-cells where the agent has positive net-
profit assuming no other agents deplete the grid-cells and assuming the agent spends their 
entire endowment of labor on foraging. Outside the zero-profit boundary, the agent has 
no profitable cells even in the best circumstances, so ignoring these cells has no impact 
on the outcome.  
An intra-temporal equilibrium is characterized by allocation choices of labor 
(𝐿𝑖
𝑔, 𝐿𝑖
𝑤 , 𝐿𝑖
𝑙) ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 and a geospatial grid-cell matrix of local prices 𝑃𝑘 for each k-th good 
such that each agent satisfies the following conditions: 
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1. There does not exist any grid-cell within the i-th agent’s zero-profit zone 𝐵𝑖 where 
𝑈𝑖(𝑁𝑖(𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡)) > 𝑈𝑖(𝐿𝑖
𝑙).  
2. There does not exist any possible purchase where 𝑈𝑖 ((
𝑝𝑤
𝑝𝑏
) 𝐿𝑖
𝑤) > 𝑈𝑖(𝐿𝑖
𝑙).  
One useful attribute of the agent-based simulation approach to economic analysis is that 
models can easily be extended. Although I have specified a model that is based only on 
one good (produced two ways) and leisure chosen with a single decision rule, it is very 
easy to extend the analysis to include additional goods, additional behavior rules, or a 
very wide set of heterogeneity among agents. The reason this approach is more capable 
of extension than approaches based on constrained optimization is that we are not solving 
equations but rather testing rules. This means we do not have to limit ourselves to models 
with analytic solutions or models that can be approximated by systems on differential 
equations. As long ago as Leibniz in the 17th century, we know that nonlinearity in 
variables leads to a broad set of models to be unsolvable analytically. In the next sections, 
I show how this can be done with data on firewood foraging from Tanzania. 
Data 
The data requirements for agent-based simulation of economic systems and ecosystems 
are considerably higher than for traditional economic analyses. In this section, I describe 
the data sources I used along with several new methods I created to manage the varying 
data needs. First, however, I summaries the overall data needs for the foraging model to 
work in Table 1. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Data Sources 
Data Type Use Data Source 
Land Use, Land Cover 
(LULC) 
Used in many applications, including 
identification of agent locations, 
creation of objective abundance and 
calculation of traversal cost. 
MODIS* 
Spatial Population To use the pixel-agent specification 
described in the methods section, data 
on the per-pixel population is 
necessary. 
AfriPop* 
Traversal Cost Factors I used road networks, river networks, 
land cover, and elevation (converted 
to ruggedness), but other locations 
may require different sets, such as 
political crossings or other transit 
modes. 
OpenStreetProject, 
HydroSHEDS, 
MODIS, Digital 
Elevation Model, 
Ruggedness 
Household Behavior 
and Demographics 
I use local wages as a proxy for 
opportunity cost. Given that wages 
vary considerably within Tanzania, I 
use household survey information 
from the National Panel Survey 
(2008) to construct a wage map. 
Many other household-specific data 
may be used, either for initial 
parameterization or model validation. 
For example, I discuss how I used 
household data on hours spent 
foraging for firewood to validate the 
model. 
Tanzanian 
National Panel 
Survey (NPS) * 
* indicates data source discussed in a separate section. 
 
Satellite Based Data 
Due to the spatial focus of my work, the majority of my data come from remote sensing 
methods, most frequently from the Moderate-resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer 
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(MODIS) instrument on the Terra (EOS AM) and Aqua (EOS OM) satellites from the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (ORNL DAAC, 2011). MODIS 
measures radiation spectral bands from 0.4 to 14.4 micrometers at varying spatial 
resolutions. A very large literature exists to study remote sensing tools like MODIS, for 
instance Justice et al. (1998), Barnes et al. (1998), Lefsky (2010), and Toller et al.  
(2013). Within the large set of MODIS data products, I use the Land Cover Type dataset 
(NASA Data Product MCD12Q12), but future analyses may incorporate additional 
products for burned areas (MCD45A1) vegetation indices (MxD13C1). The raw MODIS 
radiation data are algorithmically categorized into five different classification schemes, of 
which I use the IGBP global vegetation classification scheme (Friedl et al. 2010). Table 2 
presents the IGBP classification system with land cover types and corresponding MODIS 
classification indices. 
Table 2.2: IGBP Land Use, Land Cover Categorization of MODIS Data 
Class IGBP (Type 1) 
0 Water 
1 Evergreen Needleleaf forest 
2 Evergreen Broadleaf forest 
3 Deciduous Needleleaf forest 
4 Deciduous Broadleaf forest 
5 Mixed forest 
6 Closed shrublands 
7 Open shrublands 
8 Woody savannas 
9 Savannas 
10 Grasslands 
11 Permanent wetlands 
12 Croplands 
13 Urban and built-up 
14 Cropland/Natural vegetation mosaic 
15 Snow and ice 
16 Barren or sparsely vegetated 
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254 Unclassified 
255 Fill Value 
 
Using MODIS data is not easy. The datasets are very large, span different time periods 
with different time steps (ranging from minutes to days), are broken into smaller data 
blocks (to avoid memory constraints on computers) that need to be stitched together 
correctly while re-projecting the different spherical projections used in different zones, 
are provided in file types not commonly used in typical GIS applications (HDF format), 
and in their raw form are provided as non-categorized integer values. 
To overcome the challenges discussed above, I used the HDF-EOS To GeoTIFF Tool 
(HEG), provided by NASA to work with MODIS data and other satellite data streams 
(ASTER, MISR, AIRS, and AMSR-E), described in Dwyer and Schmidt (2006). 
Additionally, because the process for using HEG was very time intensive when applied to 
the large set of files I needed, I wrote a python script to automate the process (available 
on request).  
Overcoming the challenges of using MODIS are well worth it because MODIS allows for 
high-frequency time series data from 2000 to the present with high resolution on dozens 
of different variables at a global level. One of the goals of this dissertation is to create a 
method that can easily be replicated in any location, and thus, using a source like MODIS 
is particularly fitting.  
Fig. 2.6 below shows the results of processing the MODIS data for Tanzania while Fig. 7 
presents the same data for a subset near Mount Kilimanjaro.  
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Figure 2.6: MODIS LULC Data Processed for Tanzania 
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Household Survey Data 
Economic and demographic information cannot easily be obtained from satellites, so I 
supplement the remote sensing data with traditional household surveying methods. Data 
from the Tanzanian National Panel Survey (NPS) provides information on wages, hours 
spent collecting firewood and a wide variety of other household- and individual-level 
statistics that can be used to assess other determinants of foraging behavior, such as 
Figure 2.7: MODIS LULC Data Processed near Mount Kilimanjaro 
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opportunity cost. Over 16,000 individuals in nearly 4,000 individuals were included in 
the survey, which asked over 200 questions. Care must be taken when using data from 
the NPS because: 1.) many questions have separate look-up tables for coded responses; 
2.) questions can be specific to the individual, household, firm, or a variety of other 
entities (which presents difficult aggregation issues); and 3.) four different index systems 
were used for different components of the survey. The NPS is especially useful in this 
study because every household has a recorded latitude and longitude location, allowing 
for combination of ecosystem data and economic data in many new ways. Unfortunately, 
In the publically available data these coordinates are obfuscated for privacy reasons by 3 
to 10km and lumped into enumeration area groups, but requests to the World Bank can be 
made, especially for projects that already show results with the obfuscated data. For this 
analysis, I was unable to obtain the private data and so had to use the obfuscated 
coordinates. Because the obfuscation was done randomly, it will introduce greater 
standard errors in predicted relationships but will not produce biased results, but it 
prevents robust validation, as will be discussed in a later section. See Appendix 2 for 
more discussion of the NPS and other data sources. 
Population Data 
I will discuss population interpolation in the methods section of this chapter for situations 
when high resolution data is not available. Fortunately, high resolution data is available 
for Tanzania through the WorldPop project. The methodology uses remote sensing data 
to identify where settlements are located and then allocates population Figures from 
survey information to these settlements (and other land use classes that have positive 
population density). See Gaughan et al. (2013) for more information on this 
methodology. Fig. 2.8 shows the WorldPop population density Figures for Tanzania. 
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Calculation of Wage Surface 
Firewood collection is a time consuming activity. Because firewood can often be 
collected from common property areas, the main input cost is determined by what the 
individual could have done with their time. National wages for Tanzania are not difficult 
to collect, but in the context of firewood collection, national aggregates do not provide 
enough resolution to reflect the extreme heterogeneity of wages across the country. The 
household survey information confirms this story. Unfortunately, the surveys are only 
taken in a few hundred physical locations (after obfuscation, which merges multiple 
Figure 2.8: Population per Grid-Cell from WorldPop 
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observations onto a single point) and thus provide only a sparse data input in which the 
vast majority of grid-cells have no observed wage. To overcome this problem, I present 
and then utilize a method for creating a wage surface from these sparse points. The 
process by which I convert point-based data to data surfaces is useful in a broad set of 
situations in addition to creation of wage surfaces. Although I succeed in applying the 
method to a data-sparse environment, many of the challenges I will discuss below are 
more easily overcome when there are more observation points.   
First, using the reported wage values on the NPS, I plotted the wage points on a sparse 
agent-point raster with the z-value indicating the wage. With this, I used an inverse 
distance weighted interpolation algorithm to create a continuous surface based on the 
household survey data (see Zimmerman et al. 1999 or Mueller et al. 2004 for a discussion 
of different interpolation techniques relevant to this type of problem). This interpolation 
process converts the sparse point data to smooth surfaces where the value of non-
observed grid-cells changes continuously between observed points according to the 
interpolation assumptions chosen. The map on the left of Fig. 2.9 shows the wage surface 
this method created. I apply the information we know about population density per grid-
cell (discussed above) to calculate agent-specific wage figures (shown in the map on the 
right of Fig. 2.9).  
This wage surface is useful because it identifies with more detail how wages, and thus the 
opportunity cost incurred when collecting firewood, vary with geographic location. More 
relevant to the analysis here, this wage surfaces provides a wage value for all grid-cells 
within the country so that we can simulate the behavior of individuals who are not near 
an NPS observation point. A criticism of this approach is to argue that it is not legitimate 
to infer that the wages in grid-cells unobserved by the NPS are systematically related to 
their (inverse weighted) distance from observed cells. I will address this in future work 
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that uses the inverse distance weighted interpolation technique with a multivariate 
regression to capture the non-distance effects. For now, however, it is worth noting that 
the assumption I use is superior to the assumption that there is no geographic component 
to wages (this is the assumption that would implicitly be used if one were to simply use 
national wage averages). Additionally, the contribution I am working to present here is a 
new method for simulating spatial economic activity and that any different set of 
assumptions on wage are consistent with the agent-based approach I use and can readily 
be incorporated into my model. 
 
Literature Values on Foraging Behavior and Firewood Abundance 
One of the most difficult and important aspects of simulating firewood foraging was 
identifying the abundance of firewood available on each grid-cell. Identifying the cubic 
meter yield of each grid-cell in a small subset of Tanzania would constitute an ambitious 
Figure 2.9: Wage Surfaces 
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biology project, so approximations must be made to make nation-wide estimations 
possible. For this task, I survey the literature on land use types in Tanzania and estimate 
values of firewood density for the 16 MODIS land use classes. Additionally, I use 
literature estimates for other parameters in my model and for validation, including 
average consumption Figures, likelihood of purchasing fuel from a market, hours spent 
on foraging and a variety of other factors. 
Firewood consumption in Tanzania has been well studied, including sources as early as 
Fleuret (1978), Berio (1984) and many newer studies. Of particular use to our simulation 
tasks, Berio studied how villagers in the four sub-Saharan Africa region allocated their 
time to household tasks, including wood collection. Berio estimates the weight of 
firewood consumption per person per day at 1.1, 1.0, 1.3 and 1.0 for the four regions 
studied.  
After the studies conducted by Berio, other studies have focused primarily on the 
relationship between firewood and charcoal collection. For instance, Hosier et al. (1993), 
van der Plas (1995) and Johnsen (1999) found that the industry for charcoal creation 
poses large risks of deforestation, but that direct firewood collection rarely poses a threat 
to forests. The reason for the lower threat of firewood collection is that villagers prefer to 
collect dead wood because it is easier to gather and burns better. Charcoal, conversely, 
can be produced using fresh-cut trees and thus does result in deforestation. 
Biran et al. (2004) studied firewood foraging behavior in two sub-Saharan Africa 
locations, which included the Maasai community in Northeastern Tanzania (see Fig. 
2.10) and the area around Lake Malawi National Park (which shares a border with 
Western Tanzania and has very similar conditions). Biran reports that the mean length of 
a wood collection trip in the national part was 241 minutes and was undertaken every 3.8 
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days, resulting in a mean daily collection time of 63 minutes. For the Maasai, conversely, 
reported times again were 10 minutes per day per capita for women and 30 for girls. 
Figure 2.10: Location of Maasai Firewood Collection Study (Berin et al. 2004) 
 
Of the length of a firewood collection trip, only 123 minutes were spent actually in the 
forest, implying that travel to the collection location consumed a significant portion of the 
overall time required. 
Another useful value that Biran presents is the relationship between number of residents 
in a household and the per capita fuel wood consumption Fig. 2.11 shows the relationship 
Biran found. 
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The average household size in Tanzania is approximately six, which means, according to 
Biran’s relationship, the per capita firewood consumption is 12.5 kg/week. Due to 
population growth and other factors, firewood demand in Tanzania has grown since 
Biran’s report. 
Another area of work on this topic comes from Luoga et al. (2000, 2002 and 2004), based 
on previous work from Maliumbwi et al. (1994). This research focuses on the Miombo 
woodlands, in central and eastern Tanzania. This region is especially important because it 
contains very high populations and relies heavily on the surrounding woodlands for non-
timber forest products, but also wood products that require clearing the forest (charcoal 
Figure 2.11: Per capita Firewood Consumption versus Residents per Household 
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and timber). Their work showed that harvesting levels in public lands were not 
sustainable (6.38 𝑚3ℎ𝑎−1 versus the mean annual increment value of 4.35 𝑚3ℎ𝑎−1). 
These harvest levels were provided along with volumes of standing stocks, reported as 47 
𝑚3ℎ𝑎−1 in forest reserves, but only 16.7 𝑚3ℎ𝑎−1 on public lands. These values help us 
identify the firewood abundance map, which is one of the primary inputs to this model. 
Luoga’s work also provides us with two qualitative results that we can test to see if our 
model validates with his observations: 
1. “Harvesting intensity decreased with increasing distance from village 
settlements and reserve boundaries but the pattern had no significant 
overall impact on standing stocks of wood. The Dar-es-Salaam–Morogoro 
highway, which bisects the study area is the major axis of disturbance.”  
2. “Harvesting intensity tended to decline with increasing distance from the 
village or forest reserve boundaries (r2=0.19 and 0.16 for “old” and “all 
stumps”, respectively, in public lands (linear fits), with all other r2<0.1 
irrespective of the model used).”  
Luoga et al. (2002) focused attention on the economics of firewood and charcoal 
production. They noted that most of the value of firewood collection lied in the “domestic 
and subsistence uses within households” (based on previous work from Shackleton, 1993; 
Campbell et al., 1997; Shackleton et al., 1999) and noted the “very limited market 
opportunities” further from cities. 
More recently yet, Fabe and Grote (2013) discussed the importance of firewood to 
household subsistence, noting that only 13% of total firewood consumption comes from 
purchased firewood. They also report that 97.5% of households use firewood for their 
heating and cooking needs. Together, this shows that there clearly is not a complete 
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market for firewood and thus it is important to understand the non-market aspect of 
firewood collection. Additionally, Fabe and Grote report that each household member 
consumes 368 kg of firewood per year. This supports previous estimates (Zahabu et al. 
2005, Malimbwi and Zahabu 2009), including those that use consumption Figures to 
calculate national demand (for instance, Felix and Gheewala (2011) report that average 
national consumption of firewood was 55.5 million 𝑚3.  
One of the most useful sources for estimating firewood abundance and firewood demand 
is Zahabu et al. (2005) and Malimbwi and Zahabu (2009). In their analysis of the 
sustainability of fuelwood production systems in the Miombo woodlands in Southern 
Tanzania, they further support the contention that “subsistence fuelwood collection rarely 
affects the natural Miombo  woodlands  since only  the  dead  wood  or  wood  cut  for  
other  purposes  is collected.” Additionally, they report stand densities of woody plants. 
They note that the basal areas range from 7 to 25 𝑚2 per ha and stand densities of 380 to 
1400 stems per ha. They calculate the mean annual volume increment (MAI) of mature 
woodland species at 0.58 to 3.0 𝑚3ℎ𝑎−1𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1. The consumption values they report is 
in line with previous estimate  1.5 𝑚3𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎−1𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1. Malimbwi and Zahabou also 
report that most firewood is collected within 500 meters of the household (from Bandeira 
et al.,1996). 
The focus of this thesis is on the modeling techniques not the field-level observations of 
firewood abundance. Other disciplines are better suited to biophysically estimate what the 
expected firewood abundance per hectare is. Nonetheless, the discussion above presents a 
way to use literature estimates to create a range of parameters that can be used in the 
foraging model.  I summarize the specific value or range of values I use as parameter 
inputs into my model in Table 3. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of Relevant Literature Values for Calibration and Validation 
of Foraging Model 
Parameter Name Value (or range) Used in Model or 
Validation 
Average travel time per trip: 
 
118 minutes 
Average Growth rate of trees 
 
15 kg per tree 
Mean annual volume increment 0.58 – 3.0 𝑚3ℎ𝑎−1𝑦𝑟−1 
Trees per Hectare 
 
33 
Mean harvestable volume per hectare 14 – 117 𝑚3ℎ𝑎−1  
Per capita firewood consumption 1.5 𝑚3 
National firewood consumption 25.8 to 55.5 million 𝑚3 
 
Creating Traversal Cost 
The final input data required to run the model is the cost of traversing each grid-cell to 
populate the travel-cost network in the landscape data. This is another input that can be 
chosen changed by the user to match the information known about a region. The process I 
use starts with the assumption that humans walk at 1.38 meters per second on paved 
surfaces. This is the median value reported in Levine and Norenzayan (1999), who 
studied walking speeds in 31 countries. I then account for slower travel over different 
land types by following adjusting the assumed walking speeds using values in Table 4. 
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Table 2.4: Assumed parameters on travel speed across different LULC types 
MODIS 
LULC 
Class 
MODIS Name Times slower 
than road travel 
Implied Travel Speed 
(meters per second) 
0 Water 15 0.092592593 
1 Evergreen Needleleaf forest 3 0.462962963 
2 Evergreen Broadleaf forest 3 0.462962963 
3 Deciduous Needleleaf forest 3 0.462962963 
4 Deciduous Broadleaf forest 3 0.462962963 
5 Mixed forest 3 0.462962963 
6 Closed shrublands 2 0.694444444 
7 Open shrublands 2 0.694444444 
8 Woody savannas 2 0.694444444 
9 Savannas 2 0.694444444 
10 Grasslands 1.9 0.730994152 
11 Permanent wetlands 9 0.154320988 
12 Croplands 1.6 0.868055556 
13 Urban and built-up 1 1.388888889 
14 Cropland/Natural vegetation 
mosaic 
1.6 0.868055556 
15 Snow and ice 9 0.154320988 
16 Barren or sparsely vegetated 9 0.154320988 
 
As with many of the parameters discussed above, these are ad-hoc assumptions necessary 
for the simulation to be well-defined. However, these values are best interpreted as user-
inputs that can be defined with the specific foraging location in min. Applying the values 
in table 4 to the MODIS LULC data, I created the map shown in the upper left of Figure 
12, which is the minutes necessary to traverse across a given grid-cell based on the LULC 
information alone. I then combine this time with additional information derived from the 
elevation and ruggedness of the terrain (shown in the upper right) as well as network data 
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on roads and rivers. The result is a traversal map, shown in the bottom center of Figure 
12. I will revisit the use of this traversal map extensively in the methods section and use it 
to calculate optimized-route arrival times. 
 
Methods 
In this section, I discuss specific methods I used to run the simulation in Tanzania. Many 
of these methods are broadly applicable to all applications of spatial foraging. I will 
discuss an implementation that identifies 10 million agents in Tanzania, but I also provide 
Figure 2.12: Creating Traversal Cost from Land Cover and 
Elevation 
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an example of how to define a model with fewer (250) representative agents in Appendix 
3. 
Population Downscaling 
In many applications, there does not exist high resolution data on population density such 
as I have used here. Thus, I present a method that combines data at multiple resolutions to 
create high-resolution population density data. A common situation faced when modeling 
spatial economic phenomena includes having access to high resolution LULC data, but 
having population figures available only for larger administrative districts. Fig. 2.13 
shows these two types of data in the upper left (for LULC data) and upper right (for 
administrative data).  
 
Different colors in the land-use map correspond to different types of development, for 
which I define different population densities. I assume, for instance, that land-cover 
categorized as “Urban” has higher density than “Agricultural,” which I assume has higher 
density than “Forest” categories. These assumptions create a vector of weights, 𝑤𝑖, for 
each land use type according to the density that the land use has relative to other land 
Figure 2.13: Input Data for Population Downscaling 
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uses. I apply this vector of weights to the LULC map to create a new map with the weight 
values defined on each grid-cell. Next, I convert the administrative data into a grid-cell 
network with the same size and extent as the weights grid-cell network. Each 
administrative zone is given an integer ID value which is used to populate the values in 
the administrative ID matrix so that all grid-cells corresponding to a zone have the stored 
the same administrative ID. Finally, I calculate 𝑝𝑟𝑐, the population density for each grid-
cell, starting with the first administrative ID and incrementing upwards. I divide the sum 
of weights in the i-th zone by the population in the zone, then multiply this ratio by the 
value in the rc-th grid-cell for all grid-cells, as shown below:  
𝑝𝑟𝑐 = (
∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=0
𝑝𝑖
)𝑤𝑟𝑐 ∀ 𝑟, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑖 
This process identifies a per grid-cell population density. It has the useful attribute that 
summing up all grid-cells within an administrative zone will exactly equal the population 
listed by the zone’s survey, but it also leverages what we know about land cover to 
interpolate likely values in all locations. Results from this method are shown in Fig. 2.14. 
Downscaling methods like this (which have been used extensively in other applications 
though with slightly different methods from mine2) are sensitive to the assumptions one 
makes about which LULC types have what relative proportions of population. However, 
many of these assumptions will be broadly correct even where they are not precisely 
calibrated. For instance, the assumption that urban land cover has higher population 
density than forests is not difficult to support. Further research in this area can be 
conducted that validates the process by making predictions, selecting a sample from the 
                                                 
 
2 AsiaPop and AfriPop are the best examples of other applications of this general approach. 
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prediction and then testing those points against observed micro-data. In contrast to the 
lack of calibration on the assumptions used here, it is important to note that non-
downscaled data also make an assumption about what the population density is on 
different land-use types, namely, that it the population is uniformly distributed 
everywhere in the administrative zone. 
 
This downscaling method allows for analysis of phenomena that are sensitive to higher-
resolution effects than are available in traditional population density datasets. The next 
section will discuss how higher-resolution data like this allow for definition of the pixel-
agent approach. 
Figure 2.14: Downscaled Population Data 
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Defining the Agents 
In some applications, it is possible to make a model with relatively few representative 
agents. However, with firewood in Tanzania, this is difficult because individuals rarely 
forage more than five kilometers away from their home, yet village boundaries can be 
many time wider than this distance. Thus, I define my agent using the highest-resolution 
population density available. Fig. 2.15 presents the population present in every 450 meter 
grid-cell. Below that, Fig. 2.16 shows the same data, focusing on the area around Mount 
Kilimanjaro. This subset of the country around Mount Kilimanjaro will be used in much 
of the rest of this analysis because it allows individual pixels to be seen. Keep in mind, 
however, that everything shown for this sub-region is calculated in full for e very pixel in 
the broader scope of Tanzania.
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Figure 2.15 Population per 450 meter Grid-Cell in Tanzania 
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Fig. 2.16 above also shows how the population data are used to construct an agent set that 
defines one agent for every grid-cell in the network. This agent set can also be converted 
to a normalized matrix, which allows for mathematic matrix operations directly between 
the input data, cell networks or other sets of normalized agents (as described in Appendix 
3. 
The framework presented here is computationally feasible with 10-million agents, and in 
certain circumstances, can be extended to as many as 10 billion agents (thus allowing for 
a definition of agents as identical to individual humans). The next section considers 
Figure 2.16: Population per 450 meter Grid-Cell near Mount Kilimanjaro 
Define 1 geospatial 
grid-cell for every 
pixel present in the 
population data to 
construct the cell 
network. 
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methods capable of defining actions, specifically travel of agents over landscapes and 
road networks, while maintaining the same degree of computational feasibility. 
Calculating Travel Cost 
One of the most basic calculations necessary when simulating agent behavior on a 
landscape is to identify the cost of traveling from one location to another. Even when 
using matrix views as discussed in the previous section, finding the optimal route can 
become computationally infeasible, especially if the destination is remote from the origin. 
In this section, I identify a method that allows for route-finding even in large data sets. I 
do this by identifying four different route-finding algorithms (presented in Appendix 3) 
and then create a composite algorithm that combines all four approaches hierarchically to 
apply the correct algorithm (defined as maximizing accuracy while minimizing 
computational intensity). This approach is able to provide a large computation speed 
increase because many route finding problems are quite simple (for instance, traversing a 
uniformly flat field) and the simpler algorithms identify the optimal route in a faction of 
the computational time necessary for more complex route-finding algorithms.3  
Constructing the Traversal Cost and Arrival Cost Grid-Cell Networks 
I distinguish between two terms relevant to travel cost in this section that have 
unavoidably similar terms. The first term is traversal cost, which denotes the amount of 
time it takes an agent to traverse from one side of the grid-cell to the other when traveling 
                                                 
 
3 In the course of this work, I also created an algorithm that works well even when extremely long routes 
must be calculated. This algorithm works by solving the hierarchical search algorithm at varying levels of 
resolution for the traversal cost data and then combining the results to calculate the full route. I have 
omitted it from this analysis due to time constraints. 
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on one of the cardinal axes. Fig. 2.17 shows the traversal cost matrix for the Northeast of 
Tanzania.  
 
This matrix was constructed by using literature values (discussed in the data section) on 
how fast humans can walk over different terrain on average. The map above takes into 
account slower travel over different land cover types, increased speed from roads, 
difficulty crossing rivers, and finally, a ruggedness index based on topographical data for 
slope and elevation. In future work, this traversal cost will be modified to allow for multi-
modal transit (such as cars and boats), but for now I am limiting analysis to walking 
Figure 2.17: Traversal Cost Grid-Cell Network 
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speed only. I expect this assumption not to influence the results unduly because walking 
remains the dominant mode of transport when foraging in forests and other rough terrain. 
The second term is arrival costs, which is the cumulative traversal cost incurred crossing 
all cells necessary to reach a destination while taking the optimal route. Fig. 2.18 shows 
an example of calculating arrival cost. The left image shows the traversal costs as 
calculated above, while the right image shows the arrival cost, defined by traveling from 
the centermost grid-cell in the image to each of the other grid-cells.  
 
Because this map is unique to which pixel is the starting location, it must be recalculated 
for every grid-cell on the landscape. Additionally, to ensure that the equilibrium can be 
identified, each arrival cost map must be calculated for areas large enough to cover each 
Figure 2.18: Calculation of Arrival Cost Maps  
Arrival Cost (minutes) Traversal Cost (minutes) 
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grid-cells’ zero-profit zone. This is computationally challenging as it involves generating 
a large amount of data. In the computational approach I use, the arrival map for each 
grid-cell is described in a 4-dimensional matrix, which Fig. 2.19 illustrates with a 
traversal cost (the base map) and two representative arrival cost maps. 
 
Once created, this array is particularly useful in the foraging simulation when calculating 
the net profit available to the agent at each step and each time. 
Defining Profit-Maximizing Production 
At each iteration step in the simulation, the agent chooses to do their max-marginal-gain 
action. With the route-finding methods discussed in the appendix applied to the arrival 
Figure 2.19: Illustration of Combined Arrival and Traversal Cost Array 
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cost matrices, we can now calculate how the agent identifies which grid-cell yields the 
highest foraging profit. Profit in the context of firewood collection is calculated as: 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑏𝑐𝑖
𝑔 − 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑖 
where 𝑝𝑏 and 𝑝𝑤 are prices for buying firewood and for wage work, respectively, 𝑐𝑖
𝑔
 is 
the minimum value of either the amount available to be gathered or the max amount an 
individual can gather in one trip, and 𝑚𝑖 is the minutes necessary to travel to the foraging 
location. In this version of the model, all non-travel costs are assumed to be identical and 
thus are included in the value of the firewood. 
Fig. 2.20 illustrates the calculation of 𝜋𝑖 for an example forest patch in Tanzania. The 
image on the left shows the abundance of firewood, measured in cubic meters. This 
value, as discussed in the literature section, is drawn from a survey of forestry literature 
specific to Tanzania. In this particular patch, we see a forest of high firewood quality in 
the middle and lower-middle, with a patch of medium quality forest on the middle and 
upper sections. The areas in red are low value shrub lands where some, but very little, 
firewood can be gathered. The village in this case is exactly in the center of the plot, just 
outside the forest. The middle map shows the arrival time from the center cell to every 
other cell using the nested search algorithms described above. The traversal time map is 
omitted in this example, but see the figure after this one for an example including 
traversal cost. Finally, the figure on the right uses the first two maps in the profit equation 
to calculate the available profit on each cell. The available profit map shows which action 
would be consistent with the max marginal gain behavior rule (gather in the black cell in 
this case). Note that this map does not define on its own how much profit the agent will 
eventually collect. The reason is that this net profit map is a snapshot in time, calculated 
at exactly the iteration step in which the agent acts, but other agents will get to act before 
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the agent in question gets to gather a second time. Competition from other agents may 
deplete the firewood in the cells with positive net profit, making them no longer available 
for the agent to gather. 
 
Fig. 2.20 represents the profit map specific to a single grid-cell (defined as the center of 
the map). As with the arrival cost maps, the net profit map is calculated for every grid-
cell. Unlike the arrival cost maps, however, this array changes over time as agents make 
their choices on which cell they will forage. The simulation iterates through all iteration 
steps (in action order defined in Appendix 3), repeating until there all agents have 
reached an equilibrium (defined in the model description section). At each iteration step, 
the profit array is updating and recalculating itself to reflect the foraging behavior that 
happened on the previous step. Additionally, the profit array will update itself again as it 
moves to the next time period with, for instance, forest regrowth. 
Figure 2.20: Calculating Profit Available from Firewood Abundance and 
Travel Time 
0 1,300 
Firewood Abundance (𝑚3) 
0 1,200 
Arrival Time (minutes) 
0 2,500,00
Profit Available (2008 TSH) 
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Results 
The results of the model described above fall into two general types: results that show 
where and how agents value firewood; and, results that show how the results change 
when different forest conservation policies are considered. In typical ecosystem service 
valuation analyses (at which this method is ultimately aimed), the second type of results 
require the majority of effort and yields the most interesting results. In this case, 
however, most of my results focus on the first type, describing in detail what behavior 
this model predicts on the current landscape. Once the method is established and verified, 
future analyses can focus on analysis of alternate policies, but for now, I focus primarily 
on a single outcome (the equilibrium that results from the landscape in existence in 2012, 
ignoring potential deforestation from non-foraging phenomena) and describing the 
arrangement of profit and abundance evident in this equilibrium. The other scenarios that 
are presented are not indicative of actual policies being considered, but instead are 
presented to show how the resulting equilibria change as our assumptions about the 
landscape or the agents change. 
In this section I will first describe an overview figure that combines many of the 
important components of the overall result that I want to express. After that, I will work 
step-by-step through the components that enabled creation of the overview figure. I 
reverse the typical order of exposition because it is difficult to understand how individual 
pieces fit together without understanding the overall goal. 
Fig. 2.21 provides an overview of the results for Tanzania. Four different variables are 
plotted with colors where intensity of the color indicates the value of the variable. Green 
represents supply of firewood taken by agents in cubic meters. Note that these pixels are 
the location of the firewood that was taken but not necessarily the location where the 
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agent lives. This is because the agent travels from their home to the foraging location. 
Also note that there is much more firewood present on the landscape than what is shown 
here because forests that experience no foraging are not plotted. Magenta represents the 
amount of fuel demand per agent grid-cell that was not met with foraged firewood. In 
these cases, the agent satisfies their fuel demand with the firewood substitute purchased 
with returns from labor. As expected, areas where the fuel substitute is purchased most is 
the areas furthest from forests and the densest in population (urban areas, such as Dar es 
Salaam on the east coast). Yellow represents the amount of fuel demand per agent that 
was met with firewood. In line with observed national statistic, this model predicts that 
approximately 97% of fuel demand is met with firewood. The areas that benefit the most 
from foraging are high-population areas near high-valued forests (such as the southern 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro). Finally, blue represents the traversal time in minutes to 
cross each grid-cell. Technically it is arrival cost, not traversal cost, that directly affects 
the production decision, but it is not physically possible to represent arrival costs on a 
single map because there are 10 million unique arrival cost maps (one for each pixel) for 
the map below. This map presents an overview of multiple aspects of the model 
simultaneously. This was achieved with color transparency by making visible only the 
variable that had the highest value for a pixel.  
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The overview map here can also be summarized by a single sentence: yellow pixels 
gather firewood from green pixels taking into account blue pixel traversal costs while red 
pixels fail to meet their demand. In the next section, I will break down this overview map 
and overview sentence into their constituent parts to give a more full description.  
Scenario Definition 
The results shown above are for the baseline scenario that I define. As discussed above, 
most of the contribution of this analysis is creating new methodological approaches to 
Figure 2.21: Results Summary Map 
Fuel Substitute 
Firewood 
  
 79 
 
describe foraging behavior with more detail and more realism. However, simple 
description of the behavior alone is not enough to answer questions about what policies 
are optimal. Thus, I also present eight alternative policy scenarios, described in table 5. 
Each of these scenarios describe a change in the landscape, and thus analyzing the 
difference in value collected from firewood in these scenarios versus in the baseline 
scenario identifies the value gained or lost by pursuing the policy that would lead to the 
scenario landscape.  
Table 2.5: Eight Alternative Scenarios for Policy Analysis 
Scenario Name Description 
Forests as Shrubs Changes the land use type from forest to shrubland.  
Half Shrubs Half Forest Reduces the amount of firewood available by 50% on 
shrubland, savannah and forests. 
Quarter Shrubs Half 
Forest 
Reduces the amount of firewood available by 50% in 
forests and by 75% in shrubland and savannah. 
Half Shrubs Reduces shrubland and savannah firewood availability by 
50%. 
Quarter Shrubs Reduces shrubland and savannah firewood availability by 
75%. 
No Shrubs Eliminates all firewood from shrublands and savannah. 
Only forests have firewood. 
Forests as Shrubs Changes the land use type from forest to shrubland.  
Half Shrubs Half Forest Reduces the amount of firewood available by 50% on 
shrubland, savannah and forests. 
Lower Wage Reduced average wage by 13.1%. This reduces the 
opportunity cost of travel and thus makes foraging less 
expensive. 
Higher Wage Increased average wage by 13.1%. 
 
I plan to incorporate newly released data on forest cover from Hansen et al. (2013) that 
uses higher resolution (30 meters) to create additional scenarios. The Hansen data set also 
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charts change in forest cover from 2000 to 2012, so it will also be possible with this data 
set to analyze how firewood collection was affected by specific deforestation actions. 
These data were only made available in 2014 and require an enormous amount of 
processing time to parse, thus they were excluded from the current analysis. 
Calculating Supply 
Supply of firewood is calculated by combing LULC data with literature values on 
firewood per hectare on different land types. As discussed in the data section, the LULC 
data I use comes from MODIS, a land sensing and classification project by NASA. 
MODIS identifies 16 land use categories, of which five are forest, two are shrublands and 
two are savannah. I apply the literature values discussed in the data section and present 
the per grid-cell abundance values for firewood in each of these 16 land categories.  
Table 6 presents these values for the baseline scenario and the six policy analysis 
scenarios discussed above. The third column shows the values for baseline scenario that 
is used to generate most of the maps and results in this paper. 
Because the results of this model are sensitive to how we parameterize firewood 
abundance, I use the six policy analysis scenarios to test how and where results change 
when we make different assumptions about how much firewood is available for each land 
type. Literature values for abundance typically focus on two broad categories, 
distinguishing between forests and non-forest vegetation (shrubland and savanna). The 
first scenario tests what happens when we do not assume this differentiation and instead 
apply the same value to forests as we do for shrubland. Note that the six scenarios 
presented here are just endpoints on a continuous spectrum of tests I ran. In this example, 
that means that I tested many of the values between forests having the same abundance as 
shrublands and having the higher, forest specific value.  
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The next scenarios test what happens when shrubs and forests have less firewood 
available than in the baseline. The second scenario tests what happens when both are at 
50% of original values, while the third scenario tests with 50% forests but 25% shrubs. 
The fourth through sixth scenarios show what happens when forests are kept at their 
original values but shrublands are reduced to 50%, 25% and 0% respectively. Table 2.7 
below presents the assumptions used in each of these scenarios.  
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Table 2.6: Firewood Abundance per grid-cell in m3 used in different scenarios from 
literature values 
LULC Name Baseline 
Scenario 
Forests 
as 
Shrubs 
Half Shrubs 
Half Forest 
Quarter 
Shrubs 
Half 
Forest 
Half 
Shrubs 
Quarter 
Shrubs 
No 
Shrubs 
Evergreen 
Needleleaf forest 
1269.39 106.896 634.695 634.695 1269.39 1269.39 1269.39 
Evergreen 
Broadleaf forest 
1336.2 106.896 668.1 668.1 1336.2 1336.2 1336.2 
Deciduous 
Needleleaf forest 
1202.58 106.896 601.29 601.29 1202.58 1202.58 1202.58 
Deciduous 
Broadleaf forest 
1149.132 106.896 574.566 574.566 1149.132 
1149.13
2 
1149.13
2 
Mixed forest 1256.028 106.896 628.014 628.014 1256.028 
1256.02
8 
1256.02
8 
Closed shrublands 106.896 106.896 53.448 26.724 53.448 26.724 0 
Open shrublands 106.896 106.896 53.448 26.724 40.086 20.043 0 
Woody savannas 106.896 106.896 53.448 26.724 46.767 22.7154 0 
Savannas 106.896 106.896 53.448 26.724 33.405 16.0344 0 
Grasslands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Permanent wetlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Croplands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Urban and built-up 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cropland/Natural 
vegetation mosaic 
53.448 53.448 26.724 13.362 6.681 2.6724 0 
Snow and ice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Barren or sparsely 
vegetated 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Although the values used in the baseline scenario for firewood abundance are well 
supported by the literature, it is important to note that this analysis could easily be re-run 
with new values for abundance. For example, many locations have done field surveys 
specific to the land in question, and thus values like that can easily be substituted in to the 
model presented here.   
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Fig. 2.22 below shows the supply of firewood available before the first iteration of 
gathering begins. The majority of land is in shrublands and savannah, though there exist 
areas of dense forest around Mount Kilimanjaro and in the natural reserve land in the 
south east and North West. The values presented here for abundance are biophysical 
observations only. The agent considers the value of the forests, taking into account both 
the value of fuel, their local wage and the travel related collection costs. 
 
After the simulation has run, forests near agents who find it profitable to forage will be 
depleted. However, due to the remoteness of many natural areas, there exist many 
Figure 2.22: Original Supply (𝒎𝟑 firewood per grid-cell) 
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locations that go un-foraged. This is shown in Fig. 2.23, which plots the amount of 
firewood that is still present on the landscape after the simulation has finished all 
iterations in the first time period. 
 
 
It is visually difficult to see the differences between Figs. 22 and 23 above, so Fig. 2.24 
presents the difference between the two, which defines firewood supply taken. This map 
is a key part of this model’s results. The areas shown as foraged are determined by where 
Figure 2.23: Supply Left (𝒎𝟑 firewood per grid-cell) 
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demand is the greatest, where supply is the greatest and where costs make collection 
relatively more valuable than the fuel substitute. Some key locations shown here are the 
high degrees of foraging on the southern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, in the shrublands 
to the south of Lake Victoria and the arterial transportation links coming out of Dar es 
Salaam. 
 
Figure 2.24: Supply Taken (𝒎𝟑 firewood per grid-cell) (difference 
between Supply Original and Supply Left) 
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Calculating Consumption and Demand 
The images above only present half of the foraging action. For every cubic meter of 
firewood gathered, there is a corresponding amount of firewood that arrives at an agent’s 
household location and is consumed. This value can be described multiple ways, 
including by noting the value of firewood that accrues to each agent after travel costs are 
accounted for, by noting the amount of labor spent by each agent on foraging, or by 
observing the raw amount of firewood that arrives at a given location. The last measure, 
while very easy to define, is very difficult to interpret because demand is determined 
endogenously by the agent’s household utility maximization decisions. Even if we sum 
firewood and the firewood substitute to arrive at aggregate fuel needs, this also is not 
taken as exogenous because the marginal rate of substitution between heating and leisure 
does not have to be fixed (and probably is not fixed where there are wage differentials). 
Thus, care must be taken when stating how much firewood is “demanded” by different 
agents. 
The labor endowment of each agent, however, is taken to be exogenous in this model. 
Each agent in this model represents the full population of the 450m by 450m grid-cell. 
Thus, I define the labor endowment of an agent as the population of the grid-cell 
multiplied by the labor participation rate. Future work can easily extend this analysis to 
match location-specific labor participation rates, but this was not available for Tanzania. 
Fig. 2.25 presents the total labor endowment available at the beginning of the simulation.  
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The above map was exogenous but endogenously determines labor allocation choices. 
Fig. 2.26 presents the amount of labor on each grid-cell that was used to purchase the fuel 
substitute (usually kerosene). A clear result of this model is that locations with high 
population density purchase the majority of the fuel substitute. This is because the agents 
on the edges of the urban centers deplete all nearby firewood and thus everyone on the 
interior of the dense population area has no profitable firewood available to forage. 
Figure 2.25: Original Labor Endowment  
 
Original 
Labor 
Endowment 
(effective 
full-time 
laborers) 
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The majority of labor used to satisfy heating demand was dedicated to collecting 
firewood, as shown in Fig. 2.27. The values shown in this figure reflect agents choosing 
optimal travel routes and making the utility maximizing choice among foraging, laboring 
and leisure. 
Figure 2.26: Labor Used to Purchase Fuel Substitute  
Labor Used to 
purchase Fuel 
Substitute 
(effective full-
time laborers)  
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Accounting for labor usage and supply of firewood taken, we can now calculate the profit 
(or if desired, utility) that each agent generates. Fig. 2.28 plots the value in 2008 TSH that 
each agent collects from foraging. 
Figure 2.27: Labor used to Collect Firewood 
Labor 
Endowment Used 
to Collect 
Firewood 
(effective full-
time laborers) 
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It is difficult to see the results when viewed at a national level so I present the area 
around Mt. Kilimanjaro in Fig. 2.29. Here we can see the complexity of behavior that 
arises as a result of the competition. In the western area of this subplot, for instance, we 
can observe agents right on the border of a high quality forest who obtain a very positive 
profit from foraging with a decreasing gradient of profit obtained as we move south west 
away from the forest boundary. The gradient descent arises because the agents farther to 
the south have to travel ever further to get the firewood. Note that the agents plotted with 
yellow or blue (lower values of profit) may well gather the same (or more) firewood than 
Figure 2.28: Profit Earned by Each Agent (national) 
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the agents right on the border of the forest due to tradeoffs implied by their household 
optimization decisions. 
 
 
The results that the previous two figures show can also be considered in aggregate. 
Aggregation by village boundary can be done if policy makers prefer to know how 
political units are impacted on average rather than how specific grid-cell agents are 
affected. In Table 7 below I present a national level aggregation of cubic meters of 
Figure 2.29: Profit Earned by Agent (near Mt. Kilimanjaro) 
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firewood foraged and profit generated from firewood collection, along with a comparison 
of change in profit compared to the baseline scenario. 
Table 2.7: Demand met and Profit Earned in 9 Scenarios 
Scenario Demand Met Profit Earned Profit Deviation 
from Baseline 
Baseline 6.67E+07 1.48E+13 n/a 
Half Forest, Half Shrubs 5.54E+07 1.16E+13 -3.24E+12 
Half Forest, Quarter 
Shrubs 
4.14E+07 8.06E+12 -6.76E+12 
Reduced Shrubs 4.63E+07 9.11E+12 -5.71E+12 
Minimized Shrubs 3.28E+07 5.90E+12 -8.93E+12 
No Shrubs 1.07E+07 1.55E+12 -1.33E+13 
No Forests 6.37E+07 1.43E+13 -5.74E+11 
Lower Wage 7.38E+07 1.51E+13 2.99E+11 
Higher Wage 6.56E+07 1.45E+13 -3.46E+11 
 
Figure 30 charts the values found for each of these scenarios, while Fig. 2.31 shows the 
deviation from the baseline. 
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Figure 2.30a: Demand Met and Profit Earned
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Figure 2.31b: Profit Deviation from Baseline
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The results here are presented merely to be suggestive of what future policy application 
may look like. The reason why shrub land and savannah has such a larger impact than 
forests is simply because much less land covered by forests in Tanzania. Analyzing an 
area where forests represent a greater percentage of the land cover, however, results in 
values for forests that are much higher than for shrub lands. In reality, the scenarios 
presented here are too broadly defined to be of specific policy use, though they could be 
used to identify the marginal value of forest quality in different locations. Instead, the 
value of the results shown here must be seen in the context of providing spatially explicit, 
falsifiable statements about who gathers what from where based on microeconomic 
theory but aggregated to a national level without losing spatial heterogeneity or inter-
agent competition. There exist many additional outputs of the model that can be 
considered results, such as predicting how many hours each agent will devote to foraging. 
The next section will present several of these additional results while discussing how the 
foraging model can be validated. 
Validation 
Validating an agent based model is critically important because the results are sensitive to 
assumptions on a variety of variables. This section summarizes the validation results and 
potential future methods for validation. The full validation exercise can be found in 
Appendix 3.  
Given that demand for firewood is not given as an input parameter but instead is 
calculated endogenously as a function of the landscape and the agents’ behavior rules, we 
can start validating the model by comparing predicted firewood demand with literature 
estimates on firewood demand. Values from existing studies suggest that demand is 
between 25.8 and 55.5 million cubic meters. The baseline scenario predicts 66.7 million 
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cubic meters of firewood will be gathered. This is above, but within the order of 
magnitude reported in the literature. The overestimated value here is very likely a result 
of wrong assumptions on mean harvestable volume per hectare. The range of values I 
drew from the literature (14 – 117 𝑚3ℎ𝑎−1𝑦𝑟−1) is based on a relatively small sample of 
land which was primarily covered in woodlands and newer estimates suggest the value 
should be closer to the minimum value of this distribution than to the mean (which is 
what I used). Additionally, given that the majority of Tanzania is scrublands and 
savannah, which may have lower densities of firewood, it is not surprising that using the 
woodlands estimates would result in overstating the national effect. For this reason, the 
sensitivity analyses (presented in Table 7 in the results section) may be especially 
important because they show cases in which land is assumed to have less firewood 
abundance. For instance, the “half-forest, quarter-shrubs” scenario predicts 
approximately 41.4 million cubic meters, which is comfortably within the range of 
estimated consumption Figures. 
Future work will be able to devote more time to calibration that focuses on original work 
in the project area. For instance, I have already secured research-time with partners in 
Cambodia to make a new data-set of field observations on firewood abundance and 
gathering behavior. This study will be able to identify individual foragers’ home location 
and foraging location. Pairs of home and foraging location pairs will allow for more 
precise validation and testing. 
Although I can show that the model validates on an aggregate level, it remains difficult to 
validate at the grid-cell level due to the precise locations of village data from the NPS are 
obscured by 10 km for privacy reasons. If these data were not obscured, it would be 
straightforward to validate on the grid-cell level by running the model and making 
predictions about, for instance, how many hours each agent will forage for firewood, and 
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then compare these predictions to household survey data on firewood collection. Figure 
31 shows the travel spent for agents near Mount Kilimanjaro. Note that there is extreme 
variation at small scales. This is an expected outcome of the model given that firewood is 
not transported very far and that it has high transportation costs. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.31: Travel Time Spent in Minutes per Household per year 
(near Mt. Kilimanjaro) 
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Given the hyper-local production decisions made with firewood gathering and the high 
degree of spatial variability in the figure above, it is not surprising a comparison with the 
NPS failed to validate.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an approach for applying agent-based simulation to firewood 
collection in Tanzania. The main contribution of this approach is that it identifies an 
approach to solving two difficulties that have hindered understand of non-timber forest 
product foraging: geospatial heterogeneity and inter-agent competition for foraging 
goods. There is much demand among practitioners of ecosystem service valuation to 
include non-timber forest products in their valuation exercises but these problems have 
prevented widespread application of non-timber forest product valuation to conservation 
planning. The modeling details discussed in this chapter have primarily been theoretical; 
however, the software used to instantiate the method has already been slated for inclusion 
in InVEST, the software application of The Natural Capital Project. Initial applications of 
InVEST version of this tool include analyzing bush-meat foraging in Cambodia (in 
partnership with the World Wildlife Fund of Cambodia) and extension to fruit and grass 
gathering in Tanzania. By providing a detailed statement of how to implement agent-
based simulation to understand subsistence markets like this, I hope to have broken 
through the barrier that has prevented the valuation of non-timber products in forests, and 
thus, provided a method for more accurately understanding values of forests that are very 
often missed. 
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Chapter 3: Reciprocity in Commons Dilemmas 
Publishing note: This chapter was written concurrent to the creation of the published 
paper: 
Runge, C. F., & Johnson, J. A. (2014). Are we in this together? Risk bearing and 
collective action. Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, 6(1), 71-76. 
The published version is similar to this chapter, but here I extend discussion of 
theoretical aspects of the model and apply it to agent-based simulation 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the theoretical aspects of collective action in commons dilemmas 
when individuals’ utility is linked via reciprocity. We present a model that formalizes 
how reciprocity affects contribution to public goods in a way that matches evidence from 
behavioral economics that agents will not always free-ride in commons dilemmas. Our 
model is broad enough to include strong free-riding, socially optimal behavior and all 
intermediate choices in a single modeling framework.  
Our model shows that inclusion of reciprocity results in partial cooperation where the 
level depends on how intensely individuals care about reciprocity. It bears emphasis that 
this model relies on making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Although inclusion of 
interpersonal comparisons of utility is not typically employed in modern economics, our 
conception of this is similar to what Arrow (1977) termed “extended sympathy,” and is 
consistent with current neurobiological research (eg., Meltzoff and Decety 2010). 
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Moreover, we believe this use of utility echoes the original insights of Bentham, Hume 
and Adam Smith. 
The theoretical implications of reciprocity and fairness have been explored before in the 
literature (Sugden 1985, Runge 1981, 1984; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Rabin 1993).4 In 
these models, the formulation of reciprocity is exogenous or chosen prior to the players’ 
strategy choices. Other approaches, (Marchiori 2010, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2003) 
have expanded or endogenized the concern for reciprocity and shown that equilibrium 
levels of cooperation are above the strong free-riding prediction. In the next section, we 
present our reciprocal utility model and discuss how the model challenges traditional 
welfare economics and conceptions of economic value. Throughout the literature on 
reciprocity and fairness, it is clear that institutions and norms are critical in determining 
how reciprocity affects strategy choices. Our approach explicitly links reciprocity to the 
norms, expectations and institutional arrangements that are involved in collective action.5  
More generally, our model provides a method for disentangling the complex strategies 
that players pursue based on these norms and institutions. To make this possible, we 
define a behavioral response function and incorporate it in a Nash equilibrium utility 
model.  
After presenting the general form of our model, we then apply it to an example commons 
dilemma: global climate change. For this example, we discuss how the response function 
can be constructed to match observed phenomena and institutions. In the case of climate 
                                                 
 
4 Some relevant models use the terms fairness while others use reciprocity. We believe that reciprocity best 
describes the type of behavior in our model, though often the reciprocal response is that which is 
considered fair. In our usage, fairness is the more general term, relevant to a broad set of moral axioms, 
while reciprocity is a specific form of fairness.  
5 This framework is applicable to many collective action dilemmas. Our model is generally applicable to 
situations where individuals gain utility from observing other individuals’ levels of utility.    
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change, the institution we model is binding emissions reduction targets in which the 
countries’ reciprocal behavior depends on if other countries do or do not meet their 
emissions abatement goals. We show that in this context, a type of equilibrium exist in 
which some agents meet their goal while other agents pursue a token level of contribution 
(still higher than strong free-riding levels). This outcome matches the current state of 
climate change negotiations in which some countries are pursuing aggressive and binding 
policies while other countries are pursuing weaker, voluntary mitigation approaches. 
Finally, the last section of this chapter includes a discussion of how this model may be 
better estimated with new data and extended with future research.  
The Commons Reciprocity Utility Model 
In a survey of the role of interpersonal comparisons of utility in economic theory, 
Hammond (1991) notes the strong (and confining) hold that disallowing interpersonal 
comparisons of utility has had in welfare economics. To avoid these confines, we use a 
definition of reciprocity in which players do indeed make interpersonal comparisons of 
utility. Agents in our model view reciprocally beneficent players as friendly cooperators 
and receive positive utility from seeing them do well (similar to Valavanis 1958). 
Conversely, they see reciprocally harmful players as rival competitors and receive utility 
from seeing their rival do poorly. The idea of friendly reciprocators and unfriendly 
punishers matches with psychological theory of reciprocity (Cialdini et al. 1975, Regan 
1971) as well as behavioral game theory evidence (Falk and Fischbacher 2006, Fehr and 
Gächter 2000).  
Much of economic theory avoids making interpersonal utility comparisons due to the 
difficulty in using cardinal utility in place of ordinal utility. Nearly as soon as these 
difficulties were established, however, others noted that such comparisons are essential 
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for understanding bargaining, social welfare and collective decision making (Shapley 
1967, for example). More recently, Ng (2003) argues that without making comparisons of 
cardinal utilities, welfare economics is too narrow and ought to be expanded, while Elster 
and Roemer (1993) point out the incompatibility of using interpersonal comparisons in 
many Nash axioms and the inability to define common strategy choices, such as “split the 
difference.” Parallel to these arguments have been the fast growth of the behavioral 
economics literature. The complex human behavior that this literature has uncovered 
seems incongruent with the assumption that individuals only consider their own direct 
utility. 
Fundamentally, the problems herein are focused on how we assign value. Traditional 
utility approaches may be used to account for caring about others’ welfare by including 
the value an individual gets from their other-regarding behavior directly in their utility 
function.6 However, this approach presents two problems: first, many findings in welfare 
economics require separable utility functions among individuals, which often is violated 
in models that include others’ utility as a direct gain; second, this modeling approach 
does not easily incorporate complex reciprocal behavior, such as contingent strategies 
based on inequity aversion (similar in conception to Fehr and Schmidt, 1999); third, it is 
not well understood how preferences are formed on indirect consumption of a good.  
In a broader sense, the description of caring about others as an individual consumption 
choice may be part of the reason that non-economists quickly bristle at the implications 
of economic rationality (even though these may often be based on misunderstanding). 
                                                 
 
6 See Dellarocas, C., Fan, M., & Wood, C. (2004). Self-interest, reciprocity, and participation in online 
reputation systems; or see  Ribar, D. C., & Wilhelm, M. O. (2002). Altruistic and Joy‐ of‐ Giving 
Motivations in Charitable Behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 110(2), 425-457. For examples. 
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Indeed, the implications derived from defining care for others as purely selfish preference 
leads some to describe “homo-economicus [as] a sociopath,” (Stout 2006, Henrich et al. 
2001, and expanded in Gintis 2000) or are autistic. While many of these criticisms may 
be unfair or miss the point, they do highlight the perception outside of economics that 
having too narrow of a definition of what humans value may result in strange or distorted 
models.  
Model Definition 
We present a model in this section that includes reciprocity between agents. Suppose that 
each player in a commons dilemma must choose between two options: allocating income 
to a private consumption good or a public investment good. In the context of climate 
change, for example, investing in the public good is defined as pursuing abatement 
activity that lowers the amount of GHG that a player emits. As another example in the 
context of harvesting non-timber forest products, one could define private consumption is 
defined as consuming a product taken from a public forest while investing in the public 
good takes the form of conservation management strategies or limiting extraction. Utility 
in our models is assumed to be increasing in consumption but can be decreased by 
actions of other agents’ private consumption. Unlike traditional economic models, we do 
not assume each player’s utility is separable from the other players’ choices insofar as the 
commons is affected by decisions of all players, and thus utility for each agent depends 
on each other agent.  
To formalize this concept, we must first define the archetypical commons dilemma utility 
framework on which we will build our extensions. Define player i's payoff as 
𝑢𝑖
𝐷(𝑐𝑖, 𝑎𝑖, ∑ 𝑎𝑗
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖  ), where 𝑐𝑖 is consumption, 𝑎𝑖 is the i-th player’s contribution to the 
public good and ∑ 𝑎𝑗
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖  is the sum of all other players’ contributions. We use the 
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superscript D to indicate that this is the direct utility an individual receives. Direct utility, 
in our definition, is identical to that used in traditional economics7 and assumes a rational 
preference set and utility that is separable among players. Given these payoff functions, 
together with prices of consumption and investment of the public good, 𝑝𝑐 and 𝑝𝑎, and 
wealth 𝑤𝑖, the i-th individual solves: 
 
max
𝑐𝑖, 𝑎𝑖
𝑢𝑖
𝐷 (𝑐𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖,∑𝑎𝑗
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖
)                  (1) 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖 + 𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖 ≤ 𝑤𝑖          
This is a traditional commons problem, and the solution will result in under-contribution 
to the public good due to strong free-riding.  If the price of consumption is normalized to 
unity and there are two identical players, i and j, we can re-express consumption in terms 
of wealth and contribution to the public good, which reduces the problem to one choice 
variable, 𝑎𝑖. This type of model has been well-studied (Varian 2004, Runge 1984, 
Hirshleifer 1983, Marwell and Ames 1979), and results in under-provision of effort towards 
the public good because each player is only considering their own marginal benefit from 
abatement and the resulting allocation in equilibrium has less abatement than the 
Samuelson condition, ∑
𝜕𝑢𝑖
𝐷
𝜕𝑎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑝𝑎. In the literature, many institutions or policies have 
                                                 
 
7 𝑢𝐷(∙) is a continuous utility function representing a locally non-satiated, rational preference relation ≿ 
that is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and wealth, strictly increasing in prices, quasi-convex in 
prices, and continuous. Given the preference relation ≿, 𝑢𝐷(∙) is such that for all goods 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑢𝐷(𝑥) ≥
 𝑢𝐷(𝑦) if and only if  𝑥 ≿ 𝑦. 
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been proposed to address this form of under-provision, such as the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism (Clarke 1971, Groves 1973), although others have pointed to 
shortcomings in these approaches (for example, Rothkopf 2007). 
We extend the model above by augmenting direct utility, 𝑢𝐷(∙), with an interpersonal 
utility component, 𝑢𝐼(∙). The interpersonal utility function describes the gain or loss of 
utility that player i experiences from observing a change in another player’s utility 
(player j henceforth). The basic assumption underlying the indirect component of utility 
is that humans enjoy seeing benefit come to those who are friends and may enjoy seeing 
harm come to those who are foes. Cikara et. al (2011), along with many others in the 
psychology literature, explore the evidence for this, noting that “The failures of an in-
group member are painful, whereas those of a rival out-group member may give 
pleasure—a feeling that may motivate harming rivals.” Our interpersonal utility 
component seeks to identify and correctly parameterize this type of reciprocity. 
To account for the variety of ways in which individuals react to interpersonal exchanges, 
we define a response function 𝑅𝑖𝑗(∙) that represents how player j’s actions (𝑎𝑗) determine 
if player i will regard player j as a friend or as a foe. Thus, we allow the relationship 
alignment (friend/foe) to be determined by the exchanges that take place between pairs of 
players. An important component in determining this alignment is the extent to which 
players believe other players have acted reasonably, justly, or fairly (as in Rabin 1993). 
In this case, a higher value of 𝑅𝑖𝑗(∙) implies that player i believes player j has acted fairly 
and thus will want to reward player j with reciprocally beneficent behavior. Similarly, a 
lower value for 𝑅𝑖𝑗(∙) implies that player i believes player j has not acted fairly and so 
will want to punish player j. Rewarding beneficent behavior and punishing malevolent 
behavior is what we refer to as reciprocity. Our model also allows players to have 
different intensities of reciprocal response towards different individuals, defined by 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ∈
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(0,1), based on how close the pair of players are or how frequently they interact. Thus, 
we define interpersonal utility for player i as: 
𝑢𝑖
𝐼(∙) = 𝛽𝑖𝑗 𝑅𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑗) 𝑢𝑗
𝐷(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗) 
In this formulation, if player i views player j as a friend (𝑅𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑗) > 0), then player i will 
receive an increase in interpersonal utility when player j receives an increase in direct 
utility. 
The ways in which interpersonal behavior is assessed are not simple (and thus cannot 
easily be included into the traditional economic utility framework embodied in 𝑈𝑖
𝐷). 
Rather, reciprocal behavior depends on a complex set of norms and institutions. By 
separating the interpersonal component of utility from traditional utility and by 
endogenizing the relationship orientation between players, our model provides a 
framework that more easily incorporates norms and institutions that often violate 
assumptions required for traditional utility functions to work. 
We combine our interpersonal utility expression with the direct utility expression to 
identify the total utility a player receives as the sum of these components. We label this 
function as reciprocal utility: 
𝑢𝑖
𝑅(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗) = 𝑢𝑖
𝐷(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗)⏟      
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑖′𝑠 
𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 𝑅𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑗) 𝑢𝑗
𝐷(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗)⏟              
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑖′𝑠 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑢𝑖
𝐼
               (3) 
In the context of the climate dilemma, the term on left of equation three represents the 
direct utility player i receives from consumption after damages from climate change have 
been subtracted. These damages are a function of total abatement among all players. The 
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term on the right, conversely, represents the additional utility that player i receives from 
reciprocal assessment of player j’s behavior. Assuming that player i views abatement 
action positively, she will receive more utility when high-abating players also receive 
utility. This term represents the player’s utility from their perception of reciprocity, but 
not the utility they gain from the other players’ actual investment in the public good (this 
portion of utility is expressed in the direct utility term, as a part of the direct enjoyment of 
the public good). In this framework, individuals maximize their reciprocal utility by 
choosing abatement levels taking into account both impacts from climate change, but also 
any potential gains or losses from how other players perceive their helpfulness. The 
results will differ from the direct-utility framework because abatement affects the best-
response functions of each player in both the direct and the interpersonal terms. 
Different values of 𝛽 define a spectrum of outcomes between the traditional commons 
dilemma and the socially optimal outcome. Two benchmark cases are 𝛽 = 0, which 
converts the equations to be identical to the myopic free-rider problem discussed above, 
while 𝛽 =
𝑁
𝑁+1
 results in an allocation identical to the socially optimal solution. See 
Appendix 1 for further definition of these cases and derivation of the benchmark values 
of  𝛽.  Choosing 𝛽 < 0 implies the player rewards behavior that decreases his or her 
utility. Choosing 𝛽 >
𝑁
𝑁+1
 implies that the player cares more about helping or hurting the 
other player than they do about themselves. The latter case results in lower aggregate 
utility due to over-abatement. We will not focus on the over-abatement situation in this 
paper, but it is worth noting that the general effect of reduced aggregate utility from too 
much reciprocity is quite useful. For instance, it describes cases of extravagant gift-giving 
culture (Carmichael and MacLeod 1997) as well as cycles of revenge (Eisenberger et al. 
2004). 
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To solve for optimal private and public consumption, we must find first-order conditions 
for each player, identify best response functions, and solve for individual players’ 
abatement levels as a function of the parameters in  𝑢𝑖
𝐷(∙), 𝑢𝑗
𝐷(∙), 𝑅𝑖𝑗(∙), 𝑅𝑗𝑖(∙) and 𝛽. 
When players are identical, Nash equilibrium strategies are such that 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎𝑗. With 
heterogeneous players, an analytical solution becomes difficult for most 
parameterizations of utility and 𝑅𝑖𝑗, but can still be found numerically. The next section 
presents and solves a specific parameterization of a commons dilemma with several 
possible response functions.  
 
Application to the Climate Commons 
This section identifies two ways that the norms and institutions surrounding climate 
change can can be expressed in response functions. The first response function we 
identify is based on meeting or not meeting emissions reduction goals. The response 
function for how agent i reacts to agent j’s abatement activity is labeled 𝑅𝑖𝑗(∙) and is 
based abatement targets, 𝑡𝑗, and abatement levels, 𝑎𝑗. This response function considers 
only the binary observation of if agents met their goals or not. Equation 4 presents this 
function. 
𝑅𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑗 , 𝑡𝑗) = {     
    1        𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑗 ≥ 𝑡𝑗
−1       𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑗 < 𝑡𝑗
       }                  (4) 
This response function implies that players view other players as friendly reciprocators so 
long as they meet their abatement target, but view them as a rival otherwise. This 
response function is solved with a normal form game and results in different equilibria 
depending on the value of 𝛽.  
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We also provide an extension of this response function that accounts for reciprocity from 
partial compliance. Define ?̂?𝑗 as the level of abatement the j-th player would pursue in the 
individually myopic game (the case where 𝛽 = 0). We assume also that 𝑡𝑗 is set equal to 
the socially optimal level of abatement for player j, defined as 𝑎𝑗
𝑠. To account for partial 
compliance and the possibility that player’s have continuous responses to other player’s 
abatement, we redefine our response function to consider what portion of the goal an 
agent met, 
𝑎𝑗
𝑡𝑗
, and how much total abatement they did compared to what they would have 
done in autarky, 𝑡𝑗 − ?̂?𝑗, and is shown in equation 5. 
𝑅𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑗, 𝑡𝑗) = (
𝑎𝑗
𝑡𝑗
 ) (𝑡𝑗 − ?̂?𝑗)               (5) 
In this version, player i views player j as a friendly reciprocator to the extent that player j 
approaches their abatement target. Additionally, player i responds more positively if j’s 
target is ambitious (that is, set high relative to ?̂?𝑗). With this response function, each i-th 
player’s maximization problem becomes: 
max
𝑎𝑖
  𝑢𝑖
𝐷( 𝑎𝑖,  𝑎𝑗; 𝑋) + 𝛽𝑖𝑗 (
𝑎𝑗
𝑡𝑗
 ) (𝑡𝑗 − ?̂?𝑗)𝑢𝑗
𝐷( 𝑎𝑖,  𝑎𝑗; 𝑋)              (6) 
The functions defined here are just two of many possible response functions but are 
emblematic of reciprocal behavior based on norms created by abatement target focal 
points. 
The inclusion of reciprocity creates two new ways in which utility is affected by the 
choice of abatement in addition to direct benefit from abatement. First, players gain 
utility from rewarding or punishing other player, which we refer to as direct reciprocity. 
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Second, players gain utility by causing other players to reciprocally increase their 
abatement. We refer to this as strategic reciprocity. Strategic reciprocity is more easily 
analyzed in traditional economics via game theory, but the direct reciprocity portion does 
not easily fit in the framework. By stating that agents gain or lose their own utility by 
observing their friends or rivals utility, we depart from traditional economics because it 
requires interpersonal comparisons of utility.  
Numeric Example in a Climate Commons 
The inclusion of reciprocity identifies optimal abatement strategies that are higher than 
the strong free-rider but below that of the socially optimal level. This section uses a 
specific functional form for utility and the continuous response function above to show 
how reciprocally optimal strategies arise given various parameters. We use a relatively 
standard direct utility function, equation 7, which is a monotonically increasing, concave 
function of consumption (expressed as 𝑤 − 𝑎𝑖 as before) and monotonically decreasing, 
convex function of GHG stock, X. 
 
      𝑢𝑖
𝐷(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗; 𝑋) = 𝑣1(𝑤 − 𝑎𝑖) − 𝑣2(𝑤 − 𝑎𝑖)
2 − 𝛾(𝑋 − ∑𝑎𝑗
𝑁𝑎
𝑗=1
)
2
       (7) 
The parameters 𝑣1, 𝑣2, and 𝛾 affect the degree of concavity and relative utility impacts 
from consumption versus GHG damages. Equation 7 is used as the direct utility 
component of our maximization in equation 6. We chose values for these parameters and 
solved the reciprocity model in terms of 𝛽, 𝑋, 𝑡𝑖  and ai to see how behavior changes 
under different assumptions in the response function.  Using these parameters, we solve 
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for three cases: the strong free-rider solution (where 𝛽 = 0), the socially optimal solution 
(𝛽 =
𝑁
𝑁+1
) and a range of reciprocally optimal values in between these benchmarks. 
Strong Free-Riding Solution 
Using direct utility alone, we define the strong free-rider solution as the maximization of: 
max
𝑎𝑖
 𝑣1(𝑤 − 𝑎𝑖) − 𝑣2(𝑤 − 𝑎𝑖)
2 − 𝛾 (𝑋 − ∑𝑎𝑗
𝑁𝑎
𝑗=1
)
2
               (8)   
The solution to this is such that the marginal benefits from consumption are equal to the 
marginal benefits of abatement that results from the individual agent (not from the 
aggregate level of abatement). Solving the first order condition for player i's abatement 
gives us: 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= −𝑣1 + 2𝑣2(𝑤 − 𝑎𝑖) + 2𝛾(𝑋 − 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑗)               (9) 
This can be solved for 𝑎𝑖, which gives us: 
𝑎𝑖 =
2𝑣2𝑤 + 2𝑋𝛾 − 𝑣1 − 2𝛾 ∑ 𝑎𝑗
𝑁𝑎−1
𝑗≠𝑖
2(𝑣2 + 𝛾)
               (10) 
Assuming that players are identical in their abatement activities such that: 
∑ 𝑎𝑗
𝑁𝑎−1
𝑗≠𝑖
= (𝑁𝑎 − 1)𝑎𝑖               (11) 
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We get: 
𝑎𝑖 =
2𝑣2𝑤 + 2𝑋𝛾 − 𝑣1 − 2𝛾(𝑁𝑎 − 1)𝑎𝑖
2(𝑣2 + 𝛾)
               (12) 
Solving this for 𝑎𝑖: 
𝑎𝑖 =
2𝑣2𝑤 + 2𝑋𝛾 − 𝑣1
2(𝑣2 + 𝑁𝑎𝛾)
               (13) 
To add a level of concreteness to these expressions, we use a specific set of parameters so 
that the optimal conditions can be graphed. The parameters chosen here and throughout 
are 𝑋 = 15,𝑤 = 4, 𝛾 = .35, 𝑣1 = 20, 𝑣2 = 2, and 𝑁𝑎 = 2.  With these parameters, the 
individual-Nash non-cooperative level of abatement as 𝑎𝑖 = 1.203.  This represents the 
myopic prisoner’s dilemma baseline solution with no conception of reciprocal fairness 
included. 
Socially Optimal Solution 
The socially optimal solution can be obtained similarly, except we now assume that a 
benevolent social planner chooses all levels of abatement simultaneously to maximize 
aggregate welfare: 
max
𝑎1…𝑎𝑁𝑎
 ∑(𝑣1(𝑤 − 𝑎𝑖) − 𝑣2(𝑤 − 𝑎𝑖)
2    −  𝛾 (𝑋 − ∑𝑎𝑗
𝑁𝑎
𝑗=1
)
2
)               (10)
𝑁𝑎
𝑖=1
  
Solving this for the first order condition as above gives us: 
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𝑎𝑖 =
−𝑣1 + 2𝑣2𝑤 + 2𝑁𝑎𝑋𝛾
2(𝑣2 + 𝑁𝑎2𝛾)
               (11) 
Using the same parameters as in the myopic case, we find the socially optimal level of 
abatement is 𝑎𝑖 = 2.5, significantly higher than the individual solution.  These 
benchmarks will be used as comparisons to the fairness model. 
Reciprocal Solution 
We now add the behavioral response function, 𝑅𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑗 , 𝑡𝑗) = (
𝑎2
𝑡2
 ) (𝑡2 − ?̂?2), into our 
above functions.   Assuming again that there are two players, player 1’s problem 
becomes:   
max
𝑎1
 𝑣1(𝑤 − 𝑎1) − 𝑣2(𝑤 − 𝑎1)
2 −  𝛾 (𝑋 − ∑𝑎𝑗
𝑁𝑎
𝑗=1
)
2
⏟                              
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 1′𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽12 (
𝑎2
𝑡2
 ) (𝑡2 − ?̂?2)⏟          
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
  (𝑣1(𝑤 − 𝑎2) − 𝑣2(𝑤 − 𝑎2)2 −  𝛾 (𝑋 − ∑𝑎𝑗
𝑁𝑎
𝑗=1
)
2
)
⏟                                  
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 2′𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
The key term here is 𝛽1 (
𝑎2
𝑡2
 ) (𝑡2 − ?̂?2), recalling that 𝛽𝑖 parameterizes how much each 
individual cares about reciprocity.  The response function in this formulation is the 
mechanism by which players will gain positive value from increasing the other player’s 
utility when the other player is helpful, and similarly, gain positive value from decreasing 
the other player’s utility when the other player is unhelpful.  Intuitively, the overall result 
of including the response function is that if someone abates little relative to their 
abatement target, their rivals will want to punish them with less reciprocal abatement. 
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Similarly, if a player abates closer to their abatement target, their impact causes a 
multiplying effect on the aggregate abatement effort where all players are rewarding 
other players reciprocally. 
At this point, we are begging the question of how 𝑡2 is established.  For the time being, 
we are keeping it at an arbitrary level, in this case set at the socially optimal level of 
abatement. In an upcoming paper we will endogenize the abatement targets by 
developing a nested-commons dilemma in which international negotiations set national 
abatement targets, and conversely, national abatement choices affect the reciprocal 
response of other nations at the international level. 
To solve our algebraic example above, we take the first order conditions as above, and 
assuming that we have an interior solution and that players are identical, we find the 
optimal abatement for each i-th individual is: 
𝑎𝑖 = 
𝑡(𝑋𝛽𝛾 − 𝑣2 − 2𝛾) − 𝑋𝛽𝛾 + √4(𝑡 − 1)𝑡𝛽𝛾(2v2𝑤 + 2𝑋𝛾 − 𝑣1) + (𝑋𝛽𝛾 + 𝑡(v2 + (2 − 𝑋𝛽)𝛾))2
4(𝑡 − 1)𝛽𝛾
 
Using our parameters from above, we this solution identifies a range of optimal 
abatement values depending only on the value chosen for 𝛽. For any positive value of 𝛽 
the reciprocally optimal abatement level is higher than the individual solution.  The next 
section will analyze the shape of the relationship between 𝛽 and reciprocally optimal 
abatement. 
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Results for the Climate Commons 
Note that it is possible for the reciprocal model to predict more abatement than in the 
socially optimal case, but this only occurs if people care more about rewarding and 
punishing their rivals than they do about their direct utility, as in gift giving examples. 
Fig. 3.1 shows the relationship between 𝛽 and aggregate utility. In this figure we see that 
the socially optimal level of abatement is met when 𝛽 =
2
3
, as expected.  
 
Figure 3.1: Effect of increasing intensity of reciprocity (𝜷) on abatement 
 𝜷 
 𝒂𝒊
∗ 
Myopic Abatement = 1.203 
Socially Optimal Abatement = 2.5 
𝛽 = 0.66 
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Fig. 3.2 illustrates the effect that changing the target has on the optimal abatement level.  
If one sets the target only slightly above what individuals would do out of their own self-
interest, the behavior response function implies that neither side would care much about 
achieving this goal because it was not a very ambitious or impressive goal. Conversely, 
with a higher emissions target, each player’s response function changes so that movement 
towards the emissions target garners more respect, and therefore more reciprocal 
response.  This is intuitive insofar as players respond with more positive reciprocity to 
other players’ actions that constitute more effort. Notice that no matter how high one sets 
the target, individuals do not abate past what would have been socially optimal. This limit 
holds for any value of 𝛽, but the rate of convergence increases as 𝛽 rises. 
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The optimal abatement in the reciprocity model approaches zero as the target approaches 
zero (as in Fig. 3.3). While this may seem contradictory, as it would seem to imply that 
setting a goal would result in a lower level of abatement than selfish players would 
achieve, it is quite intuitive. Any target set below the individually rational level would 
constitute an abatement-reducing target (which increases emissions). In this context of 
climate change, this would not seem to be an interesting case, but the flexibility here 
suggests that the reciprocity model is robust to writing equations in terms of reducing a 
public bad (emissions) and increasing a public good (abatement). 
Figure 3.2.: Effect of increasing intensity of reciprocity (𝜷) on utility 
 𝜷 
𝛽 = 0.66 
Utility Loss from Climate Change 
(excludes reciprocal utility) 
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Finally, we can see from Fig. 3.4 that increasing the initial stock of GHG increases the 
optimal level of abatement. This is because the harm caused by emissions is a convex 
function while returns to consumption are concave. Other parameters in the model, such 
as 𝛾, which measures the harm of emissions relative to the benefits of consumption, show 
a similar expected result. 
Figure 3.3: Effect of Emissions Target on Reciprocally Optimal Abatement 
Emissions Target 
Abatement 
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Simultaneous changes of 𝛽 and the target increase the equilibrium abatement, shown in 
Fig. 3.5. One interesting result of the model is seen here. If the intensity of reciprocity (𝛽) 
is high, even a slight increase in the emissions target has a large impact. This is due to 
players rewarding the reciprocally beneficent actions of other players meeting the new 
goal. 
Figure 3.4: Effect of Initial Emissions on Reciprocally Optimal Abatement 
 
Initial Concentration 
Abatement 
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Fig. 3.6 shows the effect that changing the target and 𝛽 have on aggregate utility. For 
values of 𝛽 between zero and 
𝑁
𝑁+1
, increasing the target increases total utility. If players 
do not care about reciprocity at all, changing the target changes nothing, as expected. For 
values of 𝛽 higher than 
𝑁
𝑁+1
, it is still possible to achieve the socially optimal level of 
abatement, but only be setting a correspondingly lower target. 
 
Figure 3.5: Simultaneous Changes of 𝜷 and 𝒕 on Reciprocally Optimal Abatement 
 
Abatement 
t 𝜷 
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The non-monotonicity present here is another useful result. For lower values of 𝛽 and t, 
utility is increasing in a straight-forward, concave way. But, when both 𝛽 and t become 
too high, there is a precipitous drop in overall direct8 utility (I refer to this as the over-
                                                 
 
8 If one includes both direct and interpersonal utility, the effect becomes much more negative. This, 
however, is due to the additional loss of utility persons experience through their response functions (they 
are mad at their rivals and thus unhappy). I focus results discussion on the direct utility component alone 
because the policy recommendations and interpretation tasks become difficult if we consider more than 
direct utility. 
Figure 3.6: Simultaneous Changes of 𝜷 and 𝒕 on Direct Utility 
 
Utility 
t 
𝜷 
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commitment pit). The reason for the drop is that if the goal is too difficult to achieve, the 
previously virtuous feedback effect (in which partial abatement caused other players to 
respond with more abatement) becomes a negative feedback effect where each player is 
focused on punishing their rivals who failed to meet the challenging goal.  
Extending of the Climate Example to Multiple Time Periods 
The above solution relies on a static solution concept, however, it is reasonable to wonder 
what would happen if this problem played itself out over time.  Using the continuous 
behavioral response function outlined above, we add a simple equation of motion to the 
stock of emissions: 
𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝑋𝑡 + 𝜑1 (𝑤 −∑𝑎𝑖
𝑁𝑎
𝑖=1
) − 𝜑2 (∑𝑎𝑖
𝑁𝑎
𝑖=1
)               (16) 
Where consumption increases the emissions stock at a rate of  𝜑1 and abatement reduces 
the emissions stock at a rate of 𝜑2.  For simplicity, assume 𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 1, and solve 
period-by-period for the equilibrium path and levels of abatement and utility.  Charting 
this out over time (shown in Fig. 3.7), we can see how the equilibrium paths differ over 
time between the non-cooperative solution and the fairness solution. The reciprocity 
model results in more abatement activity, limiting the increase in GHG concentration 
growth to a very low level.  As expected, the GHG stock is much higher at every time 
period in the non-reciprocity case, and is much lower in the socially optimal case, 
beginning with drastic reductions in the first period. 
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The optimal abatement choices at each time are depicted in Fig. 3.8. As we might expect 
given the figure for GHG stocks in Fig. 3.7, the socially optimal abatement path involves 
dramatic reductions in emissions right away, the reciprocity model predict a moderate 
and increasing level of abatement, and the non-reciprocity model predict a very 
significant delay before the abatement levels increase (as a result of significantly higher 
harm from climate change). 
Figure 3.7: Stock of Emissions over Time 
 
Stock of 
Emissions 
  
Time 
Socially Optimal 
Reciprocal 
Myopic 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
The application discussed above provides an example of how to define, solve and 
interpret a climate commons while allowing for partial free-riding due to reciprocity. 
Although the parameters used here are for example purposes only, one of the main 
contributions of this model it explicitly states a functional model that can explain 
situations in which humans do not completely free-ride. Given the strong evidence from 
behavioral economics that observed human actions are not always typified by perfect 
rationality, it is important to develop models that can predict partial free-riding (or other 
implications of the extended utility framework) as a direct result of the model. Once 
Figure 3.8: Abatement Choices over Time 
 
Abatement 
  
  
Time 
Socially Optimal 
Reciprocal 
Myopic 
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created, such models can be used to generate specific hypotheses and functional forms 
that can then be confirmed or refuted with empirical work. I include in Appendix 2 a 
discussion of the econometric estimation technique I will use. Unfortunately, collecting 
the data necessary for this was outside the scope and budget of this thesis. Nonetheless, 
using laboratory observations, similar to Marwell and Ames (1979 and 1981), the model 
could readily be tested.  
Finally, note that the extended utility framework can be extended to consider multiple 
persons. For example, consider a vector of 𝛽𝑖𝑗 values sorted by value so that the highest 
values are at the beginning of the vector. Moving further down this vector means the i-th 
individual has progressively less intensity of their reciprocal feelings toward the j-th 
individual in the vector. Fig. 3.9 plots this relationship. 
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In this figure, we see that those relationships closest to the i-th individual have much 
higher reciprocal intensities. Also note that the arch-nemesis has a relatively high value, 
positive value. The high value of 𝛽 for the arch-nemesis simply means the i-th individual 
experiences large changes in utility from observing the nemesis gain or lose. Using a 
vector of 𝛽s like this along with the solution methods above, it is possible to solve for a 
reciprocal equilibrium for many individuals, such as is expressed in equation 17. The 
basic approach remains the same, which is to find first order conditions and best response 
functions for all individuals and solve the system of equations. 
Figure 3.9: 𝜷𝒊𝒋 Vector by Reciprocal Distance 
𝛽𝑖𝑗 
Reciprocal 
distance of 
j-th 
individual 
 
1 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9                 ....                N 
D
ef
au
lt
 C
o
n
ce
rn
 
fo
r 
O
th
er
s 
Life-partner 
Best Friends 
Family 
Arch Nemesis 
Friends 
Acquaintance
Same City  
Same Country  
Everyone Else  
  
 126 
 
𝑢𝑖
𝑅(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗) =  𝑢𝑖
𝐷(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗) +∑𝛽𝑖𝑗 𝑅𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑗) 𝑢𝑗
𝐷(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗)
𝐼
𝑗≠𝑖
                 (17) 
The shape of the curve in Fig. 3.9 provides another basis for future empirical work. 
Specifically, I econometric estimation can help identify the relationship between 
reciprocal distance and reciprocal intensity.  
Finally, the commons reciprocity utility model can be implemented with agent-based 
simulation methods, as discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis. The reciprocal 
distance, in the context of forest commons, can be defined as physical distance and/or the 
extent to which villagers use a common while the extended utility framework provides 
behavior rules used in the simulation. I present a preliminary implementation of this 
approach in Appendix 2. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis attempted to address how we can model economic systems and ecological 
systems in a coherent framework. I presented three specific models to illustrate this point, 
along with results from various locations. Although these chapters are complete, they also 
represent starting points down different methodological paths. For each of these topics, 
and a wide variety of other topics, I will extend these methods with more precision and 
more examples in future research. This chapter will outline, in cursory form, several of 
the research ideas most likely to be next on my research agenda. 
The work in chapter two on geospatial optimization of global food and carbon tradeoffs 
attempts to identify a biophysical frontier rather than a bio-economic frontier that 
incorporates economic behavior and decisions. However, with future work, I believe this 
is exactly the direction global ecosystem service analysis needs to go. To do this, I will 
focus on the following three research topics. First, I will extend the ability of the model 
used in chapter two to more accurately predict where crop extensification is likely to 
happen using crop models (DSSAT, Lizaso et al. 2011), historical data, suitability data, 
and economic indicators. Forthcoming data from Deepak et al. (2014, in prep) will 
provide historical data that can calibrate the extensification predictions, as will time 
series data from MODIS (2000 to 2012). Another avenue will be to use sub-grid-cell 
heterogeneity to make predictions about which grid-cells still have extensification 
potential. For example, if a 10km grid-cell is currently cultivated at 50%, but if we know 
that 25% of the 30 meter sub-grid-cells in this same location (using higher-resolution data 
from LANDSAT or MODIS remote sensing sources) then we can hypothesize that the 
grid-cell cannot be extensified beyond 75%. In chapter two, we avoided making specific 
extensification assumptions like this and instead limited our analysis to using ad-hoc 
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assumptions that are accurate in aggregate. However, data are available to make these 
assumptions specific rather than ad-hoc.  
Second, I will extend the analysis methodology used by the Global Landscapes Initiative 
(GLI, Foley et al. 2011, Mueller et al. 2012) to create the data I used in chapter two. 
Specifically, the analysis used by GLI relies on a concept called “climate bins” to make 
hypotheses about where intensification can increase caloric production by closing “yield 
gaps.” This methodology divides the globe into 100 non-continuous areas identified by 
similar growing degree days (GDD) and precipitation. So for example, if an area in Iowa 
and Ukraine have the same GDD and precipitation, they are defined to be in the same 
climate bin, even if Ukraine is observed to have lower yields. The yield gap analysis 
argues that if these two plots are in the same climate bin, it is reasonable to assume that 
Ukraine could increase its yields to match that of Iowa through better management and 
intensification strategies. Although the climate bin methodology is very useful and well-
accepted in the  peer-reviewed scientific literature, it has several aspects I believe can be 
extended. Specifically, the climate bin approach can be rephrased as a simple two 
variable regression that predicts yields based on GDD and precipitation:  
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝 + 𝜖 
This is a testable hypothesis and should be thoroughly validated. However, initial 
regressions I have run suggest that while the simple regression does have predictive 
power, it has considerable omitted-variable bias, specifically by ignoring management 
decisions, irrigation, access to markets and fertilization rates. Thus, I believe the climate 
bin should be extended to a broader multi-variable regression, approximately of the form: 
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𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑥𝑦
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑥𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑥𝑦
+ 𝛽2𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑥𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑥𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑦
+ 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑥𝑦
+ 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑥𝑦 + 𝜖𝑥𝑦 
This too is a testable hypothesis, and I believe that formal statistical testing of which 
equation best predicts yields will be very useful to the analysis presented in chapter two, 
but also much more broadly. 
Third, using the results from the previous two points, I will re-run the entire geospatial 
optimization model of chapter two with parameterized extensification cost functions. 
Thus, each grid-cell would have a function for marginal production increases of calories. 
The optimization, then, would choose the grid-cells where extensification maximizes 
marginal-yield / marginal carbon, rather an the existing indicator of crop advantage. 
Finally, I will extend the above analysis points with more policy discussion. Specifically, 
I will include an in-depth analysis of food-for-environment swaps by identifying ranked 
pairs of “best exchanges.” Analysis of where these pairs exist and how the best 
exchanges can be made to happen will give specific policy relevance to the global 
analysis.  
The next research topic that I plan to address post-graduation is to fully implement the 
simulation of common property forest management I presented in chapter five and 
validate the data with field observations in Cambodia. I have built a relationship with a 
field office of the World Wildlife Fund in Cambodia that will be able to do household 
surveys of villagers in the Mekong watershed and collect paired observations of villager 
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household location and foraging location. Once this data has been collected, it will be 
used to validate the general method and serve as example data in the public release of the 
modeling software I developed. The software will be a part of the InVEST modeling 
tools of the Natural Capital Project. 
Finally, the last extension of my research that I will pursue is creating a way to 
interpolate higher-resolutions of gridded data on socioeconomic indicators. The approach 
I will used, referred to as downscaling, works by determining the relationship between a 
coarse data input and a finer input and then using the relationship to impute what the best 
approximation of the coarse data on the finer grid should be. This approach was 
discussed in chapter three where it was used to interpolate high-resolution population 
density data. The approach, however, is much broader and can be used to create a wealth 
of economic data on a spatial resolution finer than what has been available. The follow-
up research that I need to do will be to create the methodology, downscale it for a specific 
data set, such as the Earthstat data, and then show if (or if not) the higher-resolution data 
are accurate. 
Although the work presented in this these (along with the additional research avenues 
discussed in this chapter) are primarily methodological and theoretical, I have attempted 
to focus them on important problems humanity faces as we grow into a more complex 
and resource demanding society. Climate change, food security and managing our 
common property resources (such as forests) all will require concerted effort to 
understand and manage. Moreover, as our societies grow more complex and harness a 
greater amount of resources, the informational requirements to understanding these 
systems will also grow. The methodologies presented in this these attempt to extend the 
scope of insights gained in economics to a broader set of problems. In this way, I hope to 
help answer the questions of how ought humans live in our environment.  
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Appendix 1: Supplemental Information for Chapter 1 
In the first section of this supplement, we provide additional details on the steps taken in 
the optimization. In the second section, we illustrate each of the steps in section one with 
global maps. In the third section, we present a sensitivity analysis and results from 
alternate scenarios that illustrate how alternative assumptions influence results. In the 
fourth section, we discuss heterogeneity within grid-cells and present an example grid 
cell that illustrates our assumption on heterogeneity. 
Optimization Details 
Our optimization procedure identifies areas to extensify agricultural production to meet 
increased demand while minimizing the loss of carbon storage. Formally, we solve the 
following optimization: 
min
𝐸𝑥𝑦
∑∑𝐸𝑥𝑦 (∑(
𝐷𝐹𝑖 𝐶
𝑅𝑖
∗ 𝑌𝑖𝑥𝑦)
175
𝑖=1
− 𝑃𝑁𝑉𝐶𝑥𝑦 − .25(𝑆𝐶𝑥𝑦))
𝑌
𝑦=1
𝑋
𝑥=1
                                  
𝑆. 𝑡.∑∑∑(𝑌𝑖𝑥𝑦 + (𝐸𝑥𝑦 ∗  𝐻𝑖𝑥𝑦))
175
𝑖=1
𝑌
𝑦=1
𝑋
𝑥=1
≥ 𝐷∑∑∑(𝑌𝑖𝑥𝑦)
175
𝑖=1
𝑌
𝑦=1
𝑋
𝑥=1
                                         
0.05 ≤ 𝑃𝑥𝑦 +  𝐸𝑥𝑦 ≤ 0.95                                        ∀ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌                                    
𝐸𝑥𝑦 =  min(𝑃𝑥𝑦 ∗ 𝐺𝑢, (. 95 − 𝑃𝑥𝑦) ∗ 𝐺𝑐 )    ∀ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌                                    
 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑦 ∈ {[0.05,0.95]  ∀ 𝑥 ∈ [0,4320] and y ∈ [0,2160]}  is the proportion of the 
xy-th grid-cell to be extensified (this is a set of approximately 10 million choice 
variables), 𝐷𝐹𝑖  is the proportion of dry matter of the yield for crop i, C is the carbon 
content of dry matter (0.45 g C per g dry matter) and 𝑅𝑖 represents the proportion of the 
crop that leaves the farm (rather than remaining on the field or belowground). Tons of 
economically valued dry crop yield, measured per xy-th grid-cell for each of the 175 i-th 
crops, is denoted as 𝑌𝑖𝑥𝑦, while 𝐻𝑖𝑥𝑦 is the per hectare yield. To calculate the amount of 
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carbon that would be contained either in natural land or in the crop chosen for 
extensification, we identify the potential natural vegetation carbon (𝑃𝑁𝑉𝐶𝑥𝑦) and soil 
carbon (𝑆𝐶𝑥𝑦). D represents the required increase in calories that must be met (100% 
increase in our baseline scenario). The first constraint simply states that the minimization 
problem is constrained to meet the required calorie increase in aggregate, based on 
existing crop production. The second set of constraints defines 𝑃𝑥𝑦 as the current 
proportion cultivated for each grid-cell. Thus, for each x-y  pair, we constrain our 
optimization to only consider cells that have at least 0.05 proportion of the grid-cell under 
cultivation and to never increase cultivation beyond 0.95 proportion cultivated. The final 
set of constraints defines how large of an increase in proportion cultivated each grid-cell 
can achieve. This is achieved by defining assumptions on how much the proportion 
cultivated can increase when the resulting proportion is less than 0.95 (defined by the 
unconstrained growth factor 𝑔𝑢) and how much it can increase if unconstrained growth 
would increase the proportion past 0.95 (defined by the constrained growth factor 𝑔𝑐). 
Together, these constraints attempt to limit the potential extensification choices we 
consider in our optimization to be limited to ones where per-crop data is sufficiently 
numerous, where land is not approaching complete cultivation, and also, to limit the 
increase by 2050 to be smaller than completely closing the yield-gap present in each grid-
cell. 
The business-as-usual (BAU) is defined as increasing the share cultivated of each grid-
cell by the percent necessary to meet the caloric goal. BAU increases are subject to the 
same feasibility constraints and limits a in the optimal simulation but ignore carbon 
storage.   
The following steps describe how we processed our data and solved the maximization. 
Step 1: Construct Caloric Yield (CY) per Ha and per Grid-Cell for Each Crop 
From the EarthStat dataset, we have yield per hectare for 175 crops (Fig. A1.1 illustrates 
this for Maize), along with the proportion of the grid-cell harvested for each crop (Fig. 
A1.2). Multiplying A1.1 with A1.2 and adjusting for the number of hectares present gives 
us the tons of Maize present in each grid-cell (Fig. A1.3). We combine the data in A1.3 
for each crop with data from FAOSTAT on caloric content of Maize (Fig. A1.4), adjusted 
so that both units are in dry-tons. Summation of 175 crop-specific versions of map A1.4 
creates Fig. A1.5, which is caloric yield, 𝐶𝑌𝑥𝑦, the numerator of our crop advantage 
indicator. 
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Step 2: Calculate Marginal Effect of Extensification on Carbon Storage (𝚫𝑪) 
We calculate the marginal change in carbon storage from equation (4). Fig. A1.6 shows 
the change in crop carbon, 𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑦. Fig. A1.7 shows the carbon storage in potential natural 
vegetation, 𝑃𝑁𝑉𝐶𝑥𝑦. Fig. A1.8 shows the carbon storage change attributable to soil 
carbon 𝑆𝐶𝑥𝑦. Using equation (4), we derive Δ𝐶𝑥𝑦, shown in Fig. A1.9.  
Step 3: Calculate the Crop Advantage Indicator (CA) 
Using equation (1), we use the maps calculated in steps 1 and 2 to create the map of Crop 
Advantage, shown in Fig. A1.10. This represents the marginal value of extensifying in 
each grid-cell. 
Step 4: Find Optimal Extensification Choices Step-wise 
To find the set of extensification choices that maximize the amount of carbon storage 
present while still meeting calorie demand, we identify which cell has the highest crop-
advantage and then extensify cultivation on that cell according to the growth factor 
(subject to feasibility constraints). We chose to increase extensification in proportion to 
observed extensification rather than to a biophysical maximum to reflect the lack of data 
and sub-grid-cell heterogeneity on soil, topography or other conditions at finer 
resolutions that may prevent extensification. We repeat this procedure on each grid-cell 
in order of decreasing crop-advantage until we meet the global calorie production goal. 
The output of this algorithm, shown in Fig. A1.11, identifies where new calories should 
be produced according to the optimal simulation. 
We implement the above algorithm in a software application, Geospatial Economic 
Modeler (GEM), which is a visualization and analysis program written by the lead author 
of this paper. GEM is written in Python and is ready for integration into other Python 
based analysis programs, such as InVEST from the Natural Capital Project.  
Step 5: Find BAU Extensification Choices 
Using the extensification rules defined above and a similar iterative procedure, we 
proportionately increase cultivation until we meet the increased calorie demand. We 
assume that the future BAU scenario has the same proportion of each crop as existed in 
2000 for each grid-cell. Fig. A1.12 shows where new calories are produced under BAU.  
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Step 6: Identify Difference between BAU and Optimal Extensification Choices 
Figs. A1.11 and A1.12 describe dramatically different agriculture systems, despite the 
fact that at global resolutions the differences are difficult to see. Because of this 
difficulty, it is more useful to analyze the difference between the simulations. We define 
a Net Land Protected map (shown in Fig. A1.13) as the difference between the proportion 
cultivated in BAU and the proportion cultivated in the optimized simulation. Positive 
values (shown in green) of this number indicate the proportion of a grid-cell that is spared 
from extensification in the optimized simulation but is not spared in BAU. Negative 
values (shown in red) indicate where extensification must be higher in the optimal 
simulation than in BAU to continue reaching the caloric demand.  
Step 7: Calculate Difference between Simulations in Carbon Storage  
Note that in red cells in Fig. A1.13, there is a net loss of carbon storage in the optimal 
scenario. This is because the optimal simulation produces as many calories as BAU, and 
thus must sacrifice some lands to reach the calorie goal. However, grid-cells sacrificed 
have systematically lower carbon storage values (a direct result of optimizing), and thus 
we see that total carbon is increased in the optimal simulation. To calculate how much 
carbon is gained or lost in each grid-cell, we multiply the values in the Net Land 
Protected map (Fig. A1.13) with the values in Fig. A1.9, Marginal Effect of 
Extensification on Carbon Storage (Δ𝐶). We present the net change of carbon storage in 
Fig. A1.14. Summation of all grid-cells in A1.14 gives us the global amount of carbon 
saved. In the scenario illustrated here (more pessimistic than the baseline scenario in the 
text), map A1.14 sums to 12.08 billion metric tons of carbon. 
Illustration of Optimization Routine 
In this section, we include global maps that illustrate each of the steps described above. 
In general, the differences between maps appear slight at the global scale, but become 
pronounced at regional scales. To illustrate the range of analyses possible, the maps 
presented in this section are from a more pessimistic scenario in which only 50% of the 
increase is met with intensification. 
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Figure A1.1: Maize Proportion of Grid-Cell Harvested.  
Proportion Harvested 
  0                                                                 0.25                                                              0.5 
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Figure A1.2: Maize per Ha Yield (tons). 
Tons per Ha 
  0                                                                  7.5                                                                  15 
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Figure A1.3: Maize per Grid-Cell Yield (tons dry weight).  
Tons per Grid-Cell 
  0                                                               7,500                                                        15,000 
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Figure A1.4: Maize per Grid-Cell Caloric Yield (kcal).  
Calories per Grid-Cell 
  0                                                            3.5e+10                                                       7e+10                    
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Figure A1.5: All Crop per Grid-Cell Caloric Yield (kcal).  
Calories per Grid-Cell 
  0                                                               1e+11                                           2e+11                    
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Figure A1.6: Carbon Storage in Crops, Assuming Complete Extensification of Grid-Cell at 
Current Crop Proportions (tons).  
Tons per Grid-Cell 
  0                                                               30,000                                                      60,000 
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Figure A1.7: Carbon Storage in Potential Natural Vegetation (tons) 
Tons per Grid-Cell 
  0                                                               1,000,000                                           2,000,000 
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Figure A1.8: Carbon Storage in Soils (tons per Ha) 
Tons per Hectare 
  0                                                                  12                                                                  24 
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Figure A1.9: Marginal Effect of Extensification on Carbon Storage (tons C per grid-cell).  
Tons C per Grid-Cell 
  -2,000,000                                                   0                                                      2,000,000 
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Figure A1.10: Crop Advantage (caloric yield per ton carbon storage loss).  
Calories per ton Carbon 
  0                                                               1,500,000                                           3,000,000 
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Figure A1.11: Change in Caloric Yield (post Optimization Simulation).  
Calories per Grid-Cell 
 -1e+11                                                          0                1e+11                         
                             500,000 
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Figure A1.12: Change in Caloric Yield (post BAU Simulation).  
Calories per Grid-Cell 
 -1e+11                                                          0                1e+11                                                       
500,000 
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Figure A1.13: Net Land Protected (Proportion Harvested in BAU less Proportion 
Harvested in the Optimal Simulation).  
Net Change in Proportion of Grid-Cell 
  -0.2                                                               0                                                                 0.2 
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Sensitivity Analysis and Additional Results  
Our base scenario, defined as producing 100% more calories with 75% of the increase 
coming from intensification, may underestimate the challenges we face, especially with 
regard to lower yield increases in the future. We discuss results from a second, more 
pessimistic, scenario than in the text. Detailed results for this scenario, in which only 
50% of the increase is met with intensification, are presented here. This section also 
provides more detail on the optimization technique with extended documentation on each 
step of the calculation of the pessimistic scenario. 
Our analysis depends on six parameter assumptions, discussed in the text and presented 
as column labels in table A1.1. The 20 sensitivity analyses presented in this table are full 
optimization runs with different parameters. Scenarios 1 and 2 correspond to the base 
Figure A1.14: Net Carbon Storage Change (tons per grid-cell). 
Crop Advantage (calories per tons carbon storage) 
  -200,000                                                               0                                                200,000 
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scenario and pessimistic scenario discussed in the text, while scenarios 3 – 20 are 
representative modulations of the input parameters. Many additional runs have been 
completed to test sensitivity but are excluded here. The rightmost column presents the 
carbon saved by optimizing under each of these assumptions sets. None of the sensitivity 
analyses depart substantially from the base scenario and nearly all of the variance can be 
explained by different assumptions on how much future intensification will contribute to 
meeting calorie demand. 
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Table A1.1: Sensitivity Analysis Results 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Scenario 
Percent 
Increase 
in 
Calories 
Percent 
met with 
Intensifi
cation 
Min 
Extensific
ation 
Constraint 
Max 
Extensific
ation 
Constraint 
Constr
ained 
Growth 
Factor 
Uncons
trained 
Growth 
Factor 
 Carbon 
Saved by 
Optimizing 
(billion 
tons)  
1 100% 75% 5% 95% 75% 4 5.89 
2 100% 50% 5% 95% 75% 4 12.08 
3 100% 80% 5% 95% 75% 4 4.71 
4 150% 75% 5% 95% 75% 4 7.11 
5* 150% 50% 5% 95% 75% 4 10.79 
6 150% 80% 5% 95% 75% 4 5.65 
7 70% 75% 5% 95% 75% 4 4.84 
8 70% 50% 5% 95% 75% 4 10.00 
9 70% 80% 5% 95% 75% 4 3.90 
10 100% 75% 5% 95% 50% 4 5.61 
11 100% 75% 5% 95% 65% 4 5.82 
12 100% 75% 5% 95% 85% 4 5.93 
13 100% 75% 5% 95% 100% 4 5.97 
14 100% 75% 1% 99% 75% 4 6.04 
15 100% 75% 0% 100% 75% 4 6.05 
16 100% 75% 5% 95% 75% 3 5.82 
17 100% 75% 5% 95% 75% 5 5.91 
18* 100% 75% 5% 95% 75% 2 5.04 
19 100% 75% 5% 95% 75% 6 5.92 
20 100% 75% 5% 95% 75% 9999*
* 
5.94 
* Indicates a scenario in which the increased calorie demand could not be met. 
** Chosen as arbitrarily high value to test maximal unconstrained growth. 
 
  
 164 
 
Additional Analysis and Discussion 
The amount of carbon storage saved by optimizing depends primarily on how many more 
calories we must produce and how much of that increase must be met through 
extensification. Figs. A1.15 and A1.16 show these two effects, respectively. In Fig. 
A1.15, we solved for global carbon storage saved under the optimal solution versus BAU 
for a range of future calorie demands (70% more to 150% more). In most cases, higher 
calorie demand implied more carbon could be saved by optimizing. In the most 
pessimistic cases, such as meeting more than a 100% increase with only 50% coming 
from intensification, we see that the value of optimizing declines. This happens because 
in the most pessimistic scenarios, meeting future food demand becomes so challenging 
(and impossible in some cases) that even the optimal simulation must extensify on nearly 
every grid-cell. At the limit of feasible scenarios, the optimal solution converges to the 
BAU solution because there are no remaining alternate choices.  
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In Fig. A1.16, we show how the value of carbon saved depends on the amount of 
extensification required (using our central estimate for the social cost of carbon, 
$181/ton). Although we centered our analysis around the assumption of requiring 25% of 
calories to come from extensification, recent reductions in the rate at which yields are 
increasing suggests future agriculture may not be able to depend as heavily on yield 
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Figure A1.15: Carbon Saved by Optimizing as a 
Function of Future Calorie Demand
Percent of Increase met with Extensification: 50% 25% 20%
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gains. This increases the importance of optimizing our extensification choices, as shown 
in A1.2. 
 
Our estimates of how much carbon is lost in different scenarios considers only carbon 
lost from extensification-related land use change. Other sources of carbon storage loss 
and other drivers of land use change are excluded from our analysis. These exclusions 
partially explain why the values of carbon saved in our estimates are two orders of 
magnitude less than total carbon storage. In efficiency terms (calories produces per 
carbon storage lost) BAU is 15.5 times worse than the optimal scenario (see table A1.2 
for supporting statistics). This suggests that making informed extensification decisions is 
important. 
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Our analysis depends on the accuracy of the EarthStat data set. There are considerable 
challenges in properly determining grid-cell cultivation statistics (particularly yield) and 
limitations arising from data interpolation. These concerns are offset, we believe, by the 
additional insights that can be gained from the higher resolution of the data. 
Other values of natural ecosystems, such as the protection of biodiversity, are excluded 
from our estimates. Thus, the valuation we place on optimizing our extensification 
choices is likely a dramatic underestimate of the true value lost. Nonetheless, our 
optimization approach provides evidence on the importance of protecting tropical 
ecosystems. Even if our specific values are underestimates, the policy precepts and 
advice support the general conclusion of protecting areas rich in all types of ecosystem 
services. 
 
Table A1.2: Descriptive and Model Statistics  
Global Carbon Storage, Current (tons, aggregated IPCC Tier 1 estimates by grid-
cell) 5.008e+11 
Global Carbon Storage in Potential  Vegetation (tons) 7.389e+11 
Total Carbon Storage Change under BAU  (tons) -6.295e+09 
Total Carbon Change under Optimizing (tons) -4.051e+08 
Number of cultivated cells in dataset 9.209e+05 
How much more carbon is lost under BAU than optimal? (tons) 5.890e+9 
How many times more efficient (in terms of carbon lost per calorie produced) is 
the optimal scenario compared to BAU? 15.54 
  
 
Heterogeneity within Grid-Cells 
Although our data are higher-resolution than national-, state- or county-level data, there 
still exists considerable heterogeneity within each grid-cell. To make global analysis 
computationally possible, each variable is represented with a single number for each grid-
cell. This masks the heterogeneity that exists at the sub-grid-cell level. Fig. A1.17 (right) 
illustrates this point by comparing satellite imagery with a plot of CA at varying altitudes. 
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The image on the right, for example, shows one particular grid cell, which includes areas 
with very different extensification possibilities. Location one, for instance, may be quite 
suitable for extensification due to the relatively large extent of the undeveloped land. 
Area two is likely more expensive to bring into cultivation due to the difficulties of 
cultivating along the banks of a stream. Area three would be extremely expensive to 
cultivate because of the high-value of land in different uses (commercial and residential 
in this case). This type of sub-grid-cell heterogeneity will affect how much 
extensification is possible within the grid-cell. Due to computational difficulties of 
analyzing this higher-resolution, our model implicitly assumes that each grid-cell is 
homogeneous, but we apply constraints on how much extensification can happen within a 
grid-cell to reflect the heterogeneity. The assumptions are discussed in more depth in the 
text, but the most important assumption is that the maximum extensification within a 
grid-cell is a function of how much is currently cultivated. This captures, albeit in an ad 
hoc way, the possibility that grid-cells are physically unable to extensify past a certain 
point and that this effect is partially captured by current rates of extensification. Future 
work will address this point more directly by utilizing downscaled data applied to smaller 
regions of the globe.  
  
 169 
 
 
     
     
     
     
Figure A1.17: Grid-cells compared 
to satellite imagery at differing 
altitudes (left) and sub-grid-cell 
heterogeneity in one example grid-cell 
(right).  
Although the resolution of our data is 
higher than existing global analyses, 
we still exclude considerable sub-grid-
cell heterogeneity. For example, the 
relative cost of cultivating locations 1 
and 2 are likely to be much lower than 
for area 3 in the image on the right. 
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Appendix 2: Supplemental Information for Chapter 2 
This appendix provides detail on the model, results and validation of Chapter 2. The first 
section describes the notation I used to define the agent-based simulation, both in grid-
cell and non-grid-cell network arrangements. The notation is then used to restate the 
model described in chapter 2 with more detail. Next, I provide a set of results parallel to 
those presented in the chapter focused on 250 representative agents rather than 10 
million. This example is useful because many simulations may be done at the village 
level rather than the individual level with approximately this many villages as the agents. 
Moreover, this section presents additional methodological concerns that arise when using 
representative villages, such as how to identify the optimal zone definition or the optimal 
number of agents. Third, I provide more details on the specific algorithms and methods I 
used in computing the simulation in chapter 2, including a full discussion of the nested 
hierarchy of route-finding algorithms I used to balance accuracy with calculation speed. 
Finally, I provide additional information on how I attempted to validate this model. 
Notation and Model Details 
Describing a model that combines agent-based simulation with economics in a spatially 
heterogeneous environment requires new notation and data concepts. This section 
presents that notation and applies it to firewood foraging behavior. The result of this 
section is a comprehensive framework that can be applied to other geospatially specific 
economic phenomena. In a departure from traditional economic techniques, I do not use 
the concepts of equilibrium or optimization to define how agents act. Instead, I derive 
behavior rules from traditional economics and use those rules in a simulation to 
iteratively reach an outcome. This section is admittedly dense and rather long. However, I 
err towards comprehensive inclusion of notation so to allow for greater generalization. It 
is important to keep in mind that the technical details here are critically important to 
ensure clarity but once clarified can be safely deemphasized in favor of the broader and 
more intuitive results that emerge from this logical construct (see the results section for 
an example that shows the intuitiveness of results despite the complexity of notation 
defined here). 
The notation I define will include: 
1. Cell Network 
2. Normalization Method 
3. The Agent  
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4. Behavior Rules 
5. Time and Simulation Steps 
I begin this methods section by describing the cell network and a specific instantiation of 
it useful to spatial topics, the geospatial grid-cell network.  
The Cell Network 
The cell network, and many of the subsequent data types I define, require introducing 
three “primitive” data types I use: points, zones, and networks. These types are not 
interesting in themselves, but by carefully defining their usage, subsequent notation can 
be shortened.  
Point and Correspondence 
Points are zero-dimensional references defined in continuous space. All points (and 
subsequent data types defined below) are defined either with a Cartesian scheme tied to 
latitude and longitude, which I denote with the subscripts x and y, or in matrix notation, 
which I define with row, column notation with subscripts r and c respectively. For 
notational simplicity, these coordinates may be omitted if the primitive is indexed to 
another primitive that does have coordinates defined. In this event, the primitive must be 
in a defined correspondence list (in which I will index each element 𝑖). In practical terms, 
this allows us to connect a primitive to an agent-indexed variable, (such as labor 
expenditures, 𝐿𝑖
𝑔
 in future sections) via an agent-point correspondence between the 𝑖-th 
agent and the 𝑥, 𝑦 or 𝑟, 𝑐 location: 𝑖 = (𝑟, 𝑐) or  𝑖 = (𝑥, 𝑦). Though seemingly trivial, the 
advantage of this framing includes that full precision may be maintained even when a 
geospatial transform is applied (such as gridded interpolation), vector-based mathematics 
and algorithms may be used,9 points are a required to define full-precision shapes at 
higher dimensions, and points are the simplest way to combine non-spatially defined 
agent data (such as survey-based cross-sectional demographic data) with spatially defined 
agent locations.  
                                                 
 
9 The important part of this aspect is that it maintains access to the wide array of geometric algorithms 
documented in computer science. This is a technical hurdle necessary for maintaining computational 
feasibility at the scope and resolution necessary to analyze firewood collection in Tanzania. 
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Zone 
Zones are ordered sets of points where each point forms an edge with its two neighbors 
within the wrapped set. For instance, the zone 𝑍 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4} implies 𝑝1 forms edges 
with 𝑝4 and 𝑝2 while 𝑝2 forms edges with 𝑝1 and 𝑝3. Each zone must also have a defined 
reference point, 𝑝𝑟, that is used to pair the zone with other data constructs (similar to why 
point correspondences were used above). The reference point, if left undefined, is 
assumed to be the geographic centroid of the zone. An example of a reference point that 
might be better defined explicitly is representing the population of the state of Minnesota. 
If our interest in defining Minnesota is to understand how it acts as an agent in a 
simulation, it is nonsensical to assume the geographic center of the state is the best 
representative point of the state’s overall economic activity. Rather it should be defined 
somewhere near the population centers of Minneapolis and St. Paul rather. If processing 
power was unlimited, the better approach would be to define smaller political units each 
with population figures, but in many applications it is important to aggregate. 
Network 
A network is a set of nodes n and corresponding link lists. The node is defined as a zone 
and reference point pair while the link list contains the set of other nodes to which the 
given node is connected and the attributes of the link. I define a network with the 
following notation:  
𝑁 = {(𝑛1,1, 𝑙1,1), (𝑛2,1, 𝑙2,1),… , (𝑛𝑅,𝐶 , 𝑙𝑅,𝐶) } 
where 
𝑛𝑟,𝑐 = 𝑍𝑟,𝑐, 𝑝𝑟,𝑐
𝑟  
and  
𝑙1,1 = {(𝑛2,1, 𝑎2,1), (𝑛2,2, 𝑎2,2),… , (𝑛𝑅,𝐶 , 𝑎𝑅,𝐶)} 
In this definition, a link list is composed of all the other nodes to which the current node 
is linked paired with the attribute value of that link, 𝑛2,1 and 𝑎2,1 respectively. Networks 
allow for description of interactions between nodes. For instance, a network may describe 
bilateral trade relationships, travel time between locations, social networks or supply 
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chains. The advantage of using full  network notation, as described above, is that it 
provides a comprehensive data frame that can contain all elements that comprise the 
network, rather than case-specific representations more frequently used (such as 
adjacency matrices, trade partner lists, or flow maps, which are case-specific subsets of a 
full network description). 
Combined, the point, zone, network data primitives create the first basic unit of analysis I 
use for geospatial economic simulations, the cell, and is shown in Fig. 2.1 with a 
summary of the notation used to describe the cell.  
 
The cell above is only a simple instance of this basic unit type.  The example in Fig. 4.2 
below shows the same framework applied to the State of Minnesota, using population 
density to define the reference point and the interstate highway system to define the 
network.  
𝑙1,1 = {(𝑛2,1, 𝑎2,1), (𝑛2,2, 𝑎2,2),… , (𝑛𝑅,𝐶 , 𝑎𝑅,𝐶)} 
 
𝑍1,1 = {𝑝0.5,1.5, 𝑝1.5,1.5, 𝑝1.5,0.5, 𝑝0.5,0.5} 
𝑝1,1
𝑟  
Figure A2.1: Example Cell with Notation 
𝑛1,1 = 𝑍1,1, 𝑝1,1
𝑟  
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I further define a set of such cells as a geospatial cell network if it satisfies the following 
assumptions: 
1. Each cell zone is polygon defined by the non-reference points in the zone 
definition.  
2. No cell zones overlap 
3. No area in the convex hull of all cell zone points is not part of one cell zone 
Intuitively, a geospatial cell network is a set of cells that are correctly linked and 
correctly cover a geographic space. Fig. A2.3 shows an example of a geospatial cell 
network by placing the cell for Minnesota define above on a map of the United States 
along with cells for the other 47 contiguous states. Choosing how to define the grid-cells 
is still arbitrary, but is chosen to be relevant to a research question. In this example, the 
each network link has an attribute for average truck speed, and thus, the geospatial cell 
network may be particularly relevant to research questions involving inter-state transport 
of goods. 
 
 
Figure A2.2: Example of an Agent Applied to Minnesota with Interstate 
Highway Network Links 
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Normalization Method  
The network defined above in Fig. A2.3 defines a geographic space on which agents can 
operate and uses non-approximated vector based definitions. Simulating agent actions on 
precise geographic spaces is possible when there are fewer than 1,000 cells, but becomes 
computationally impossible given current technology with many more cells. In this 
section, I define a method of normalizing the cell structure defined above that allows for 
computation of many more agents, including as many as 10 billion agents, without losing 
Figure A2.3: Example Geospatial Cell Network using States as Zones and Interstate 
Highways as Links. Source: U.S Department of Transportation, Federal Highway 
Administration, Office of Freight Management and Operation, Freight Performance 
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theoretical generality.10 The simulation methodology I use requires having a valid 
normalization method, 𝑀, so that all input networks and agent sets may be converted to a 
data representation that works across types while maintaining computational speed, 
transparency and replicability. 
To normalize a cell network, I convert the vector-based cell described above to 
approximated grid-cells. This requires choosing a tesselatable regular shape (almost 
always a square in 2 dimensions or a cube in 3 dimensions, but is best done with 
hexagons or triangles in a small set of situations), a uniform size of this shape (for 
instance, the edge length of the square) and a row, column schema for defining the 
location of all grid-cells. Finally, the schema requires a geographic extent defined so that 
we know what rectangle of space on the globe our matrix represents (see Chang 2010 for 
a description of how geographic information systems, GIS, approach this problem). 
Assuming we chose squares as our shape, we can define this schema as a grid-cell 
matrix, where each element in the matrix is a single valued number that describes a 
particular attribute of the cell network and where the row, column index of the matrix is 
sufficient to identify the location and extent of each grid-cell, both in geographic11 space 
and network space. Grid-cell matrix, as defined here, also go by the aliases raster, 
GeoTIFF,12 or map, however each of these terms connotes a slightly different data type 
an application, so I use the term matrix throughout this text. 
Four different types of matrices emerge from the process of gridding the cell network, 
described below. These types are able to describe the cell network in matrix form, and 
thus enable highly efficient computation methods (such as use of NumPy and SciPy; see 
Olophant 2006). 
1. A zone identity matrix stores the cell reference identity (from the (𝑖 = 𝑟, 𝑐) 
correspondence described above) in the grid-cell matrix of whichever cell covers 
the most of the grid-cell in question. 
2. A point identity matrix is similar to a zone identity matrix, but only stores the 
cell reference if the zone’s reference point is in the grid-cell. If there is no 
                                                 
 
10 10 billion is a useful number because it is near projections of maximum human populations in the 22nd 
century. 
11 Throughout this text, I have used the word geographic to refer to any location-designation system that 
corresponds to 2- or 3-dimensional Euclidean space. 
12 GeoTIFF is the name of the file type used in many GIS applications to represent gridded data. 
  
 178 
 
reference point within the cell, the grid-cell is valued at zero. Thus, if a zone 
covers more than one grid-cell, the identity reference will not be repeated in each 
zone cell as it was for the zone matrix. 
3. An attribute matrix defines the value that each grid-cell takes for a particular 
variable. Because the row, column index of each attribute corresponds to the row, 
column index of zone and point identities in the same location, we implicitly 
know to which cell the attribute applies without the need to directly specify it. 
A network matrix stores the information on network links between each cell. Because 
the links may overlap, skip cells, and are in the intersection between grid-cells, it requires 
a level of abstraction to describe a network in matrix form. To do this, I use the zone 
matrix created in step one rather than the unnormalized cell network. Then, I subdivide 
any link that spans multiple grid-cells into multiple links, each describing a route with 
start and end grid-cells that are adjacent (or later, diagonal).13 This means that to travel 
three grid-cells, one will traverse three link. Finally, I split the cost-of-traversing each 
grid-cell into the network matrix so that the traversal cost of each link is defined by its 
starting and ending grid-cells:  𝑡𝑐 =
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑐
2
+
𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑐
2
. If the link is diagonal, we 
must account for the longer distance across the diagonal of a square: 𝑡𝑐
𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 =
√2(
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑐
2
+
𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑐
2
). The result of this process is a single-valued matrix of the 
same dimensions as the zone matrix and point matrix that describes the cost of traversing 
from any location to any other location on the zone and point matrices. 
Fig. A2.4 illustrates the process for defining each of the data types described above. The 
input data for this example is shown in Fig. A2.4.a, which is satellite imagery of 
approximately 4 square miles of farmland in southeastern Minnesota. Fig. A2.4.b defines 
ten cell zones that roughly correspond to land use and/or land ownership. This step can be 
done by using zoning data from government entities, automatic classification algorithms 
or manual input according to classification rules (these method are well documented in 
the remote sensing literature, such as Singh 1989 or Marpu et al. 2013). 
                                                 
 
13 I have decided to focus my exposition on the subset of networks described by square grids. This 
approach can be criticized for incorrectly taking the square as somehow fundamental to spatial phenomena, 
but it turns out this may not be a bad assumption given the broad proclivity of humans to arrange things in a 
gridded fashion. The reasons for the frequency of grid-schemes in human systems is complex and out of the 
scope of this thesis, but a likely reason is that a square is the only regular shape that can be tessellated 
without gaps, rotation or off-setting of the shape. The square is fundamental.  
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The zones defined in A2.4.b are not full definitions of cells yet, as they lack reference 
points and network links. Fig. A2.4.b adds this information based on where within the 
zone the farm buildings are located and a rough approximation of travel to other locations 
via nearby roads. Note that although the network links are depicted as straight lines, this 
is just an abstraction. Each link can be constructed with a travel time attribute on each 
network link that reflects the shortest road route.  
Fig. A2.4.c shows reference points for each zone and defines the set of network links 
between zones. With zones, points and network links in place, this defines a full cell 
network as described above. 
I then normalize the cell network, which results in matrices shown below. Figs. A2.4.d 
shows the normalized point matrix, A2.4.e shows the normalized zone matrix and A2.4.f 
shows a network matrix that roughly constructed from the cost of traversing from 
adjacent cells based on the location of the reference point within the cell and the presence 
of roads. 
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1 4 
8 
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3 
6  9 
7 
10 
Figure A2.4: Process for Defining Cell Network and Normalized Matrices 
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The process of normalizing the cell network shown above maintains all of the detail in 
original network but now allows for much faster computation. Choosing the correct zones 
(step 2 in the figure above) depends on what data are being analyzed and what type of 
behavior is being simulated. A further simplification of the geospatial cell network 
described above allows us to bypass the arbitrary choices of how to define zones. 
To summarize, I have applied the notation defined above to a network construct and a 
normalization method, such that for Fig 2.5.d, in which we have 16 cells defined, we 
have reference points 𝑝1,1
𝑟 , 𝑝2,1
𝑟 , … , 𝑝4,4
𝑟 , zones 𝑍1,1 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4}, 𝑍2,1 =
{𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4}, … , 𝑍4,4 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4} and a cell network: 
𝑁 = {(𝑝1,1
𝑟 , 𝑙1,1), (𝑝2,1
𝑟 , 𝑙2,1),… , (𝑝4,4
𝑟 , 𝑙4,4) } 
𝑙𝑟,𝑐 = {(𝑝𝑟−1,𝑐
𝑟 , 𝑎𝑟−1,𝑐), (𝑝𝑟,𝑐+1,
𝑟 , 𝑎𝑟,𝑐+1), (𝑝𝑟+1,𝑐,
𝑟 , 𝑎𝑟+1,𝑐), (𝑝𝑟,𝑐−1,
𝑟 , 𝑎𝑟,𝑐−1) | 𝑝𝑟,𝑐
𝑟 ≠ {∅}}  
∀ 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑅, 0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝐶 
Gridded data are frequently used by physical scientists and a broad literature exists on 
how to create matrices to represent spatial data. Scientists less frequently use gridded data 
to understand human agents and their behavior, which limits the ways that physical 
science can make policy-relevant recommendations. Economists, conversely, rarely use 
gridded data, and instead use tabular data to represent cross-sectional or time-series data 
on individuals or aggregated agents and their behavior. When gridded data are used in 
economics, it is often just as an input to be converted to tabular data. By shedding 
spatially precise information, tabular data solves the computational problems that arise 
when 1,000 or more agents are considered, but this is at the expense of losing geospatial 
detail. The method I present here defines a data type that can define both physical 
phenomena and agent behavior in a unified framework along with a normalization 
method that allows for broad computational feasibility without shedding either agent or 
spatial information. 
The cell as defined here differs from the other basic entity in my modeling approach, the 
agent, in how the entities interact over time. Thus before defining the agent, I first use 
define with more specificity how my modeling approach handles time. 
Additional attributes can be added to define an agent specific to a particular simulation 
task. Figure 4.7 below shows the process for defining our cell network and agents based 
on a small forest plot in Eastern Tanzania (for now I will exclude stating variable 
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definitions, units and colorbars to focus on the method used. See the Data section for 
details on the data used). Fig. A2.7.a shows satellite imagery of the location we will use, 
which is a mixture of secondary forest and mosaic cropland with shrubland. Fig. A2.5.b 
is a matrix depicting how much firewood is available to be foraged on each grid-cell 
based on the underlying land cover. Fig. A2.5.c is the number of persons whose homes 
are on each grid-cell. Fig. A2.5.d shows a 9 row, 11 column spatial grid-cell network. 
This network was constructed so that there is exactly one grid-cell defined for each 
matrix element and so that the area of a grid-cell is equal to the area implied by the 
matrix. Fig. A2.5.e shows how the grid-cell network corresponds to the firewood 
abundance input matrix to illustrate how the network is constructed to reflect the input 
data. Each cell in the network has a cell attribute that corresponds to the value in the 
firewood abundance matrix. Finally, Fig. A2.5.f shows three agents chosen to represent 
the population per grid-cell input matrix, shown as grid-cell reference points, along with 
the grid-cell zones. Summing the total population of the input matrix laying in each of the 
grid-cell zones defines a “population” attribute for each agent. Because the agent 
represents multiple persons, I refer to it as a representative agent. The process for 
identifying how many agents is optimal depends on the specific research question being 
asked and on the size of the input data (which determines computational difficulty). As I 
will discuss in the data section, the model I ultimately construct is different than the 
example shown here. Instead of using agents that are representative of data from multiple 
elements in the input matrix, I construct many more agents so that there is exactly one 
agent per grid-cell.  
Using the agents defined in 4.7.f, we construct an attribute table similar to the previously 
shown table. One category of attributes that will be included in the table will 
parameterize utility functions and production functions for each agent. The next section 
introduces how utility and production are used to define agent behavior in the simulation. 
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Defining the Simulation 
Using the elements above, I define the simulation as composed of a valid geospatial grid-
cell network 𝑁 and corresponding matrix normalization 𝑀, a set of valid agents 𝐴 
defined with attributes in an agent table, a set of behavior rules (max-marginal-gain 
iterative approach to utility maximization) 𝑅, and finally, a structure and order to time 
periods and iteration steps, 𝑇 and 𝑆 respectively. 
Satellite Imagery 
Firewood Abundance 
Matrix (green is high) 
Population Density 
Matrix (green is high) 
Geospatial Grid-Cell 
Network 
Network to Firewood 
Matrix Comparison 
1 
2 3 
Three representative 
agents on population 
Figure A2.5: Process for Defining Geospatial Grid-Cell Network and Agents based on 
Tanzanian Data 
4 5 ... ... 
... 
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𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = {𝑁,𝑀, 𝐴, 𝑅, 𝑇, 𝑆}  
Given this definition of simulation, I solve the simulation by iterating through 𝑆 and 𝑇 for 
each agent in 𝐴 acting on network 𝑁, given the normalization 𝑀. 
Data additional comments 
Part of the contribution of this paper is to present methods for systematically and 
transparently dealing with these data issues and creating a methodology (implemented in 
a software package) that combines survey data with geospatial data. Replicability is a key 
motivation here, especially given the many ways that errors and biases can be introduced 
when spatial and non-spatial data are combined. Existing literature in economics often 
does not report how aggregation issues such as these are treated, and thus replication is 
impossible. In this analysis, the main household survey information that was used was 
from questions on wage generating activities and firewood collection time. Table 4.3 
describes these variables and a collection of additional variables that can be used for 
validation and future extension. To illustrate the spatial aspect of the NPS, Fig. A2.6 
presents the per household wage income at each of the enumeration areas using in the 
NPS. 
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Table A2.1: Questions from NPS Used in Simulation 
E15: How long does it take NAME to get to work from here? [TIME ONE WAY 
ONLY] (codes = Hour, Day, Week, Fortnight, Month, Quarter, Half year, Year) 
E18: How much was NAMES last payment? IF RESPONDENT HAS NOT YET 
BEEN PAID, ASK: What payment to do you expect? What period of time did this 
payment cover? 
E19: How many hours did NAME work last week? 
E21: What is the value of those payments? Over what time interval? (same intervals as 
E18) 
E32: What is the total value of your physical capital stock, including all tools, 
equipment, buildings, land, vehicles for the business? 
E33: What is the total value of your current stock of inputs or supplies? 
E34: What is the total value of your current stock of finished merchandise (goods for 
sale)? 
E35 What gross income/takings did you get from your business of businesses last 
week/month? (Week = 1, month = 2) 
E36 What was your net income (profit) from your business or businesses last 
week/month? 
E38: What is/was NAME’s total expenditure on wages last month? 
E39 What was NAME’s total expenditure on raw materials last month? 
E42: What was your AVERAGE net income (profit) during the months you operated 
this business (TSH)? 
E47: “How many hours did you spend yesterday collecting firewood (or other fuel 
materials)?” 
Data note: 2 columns, first is for hours, second is for minutes. 
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J18 Major fuel used for lighting? (codes = Firewood, Paraffin, Electricity, Gas, 
Charcoal, Animal residual, Gas (biogas), other) 
J8 Which is the household main source of cash income? (codes = Sale of food crops, 
Sale of livestock, Sale of livestock products, Sale of cash crops, Business income, 
Wages or salaries in cash, Other casual cash earnings, Cash remittances, Fishing, 
Other) 
 
 
One difficulty in using these data is that they are answered by one representative in the 
household for each member [NAME]. Thus, each household may range in the number of 
Figure A2.6: Household Survey Reported Average Wages (TSH) 
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workers from zero to many. This presents a problem when aggregating because 
opportunity cost must be per individual, not per household. Another challenge with these 
data is that each enumerate area (EA) comprises many households, but with this release 
of the data we only have the geolocation for the EA, not the household. Thus, there will 
be many observations stacked on a single point. As above, this presents interpretation 
challenges when understanding totaled values vs. per capita values. 
The household survey data discussed here have considerable shortcomings when used on 
spatial data, particularly with respect to lack of coverage in certain locations and 
insufficient quantity of enumeration areas. These shortcoming will be discussed in more 
depth in the model validation section.  
Representative Agent 
I present two different implementations of the firewood foraging simulation model. These 
models represent two approaches to choosing how to summarize the complexity of the 
situation in a way that allows for feasible computation. In this section, I will describe an 
implementation that identifies the 250 agents that optimally (as defined below) 
summarize the full set of grid-cells in Tanzania. This implementation is useful in 
describing the generalized agent-based simulation approach and identifies key 
methodological solutions such as identifying which agents are best to analyze and which 
geographic zones we should ascribe to each agent. I will end discussion of this 
implementation with a discussion of where it was insufficient to model the hyper-
localized phenomena of firewood foraging  
Defining Representative Agents using Voronoi Specification 
In many circumstances, it is necessary to identify representative agents for use in 
simulation to allow for feasible computation. However, model results may be very 
sensitive to how the agent was specified, so it is critical to correctly identify 
representative agents. In this section, I define what a representative agent is and describe 
a method to identify the optimal set of agents for an example landscape in Tanzania. 
When village-level data are available, it can be best simply to use the village boundary as 
the definition of the agent zone. However, even when these data are available (and they 
often are not), they may still not be precise enough to model a phenomenon like firewood 
foraging that is sensitive to geographic scales much smaller than the village. Analyses 
that use single values for village zones imply, whether stated or not, that the population 
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value for the village zone shape is uniformly distributed. In many applications this 
assumption has no effect on the interpretation of results. In other cases, however, the 
zone value is compared to grid-cell input data that have higher resolutions (such as LULC 
data). In this context, the analyst must choose how to represent the zonal data in a grid-
cell format. The uniform distribution assumption here means that every grid-cell used to 
represent the village zone has the same single value. This assumption becomes very 
problematic when local phenomena are assessed.  
One method used to address the problems that arise with the uniform distribution 
problem is to attribute the value to single point, typically the village centroid, defined as 
the spatial gravity center of the boundary. In many cases, however, this location does not 
correspond to the actual village center and may instead identify a parcel of land that has 
few or no individuals present. Using the centroid raises additional problems and does not 
solve those raised by the uniformity assumption that can lead to estimation bias. Fig. 
A2.7 presents an example that shows these two types of problems that arise from using 
centroid-based or uniformly-spread data. The map on the right presents three hypothetical 
villages and their boundaries with the population of each village depicted by the number 
in the center of the village. Suppose, however, that the population of all three villages is 
actually concentrated in the center of the map, as shown in the map on the right. In this 
case, the assumption that all grid cells within a village zone have an identical share of the 
village’s population is clearly flawed. 
 
 
300 
500 
150 
 
950 
0 
0 
0 
Figure A2.7: Example of Problems from Using Village Population Values 
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The method I present in this section is an alternative to using village centroid or a 
uniform distribution. I use high resolution population data to identify a grid-cell 
definition (both a point and a corresponding zone) that improves upon the methods 
discussed above. Because high resolution data are not always available, I also include a 
section below on how to use downscaling techniques to create high resolution data.  
Optimal Agent Definition 
Fig. 4.20 (upper left) shows the population density data described above. I apply an 
algorithm I created, which I call the N-Optimal Agent Identification Algorithm, to these 
data in order to identify the set of agent grid-cells that are the best 𝑛 choices to represent 
the population. The algorithm minimizes the log-difference between the marginal 
reduction in distance between non-agent grid-cells and agent grid-cell and the number of 
agents chosen. Intuitively, the algorithm functions by choosing agents so that they are 
more likely to be represent a location with high population density, but because distance-
to-nearest-agent also is in the heuristic, the algorithm also identifies some agents in 
remote, but potentially less dense, areas. The positive value obtained in this heuristic is 
then subtracted by the log of the number of agents identified. This second value 
approximates the computation time necessary to work with datasets of size 𝑛, and thus 
lowers the value of using too many agents. The approach balances the need to over-
sample high population density areas with the need to assess the broader geographic 
extent in a project. For all of the agents chosen, whether in areas of relatively high or low 
population density, each agent represents a local maximum of population density, thus 
eliminating the problems of using naïve village centroids discussed above. 
N-Optimal Agent Identification Algorithm 
1. Identify the grid-cell with the highest population density in the grid-cell network. 
Starting with 𝑛 = 1, define this grid-cell as agent 𝑛 and add to the set of agent 
grid-cells. 
2. Calculate the distance of all non-agent grid-cells to the nearest agent grid-cell. 
3. Multiply the distance value(s) found in step 2 by the population density in the 
grid-cells. Define this value as heuristic ℎ.  
4. Identify the grid-cell with the highest heuristic value, define it as the n+1th agent 
and add it to the set of agent grid-cells. 
5. Recalculate the heuristic and use it to calculate the quality of fit metric Q, where: 
𝑄 = ln |
𝜕(∑ ∑ ℎ𝑥𝑦𝑦𝑥  )/𝜕n
n
| − ln(𝑛) 
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6. Repeat steps 2-5 until 𝑄 = 0. Define the set of agent-grid cells as the N-Optimal 
set of Agents. 
Fig. A2.8 below graphically illustrates the results of this algorithm applied to a sub-
region within Tanzania. The map in the upper-left shows the population density input 
data while the map in the upper-right shows the 250-optimal agents the algorithm 
identifies. These agent-points were chosen iteratively using the distance-weighted 
heuristic. The image in the lower right shows the map of distance of non-agent grid-cells 
to their nearest agent grid-cell, which is the value multiplied by the population density to 
create the heuristic. Finally, the map in the lower right presents a corresponding set of 
agent zones for each of these agent point, thus identifying two parts of the cell network. 
The zones were identified by calculating the Voronoi zones for each point. This approach 
assigns all areas on the map to whichever agent point is closest. 
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Using this algorithm, one can choose the correct number of agents to balance 
computational feasibility with model accuracy. The algorithm provides a quality of fit 
metric for a subset region within Tanzania. Fig. A2.9 plots the quality of fit metric when 
0 35,000 Population per 450m 0 35,000 Population per 450m 
0 35,000 Population per 450m 0 1,000 Distance to nearest agent 
(in 450m grid-cells) 
Figure A2.8: N-Optimal Agent Algorithm Applied to Tanzania 
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this algorithm is applied to a subset of Tanzania14 with values of N ranging from 1 to 
1,000. The algorithm value becomes negative at approximately 250 agents, suggesting 
that for this subset 250 is the optimal number of agents to define.  
 
Application of Representative Agents to Tanzanian Data 
Using the 250 agents identified with the algorithm above, I present the first of two 
implementations of the agent simulation. I refer to this first implementation of the 
“representative agent” approach. The representative agent approach is inferior to the 
second approach discussed, which identifies every pixel as an agent rather than a zone of 
pixels (thus I will I spend relatively less time presenting details on this case). However, 
using representative agents has the positive attribute that the results are much easier to 
visually interpret. Moreover, many environmental end ecosystem service analyses focus 
                                                 
 
14 Subset chosen to increase the visual clarity of the resulting zones. 
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Figure A2.9: Sum of Heuristic from N-Optimal Agent 
Identification Algorithm for different N 
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on phenomena that are not as hyper-localized as firewood collection. In these cases, the 
value of using representative, zonally defined agents as in this first approach may be 
superior, such as when doing watershed-level analysis or farm-level analysis. 
Fig. A2.9 shows results from the representative agent example. Three different variables 
are plotted, including the firewood remaining after the simulation has been run (blues), 
the initial population data that were used to identify the optimal set of 250 agents 
(oranges) and the amount of firewood that was gathered from each grid-cell (greens). 
 
Figure A2.9: Results from Representative-Agent Simulation 
Firewood Remaining (𝑚3) Population Firewood Taken (𝑚3) 
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In this example, we see the basic dynamic that arises from the simulation approach. We 
have specific agent locations (denoted in the close-up Fig. A2.10 below with an X mark) 
and specific cells from which they gather firewood. Rather than identifying aggregate 
behavior, this method identifies a full set of agent-home and agent-foraging locations, 
giving much more specific predictions about who benefits. 
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Figure A2.10: Results from Representative-Agent Simulation 
Firewood Remaining (𝑚3) Population Firewood Taken (𝑚3) 
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Even with this many agents, however, we see some undesirable results. For instance, the 
population cluster near the center has some populated areas on the north side of the 
cluster and has available forest underneath, but it registers no foraging because that 
portion of the population node was summarized by an agent centered far enough to the 
south that these forests were not foraged. An additional problem shown above is the 
arrangement of foraged zones into diamonds. This is an artefact of the route-finding 
algorithm being based on grids, but more importantly shows how sensitive the results are 
to the edges of the zero profit zones that are implied by this travel algorithm.  
For these reasons, I present an approach that extends the number of agents defined so that 
there is one agent per pixel of input data. I refer to this level of analysis as the “pixel-
agent” approach. Before discussing the next approach, however, I first define a technique 
for creating the type of high-resolution data necessary for the pixel-level result to work.  
Additional Methods 
The agent set defined here also has an attribute table and a corresponding set of attribute 
matrices (as shown in Fig. A2.11). The notation used in Table 4.5, for instance, 
𝑁1(𝑝𝑜𝑝1), references the normalized matrix for population as viewed from the 𝑖 = 1 
position in network 𝑁. Note that matrix references as used here are slightly different than 
standard matrices, represented in this case by the i-th index. This notation implies the 
data form is a “view” of a matrix such that it may be a subset of the full matrix defined by 
a reference point stored in the center element in the matrix and all the neighboring cells 
within square radius (defined by vertices calculated as (𝑟 − 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠, 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠, 𝑟 +
𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠, 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠). The idea of using a matrix view allows for a dramatic increase in 
computational speed by eliminating data and calculations that may be considered 
unnecessary due to spatial remoteness from the point of interest. A matrix view with the 
largest possible radius is identical to the original matrix. 
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Table A2.2: Agent Attributes 
Agent 
ID 
Location 
Cell 
Agent 
Population 
𝜶𝒊 𝜷𝒊
𝒄 𝜷𝒊
𝒄𝒍 𝒑𝒘 ... other 
attributes 
𝒊 = 𝟏 (𝑟1, 𝑐1) 𝑁1(𝑝𝑜𝑝1) 𝑁1(𝛼1) 𝑁1(𝛽1
𝑐) 𝑁1(𝛽1
𝑙) 𝑁1(𝛽1
𝑙) … 
𝒊 = 𝟐 (𝑟1, 𝑐1) 𝑁2(𝑝𝑜𝑝2) 𝑁2(𝛼2) 𝑁2(𝛽2
𝑐) 𝑁2(𝛽2
𝑙) 𝑁2(𝛽2
𝑙) … 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
𝒊 = 𝑰 (𝑟𝐼, 𝑐𝐼) 𝑁𝐼(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝐼) 𝑁𝐼(𝛼𝐼) 𝑁𝐼(𝛽𝐼
𝑐) 𝑁𝐼(𝛽𝐼
𝑙) 𝑁𝐼(𝛽𝐼
𝑙) … 
 
 
 
 
 Figure A2.11: Normalized Matrices Corresponding to Elements in the 
Attribute Table 
𝑁1(𝑝𝑜𝑝1)  𝑁1(𝑝𝑤)  
…  …   …   …   𝑖 = 1  
𝑁𝐼(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝐼)  
𝑖 = 𝐼  
⋮ ⋮ 
…   
⋮ 
…   …   …   
⋱ 
𝑁𝐼(𝑝𝑤)  
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Calculating Travel Cost 
One of the most basic calculations necessary when simulating agent behavior on a 
landscape is to identify the cost of traveling from one location to another. Even when 
using matrix views as discussed in the previous section, finding the optimal route can 
become computationally infeasible, especially if the destination is remote from the origin. 
In this section, I identify a method that allows for route-finding even in large data sets. I 
do this by identifying four different route-finding algorithms and then create a composite 
algorithm that combines all four approaches hierarchically to apply the correct algorithm 
(defined as maximizing accuracy while minimizing computational intensity). This 
approach is able to provide a large computation speed increase because many route 
finding problems are quite simple (for instance, traversing a uniformly flat field) and the 
simpler algorithms identify the optimal route in a faction of the computational time 
necessary for more complex route-finding algorithms.15 Before presenting these 
algorithms, however, I first discuss how the traversal cost grid-cell network was created. 
Constructing the Traversal Cost and Arrival Cost Grid-Cell Networks 
I distinguish between three types of travel values in this section that have unavoidably 
similar terms. For the first term, I use traversal cost to denote a network or matrix that 
stores the amount of time it takes an agent to cross from one side of the grid-cell to the 
other when traveling on one of the cardinal axes. Fig. A2.12 below shows the traversal 
cost matrix for Tanzania.  
 
 
                                                 
 
15 In the course of this work, I also created an algorithm that works well even when extremely long routes 
must be calculated. This algorithm works by solving the hierarchical search algorithm at varying levels of 
resolution for the traversal cost data and then combining the results to calculate the full route. I have 
omitted it from this analysis due to time constraints. 
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The second term is the traversal step cost. When an agent travels from one cell to 
another, the agent incurs a travel cost equal to the sum of the traversal cost in the origin 
cell and the destination cell, divided by two to reflect that the agent is presumed to start 
from the middle of the origin cell and thus only travels half the distance of the cell. I refer 
to this value as the traversal step cost because it is accounts for traversal cost values in 
both of the adjacent cells. 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑜𝑟𝑐, 𝑑𝑟𝑐) =
1
2
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑜𝑟𝑐) + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑑𝑟𝑐)) 
Here, and in this rest of this section, 𝑜𝑟𝑐 and 𝑑𝑟𝑐 refer to the origin and destination points 
with row indexed by 𝑟 and column indexed by 𝑐. When calculating traversal step cost, 
the origin and destination must be either adjacent or diagonal. The above traversal step 
cost function is only valid for adjacent cells but in many applications it is useful to allow 
Figure A2.12: Traversal Cost Grid-Cell Network 
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travel to diagonal cells. In this case, a slight modification of the function above is 
required to account for the greater distance from the center of a square to one of its corner 
vertices: 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑜𝑟𝑐, 𝑑𝑟𝑐) =
𝑑
2
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑜𝑟𝑐) + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑑𝑟𝑐)) 
where 𝑑 = √2 𝑖𝑓 (𝑟𝑜 − 𝑟𝑑)(𝑐𝑜 − 𝑟𝑜) = 0 𝑜𝑟 𝑑 = 1 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒. 
Finally, the third term I use is arrival cost, which denotes the sum of traversal step costs 
in the set of moves necessary to reach a destination cell not adjacent to the origin cell 
(i.e., the arrival cost sums the traversal step cost of all grid cells the  agent must cross). 
The following section will define the algorithms used to identify the cells that must be 
traversed in the optimal route. For now, while delaying definition of how the route cells 
were determined, denote the arrival cost as: 
𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑜𝑟𝑐 , 𝑑𝑟𝑐) = ∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖, 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖+1)
#𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑠
𝑖=0
 
In applications where an agent is considering what action to do based on multiple 
potential locations, it is useful to define an arrival cost geospatial grid-cell network and 
corresponding matrix. This matrix (or matrix view) requires that the origin cell be exactly 
located at the center-element of the matrix and that the matrix is square with an odd-
valued dimension so that the center point of the matrix corresponds with the centroid of a 
cell. Thus, all non-central elements in the arrival cost matrix represent the arrival cost 
calculated with the center-cell of the matrix as the origin of the route and the non-center 
cell as the destination of the route. It will become clear when constructing net profit why 
this data structure is useful, but for now note that it is a way to represent the full set of 
transport costs an agent must consider when searching multiple grid-cells for their next 
action. Figures are included in the subsequent sections giving examples of arrival cost 
matrices. 
Euclidean Route 
The first route-finding algorithm is quite simple, but ignores any data besides the origin 
and destination coordinates: 
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𝐸𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
= (((𝑜𝑟 − 𝑑𝑟)
2 + (𝑜𝑐 − 𝑑𝑐)
2).5) ∗ (𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) ∗ (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) 
The route identified by this algorithm is simply the set of grid-cells intersected by the line 
connecting the origin to the destination. The set of cells contained in this route will be 
exactly the same as the next algorithm, but the Euclidean route ignores the traversal cost 
in each cell and instead calculates the route cost blind to the cells it is traversing. Figure 
4.30 applies the Euclidean route to create an arrival cost grid-cell matrix. As discussed 
above, all arrival cost maps are defined such that the value of each cell is the cumulative 
travel time it takes an agent to travel from the center of the map to the cell in question. 
 
Bulldozer Route 
The bulldozer route-finding algorithm identifies exactly the same set of grid-cells as the 
Euclidean route, defined as all grid-cells intersected by the line connecting the origin 
grid-cell and the destination grid-cell. However, the Bulldozer route determines the cost 
of arrival by summing the traversal costs of all cells through which the agent passes. 
Thus, the use of this algorithm (and all subsequently defined algorithms) requires 
Figure A2.13: Euclidean Distance Arrival 
Cost Grid-Cell Matrix 
0 4,000 Euclidean Distance 
(m) 
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constructing a traversal cost grid-cell network as described above. The name “bulldozer” 
was chosen because the route travels through all cells that are in a straight line between 
the origin and destination, regardless of traversal cost. Calculation time for the bulldozer 
route is approximately n-times slower than the Euclidean route, where n is the number of 
cells that must be traversed. 
Myopically Optimal Route 
Consider how a person chooses a route to travel through a crowded room when they 
cannot see beyond the area immediately adjacent to their current position because their 
view is blocked by other persons. In this circumstance, the person knows approximately 
the direction they want to go (to the bathroom, for instance) but cannot identify which 
movement (go straight, veer left, or veer right) is the optimal choice. Suppose that the 
person will proceed towards their goal by choosing whichever movement yields them the 
greatest advancement towards their goal per travel cost incurred by making that 
movement. This means that the person will prefer to go straight forward towards their 
goal if all choices’ traversal costs are the same, but will veer left or right if the direct 
route is expensive. In the bathroom finding example, this algorithm means one prefers to 
go straight towards the bathroom but will deviate from the straight line if there exists 
something that is particularly expensive to pass through, such as a thick pack of persons 
in a discussion. This process iterates until the person arrives at their goal. I refer to this as 
being myopically optimal because at each step the agent chooses the movement that is 
best if only the immediately adjacent cells are observed. Clearly this method may fail to 
find the optimal route, but it has the very important attribute that it only needs to consider 
the subset of adjacent neighbors. This lets the route be found approximately 100 times as 
fast as fully-optimal route-finding algorithms. When applied to the traversal cost matrix 
for Tanzania, the myopically optimal route algorithm performs almost identically to the 
fully-optimal route except in cases where there are complex road networks, tight 
mountain passes or few river crossings. 
The Myopically Optimal Route-finding Algorithm proceeds as follows:  
1. Draw a line between the current location and the destination. Define the first cell 
intersected by this line as the “go straight” choice. Define the cells adjacent to the 
current cell but to the left or right of the line as the “veer left” and “veer right” 
choices respectively. 
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2. Calculate the heuristic value for each of these three cells16 as follows: 
ℎ(𝑐) =
𝑑(𝑐, 𝑑)
𝑑(𝑠, 𝑑)
 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑡(𝑐)  
where 𝑑() is a function to calculate the Euclidean distance between a potential 
choice 𝑐 ∈ {𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡, 𝑔𝑜 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡, 𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑡} and the destination 𝑑 while 𝑠 
represents traveling straight. The traversal cost of the choice is drawn from the 
traversal cost matrix and is represented as 𝑡(𝑐) above. Finally, 𝑝 represents the 
agent’s preference for traveling straightness. I will solve for the value of p that 
optimizes this heuristic below. 
3. Choose whichever choice has the lowest heuristic value and define that cell as the 
current location. Repeat steps 1-3 from the new current location until the agent 
arrives at the destination cell. 
The preference for directness is a calibration parameter that can be determined by testing 
the algorithm on different landscapes. I chose the value for p by solving the algorithm for 
multiple values of p and choosing the value that achieves the minimum travel time. Fig. 
A2.14 shows the results of this process, which identified 𝑝 = 32 as the optimal choice. 
                                                 
 
16 I also used, but excluded from this exposition, versions of the algorithm that considered five choices (90 
degrees left, 45 degrees left, straight, 45 degrees right, 90 degrees right). This version showed promising 
results in situations of complex terrain and thus I will explore it in future research. 
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Fig. A2.15 shows the arrival cost grid-cell matrix for the myopically optimal route side-
by-side with the traversal cost map used to generate the routes. Notice that elements like 
the mountain in the southwest or the road running through the center have very noticeable 
impacts on the shape of the arrival cost surface. 
 
 
 
Figure A2.14: Identification of the Optimal Preference for Directness in the 
Myopically Optimal Route-Finding Algorithm 
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Optimal Route (A-Star) 
There exists a vast literature in computer science and transportation studies that addresses 
how to find the optimal route through a network (see, for instance, Hall 1986). I will not 
compare the many approaches to finding the optimal route, but instead, will compare one 
of the most common and efficient algorithms, the A-Star algorithm, to the other 
algorithms already discussed in this section. The class of fully optimal route-finding 
algorithms all share the feature that they are too slow on their own for the route-finding 
tasks in this paper. However, they do have the desirable trait of being fully optimal under 
broad assumptions, and so should be used when the other approaches identify a 
suboptimal result. 
Figure A2.15: Identification of the Optimal Preference for Directness in the 
Myopically Optimal Route-Finding Algorithm 
Traversal Cost (minutes) Myopically Optimal Arrival 
Cost (minutes) 
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The A-Star algorithm uses a graph tree and a sorted priority queue of alternate paths to 
find the least cost path between two nodes. Fig. A2.16 shows a pair of traversal cost and 
arrival cost maps generated with the A-Star algorithm. The conditions under which the A-
Star algorithm identifies the optimal route are well studied in computer science. The main 
requirement relevant to the work here is that the heuristic used is admissible, defined as 
never overestimating the minimal cost of reaching the goal.  
Combined Route Finding 
The method I use for calculating travel costs overall is to combine all four approaches 
into a decision hierarchy that chooses the algorithm that maximizes speed subject to 
achieving a threshold of accuracy. For every travel route, I use the Euclidean distance to 
estimate a first-pass estimate on traversal cost. In the (relatively uncommon) event that all 
of the traversal costs are uniform (such as traveling over a flat field), choosing the route 
that minimizes Euclidean travel cost identifies the fully optimal route. In the more 
common cast that it does not identify the optimal route, I instead use it as the heuristic in 
the next level algorithm. So, if Euclidean distance does not identify the optimal route, use 
it as a heuristic to enable computation of the bulldozer route. If the bulldozer route yields 
a different value than the Euclidean route, we know that the Euclidean route is not 
accurate and can disregard it. Next, I calculate the myopically optimal route. If there is no 
or little difference between the myopically optimal route and the bulldozer route, the 
algorithm ends here and uses the myopically optimal route to determine arrival cost. If 
the myopically optimal route is considerably different than the bulldozer route, I proceed 
to using the A-Star algorithm using the myopically optimal route as a candidate solution 
to speed up calculation. Fig. A2.16 shows the output of this process using the same area 
as in the myopically optimal algorithm (but with a smaller geographic extent due to 
calculation constraints). The reason this process yields a dramatic speed increase is 
because many routes a villager must travel are actually quite simple and thus applying a 
complicated routing algorithm is unnecessary. 
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This combined algorithm is then applied to all of Tanzania to identify the arrival cost of 
traveling from every grid-cell to every other grid-cell that might profit greater than zero. 
The result of this process is rather difficult to express in words or on paper, but is a very 
important mathematical construct that is useful in spatial analyses that define behavior 
happening over space during time. The algorithm described above creates a 2-
dimensional array of arrival costs reflecting the optimal routes between the center cell 
and all other cells. This 2-dimensional array is created for every grid-cell in Tanzania, 
thus creating a 4-dimensional array that combines traversal cost with the arrival cost 
maps on each pixel of the traversal cost map. Fig. A2.17 illustrates a portion of this array 
with two of the arrival cost maps shown for two example grid-cells. 
 
 
 
Figure A2.16: Combination of Myopically Optimal Arrival Cost Calculation 
with A-Star Algorithm 
Traversal Cost (minutes) Myopically Optimal Arrival 
Cost (minutes) 
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Process for Defining Action Order 
Step 1: Identify the order in which agents will forage. For this problem, I define the order 
so that the agent with the highest initial marginal profit available goes first, followed in 
descending order by all other agents and ruling out of consideration any agent that 
doesn’t have any positive marginal profit within a search depth. Fig. A2.17 shows a 
mapping of agents by their available marginal profit. Currently, this only uses Euclidean 
distance as a heuristic for least-cost distance. 
 
Step 2: Create a matrix that represents the order in which agents will act by assigning an 
incremental counter to each cell, ranked by descending marginal profit, shown in Fig. 
A2.18. 
Figure A2.17: Initial Profit Available 
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Sensitivity Analysis on Number of Trips 
The results from this simulation are not sensitive to order. I tested this by trying many 
different orders and saw that there was nearly no change. Testing with step sizes as low 
as the amount of cargo one actual individual could carry (28 kg for an adult female), and 
then comparing it to higher step sizes, I found very little difference. Additionally, I tested 
how sensitive the results were to the number of trips each pixel-agent can take in one 
step.  
Starting with one trip per iteration step and increasing to 2000 trips per step, I found that 
the results changed very little. The maximum difference in the outcomes was found by 
comparing the one-trip example to the 2000-trip example, which yielded only a 1.1% 
difference in total profit collected. When comparing the one-trip example to the 300-trip 
example, there was only a 0.013% change in total profit collected. These results are 
shown below in A2.19. Additionally, I compared the same example runs to see if specific 
agents had different results (but with a similar total profit). I did not find evidence for this 
and the deviation was almost exactly the same per agent as it was in aggregate. 
Figure A2.18: Action Order of First 100,000 Agents 
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The action order together with the original firewood abundance map constitute the initial 
conditions for the model to begin. Once these conditions are defined, running the model 
is relatively straightforward. The model iterates through every iteration step and every 
time period while letting each agent identify and then do their max-marginal-gain choice. 
This is done in sequence and updates the 4-dimensional profit map at each step so that all 
other agents are making profit decisions based on the depleted landscape. Given this 
process, we obtain our results, which primarily lie in observing and reporting how this 
profit array changes over time and how it is affected by different policies. The next 
section presents a subset of results from this process, focusing on showing profit-maps 
and post-depletion abundance maps after the simulation has reached a resting state. 
Defining the Action Order 
One tricky assumption that becomes more important in pixel-based approaches is 
defining the order by which agents get to forage. A naïve algorithm that chooses the top-
left pixel and iterate down and then across, though computationally fast, can introduce 
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non-trivial bias. The reason why this matters more for the pixel approach is that many 
agents are immediate neighbors while in the more aggregated approach, agents have a 
large set of non-contested objective cells. In other words, the sensitivity to competition 
effects increases as the number of agents increases, and thus order of play becomes more 
important.  
The ordering approach I use prioritizes agents who have the highest initial profit, defined 
by ranking all agent cells by their max available profit at the start of the simulation, and 
then letting them play in that order. This method has the benefit that agents adjacent in 
the order of play are not frequently adjacent spatially. This minimizes ordering-sensitive 
bias. While still as arbitrary as nearly any other ordering scheme, this method has the 
positive attribute that it lets those act first who are most motivated to act – an assumption 
that may be close to reality. Nonetheless, recall that the bias is also dealt with by 
choosing very small iteration steps. As the amount of firewood each agent can gather 
each step goes to zero, the bias also goes to zero. I show sensitivity results for this in the 
next section. First, however, I define the algorithm I use to identify the action order. 
#See Appendix 2 for more details on how the action order was established as well as a 
sensitivity analysis that shows changing the action order has extremely minimal effects 
on the results.  
Validation 
Validating an agent based model is critically important because the results are sensitive to 
assumptions on a variety of variables. This section discusses validation results and 
potential future methods for validation. There are two basic levels of validation that I 
discuss. First, I validate at a regional level. Specifically, I test to see if the model predicts 
aggregated values correctly, such as for the amount of firewood consumed. Secondly, I 
discuss validation of grid-cell level predictions. 
Aggregate-Level Validation 
The focus of this chapter has been on the modeling framework and methodology I used 
and has not been on the specific values and policy recommendations that result from my 
model. However, the calibration parameters chosen (described in the data section of this 
chapter) were drawn from peer reviewed sources and should be generally correct. For this 
reason, we can validate the model on an aggregated level to see if it makes predictions 
consistent with observations in Tanzania. Although aggregate validation like this is much 
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less specific than the agent-level validation discussed in the next section, it matches the 
general scope that policy makers often want, focusing on general conclusions such as 
what is the overall magnitude of the non-timber forest product valuation, what is the 
general distribution of benefits, what regions are particularly harmed, and other such 
questions.  
National Firewood Consumption 
Given that demand for firewood is not given as an input parameter but instead is 
calculated endogenously as a function of the landscape and the agents’ behavior rules, the 
first value for calibration is to see how accurately the modeled demand matches literature 
estimates on firewood demand. Values from existing studies suggest that demand is 
between 25.8 and 55.5 million cubic meters. The baseline scenario predicts 66.7 million 
cubic meters of firewood will be gathered. This is above, but within the order of 
magnitude reported in the literature. The overestimated value here is very likely a result 
of wrong assumptions on mean harvestable volume per hectare. The range of values I 
drew from the literature (14 – 117 𝑚3ℎ𝑎−1𝑦𝑟−1) is based on a relatively small sample of 
land which was primarily covered in woodlands and newer estimates suggest the value 
should be closer to the minimum value of this distribution than to the mean (which is 
what I used). Additionally, given that the majority of Tanzania is scrublands and 
savannah, which may have lower densities of firewood, it is not surprising that using the 
woodlands estimates would result in overstating the national effect. For this reason, the 
sensitivity analyses (presented in Table 4.7 in the results section) may be especially 
important because they show cases in which land is assumed to have less firewood 
abundance. For instance, the “half-forest, quarter-shrubs” scenario predicts 
approximately 41.4 million cubic meters, which is comfortably within the range of 
estimated consumption figures. 
Future work will be able to devote more time to calibration that focuses on original work 
in the project area. For instance, I have already secured research-time with partners in 
Cambodia to make a new data-set of field observations on firewood abundance and 
gathering behavior. This study will be able to identify individual foragers’ home location 
and foraging location. Pairs of home and foraging location pairs will allow for more 
precise validation and testing. 
Agent-Level Validation 
The basic framework for validation I use on the grid-cell level is to run the model and 
make predictions about, for instance, how many hours each agent will forage for 
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firewood, and then compare these predictions to household survey data on firewood 
collection. Figure 4.61 shows the travel spent for agents near Mount Kilimanjaro. Note 
that there is extreme variation at small scales. This is an expected outcome of the model 
given that firewood is not transported very far and that it has high transportation costs. 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, validation at the grid-cell level was not possible with the National Panel 
Survey because the household coordinates were randomly offset by 10 kilometers for 
privacy reasons. In many applications, this offset does not prevent geospatial analysis, 
but with a hyper-local production decision, as with firewood collection, the offset 
Figure A2.20: Travel Time Spent in Minutes per Household per 
year (near Mt. Kilimanjaro) 
  
 214 
 
presents insurmountable problems. Figure 4.62 expresses the difficulty with this by 
showing the where the enumeration areas are located along with a 10 kilometer radius 
circle overlaid on the point to show where the enumeration area may actually be located. 
The circle illustrates the size of the region in which the household is actually located. As 
Fig. A2.21 shows, there is a very high degree of variation in what my model predicts will 
be the traveled hours. This results in dramatically higher standard errors of any statistical 
comparison of the predicted results with the NPS observations.  
 
 
The NPS data are insufficient for several other reasons. First, population in Tanzania are 
spatially located such that most areas have very low population while a handful of 
locations have extremely high population (cities and villages). When plotted on a two 
Figure A2.21: Travel Time Spent in Minutes per Household per 
year (near Mt. Kilimanjaro) 
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dimensional geospatial map, the results resembles tall spikes on an otherwise flat surface. 
The households surveyed in the NPS are very likely located in one of these spikes, but 
because they are offset for privacy reasons, the location stated in the NPS is very likely 
located in a non-spike location. Thus, the results I presented here must be taken as correct 
on an aggregated level but not yet validated on a local level. This is not surprising given 
that I have specified a structural model with a resolution thousands or millions of times 
more detailed than existing structural models. For this reason, the value of the results lies 
in the methodological advances that are consistent with microeconomic theory but 
applied to a high resolution environment. 
Towards overcoming the validation challenges discussed here, I present two methods for 
making validation succeed at the agent-level. First, as is illustrated in Fig. A2.22 and 
A2.23, one can construct a contour plot that identifies the continuous two dimensional 
surface that is consistent with the observed point data and assumes that the value changes 
in a linear fashion between all pairs of points. The background color of this figure is this 
contour surface derived from the survey points (similar to how the wage surface was 
created, as described in the data section). Also plotted in the model-predicted travel time 
spent. Although I do not provide statistical proof, it does seem evident that the contour 
plot is consistent with the modeled results (the regression however has an r-squared of 
only 0.33 due to the standard error problem discussed above).  
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Figure A2.22: Validation using Contour Surfaces (National) 
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The second method that can be employed to validate data of this type is to create zones 
and fill them with an algorithm I describe below. For zone definitions, I used the 250 
optimal agent zones discussed in the methods section, presented again for convenience in 
Fig. A2.24. 
Figure A2.23: Validation using Contour Surfaces (near Mt.  Kilimanjaro) 
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To fill spatial zones with sampled survey data, it is critical to correctly deal with missing 
value and zones for which we have no survey observations. Fig. A2.25 shows a naive 
approach to this, in which I assign the mean value from survey responses to each zone. I 
extend this approach in Fig. A2.26 by filling the adjacent zones according to rules. 
Figure A2.24: 250 Optimal Agent Zone-Point Pairs 
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The approach above is flawed because it assumes that the value of all locations where a 
household survey was not conducted must be zero. Instead of assuming zero values for 
the empty zones, I instead apply the following algorithm to fill all of the zones. If an 
agentshed has 1 survey data point, use it as the average for each individual within the 
agent. 
1. If an agentshed has more than 1 survey data point, use the average 
Figure A2.25: Naïve Approach to Zone Assignment: Mean or Zero 
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2. If an agentshed has no survey data points, save until all other possible zones have 
been defined using steps 1 and 2, and then for the remaining unassigned zones, 
use my m-direction neighbor search algorithm: 
a. M-direction neighbor search algorithm, assuming m=4 (ideal for rasters): 
b. Starting from the agentpoint, define 4 directional vectors 𝑣 =
{𝑣!, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4} where 1 = up, 2 = right, 3 = down, 4 = left. For a set of 
vectors not equal to four, assign starting at 12-oclock with each vector 
360
𝑚
 
degrees separated. 
c. Travel 1 grid-cell away from the agentpoint grid cell following each of the 
4 vectors and check the value in those 4 cells. 
d. If any of these cells have a non-zero value, record it in the corresponding 
position in the set 𝑛 = {𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑛3, 𝑛4} and ignore that vector for the rest of 
the algorithm. 
e. For the remaining vectors, continue stepwise until each has found a non-
zero-valued grid-cell.  
f. The value for the target agentshed is the average if the vector’s results: 
∑
𝑛1
𝑚
𝑚
𝑖=1 . 
A first attempt at improving the “Mean or Zero” assignment rule is shown in Fig. A2.26. 
Here, I use the above algorithm to fill all of the zones. 
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The approach shown in Fig. A2.26 is an improvement over the approach in Fig. 4.66 in 
situations where assuming zero for non-observations would introduce bias. The approach 
in Fig. A2.26, however, assumes that an empty zone takes on the value of its nearest 
valued neighbor no matter how distant that neighbor is. In many cases, it may be more 
reasonable to assume that the predictive accuracy of a neighbor smoothly decreases with 
distance. This is the assumption used in many interpolation methods, but typical 
interpolation methods do not work well in our case with defined, irregular zones and non-
uniformly sampled data points.  
Figure A2.26: Algorithmic Approach to Zone Filling 
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Thus, I extend the algorithm to calculate the value as the spatial average using the 
distance weighted average of the z-nearest neighbors. Distance weighting for zone x 
(𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑥)  is done by calculating: 
𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑥 =
𝑣1𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑1
+ 
𝑣2𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑2
+⋯+ 
𝑣𝑧𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑𝑧
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑1
+ 
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑2
+⋯+ 
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑𝑧
 
Where 𝑣𝑖 is the value in the i-th nearest cell to cell x and 𝑑𝑖 is the distance to cell x of the 
i-th nearest cell for 𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑧}. This equation considers the value of each of the z 
nearest neighbors to the target cell but considers the nearest cells more important. 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 is 
the distance to cell x of the nearest cell. 
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Appendix 3: Supplemental Information for Chapter 3 
The traditional commons problem that exhibits strong free-riding can be expressed as 
max
𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝑎𝑖𝑡
 ?̃?𝑖𝑡(𝑐𝑖𝑡,  𝑋𝑡(𝑋𝑡−1, 𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑎~𝑖𝑡 ))                
 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑤𝑖𝑡 
in which we define player i's payoff at time t as ?̃?𝑖𝑡(𝑐𝑖𝑡,  𝑋𝑡(𝑋𝑡−1, 𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑎~𝑖𝑡 )), where 𝑐𝑖𝑡 is 
consumption, 𝑎𝑖𝑡 is abatement and 𝑋𝑡(𝑋𝑡−1, 𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑎~𝑖𝑡) is the total GHG emissions present 
at time t, which is a function of the stock in the previous period, 𝑋𝑡−1, and the abatement 
activities of all players. Given these payoff functions, together with prices of 
consumption and abatement, 𝑝𝑐 and 𝑝𝑎, and wealth 𝑤𝑖𝑡. Normalizing prices to unity and 
assuming two identical players, i and j, we can re-express consumption in terms of wealth 
and abatement. Further, assume each player makes a single mitigation choice at the 
beginning of the game, which results in one time period. We now have the maximization 
problem: 
max
𝑎𝑖
 ?̃?𝑖 (𝑎𝑖, 𝑋(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗))     
Which is solved by taking first order conditions with respect to 𝑎𝑖 : 
𝜕 𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖,𝑎𝑗)
𝑎𝑖
  and 
defining best response functions for each player, 𝑏𝑟𝑖(𝑎~𝑖) ∀𝑖. These can be solved as a 
system of equations to find the optimal abatement. Note that this solution is identical to 
our reciprocity model if we set 𝛽 = 0. 
The level of abatement in the strong free-rider’s problem will be less than the socially 
optimal solution to the climate dilemma. To identify the socially optimal level, we 
consider a benevolent social planner that solves the following modified commons 
dilemma: 
max
𝑎1,𝑎2,…,𝑎𝑛
   ∑( ?̃?𝑖(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛 )   − 𝑋(𝑋0, 𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛) ) 
𝑁
𝑖=1
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The solution to this model is found by calculating 
𝜕 𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖,𝑎𝑗)
𝑎𝑖
 for each i and solving as a 
system of equations. The difference in this problem is that the social planner is 
maximizing aggregate utility and choosing all abatement levels.  Our reciprocity model 
defines the same allocation as the social planner’s problem so long as 𝛽 =
𝑛
𝑛+1
. The level 
of utility in the social planner’s problem is the maximum utility possible . 
Together, the self-centered and socially optimal solutions define a spectrum of outcomes 
ranging from the worst-case scenario to the best. Our reciprocity model results in a 
solution necessarily between these two bounds.  
Application to Forestry Management 
To end this section, I will apply the commons reciprocity utility model to a different 
commons situation: sustainable forestry vs. clear-cut logging. Forest management results 
in commons dilemmas similar in type (though obviously not in scope) to climate change. 
This section applies the extended utility framework I have developed to understand how 
individuals operate in common-property forests by defining an agent based simulation 
(with the methods in Chapter 3). This section does not present results due to time 
constraints approaching the defense of this thesis (which is unfortunate because the 
results were almost done). 
I define the forest management agent based simulation as 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = {𝑁,𝑀, 𝐴, 𝑅, 𝑇, 𝑆}  
The time periods and iteration steps, T and S, are similar to chapter 3 but now emphasis 
will be on a more complex growth function for trees in between time periods. For 
simplicity, I assume a very small network, where N is 15 by 15 grid-cells and the 
normalization method M is identical to chapter 3 (gridded-normalization to matrices). 
The abundance matrix will be assumed to be uniform (arbitrarily defined so that each 
grid-cell has 3 cargo-loads worth of the objective) but the location of agents will be 
irregular. The main elements that differentiate this simulation from chapter three include 
the set of agents and behavior rules. 
For the set of agents, I use the notation and decision structure of the commons reciprocity 
utility model. Thus defined, agents choose between a private consumption activity (clear 
cutting a forest grid-cell) or practicing sustainable harvest (which will accelerate the tree 
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regrowth rate). These actions are defined as 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑎𝑖, but in addition to choosing the 
level of each variable, the agent must also specify in which grid-cell it does its action. 
Thus, while omitting the x, y subscript to represent the geospatial location on each 
variable and including a discount rate of 𝑟, the agent solves:  
max
𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑐𝑖𝑡
 ∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 (𝑢𝑖
𝐷( 𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖𝑡;  𝑎𝑗𝑡, 𝑁𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑗∈~𝑖)
+ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑅𝑖𝑗(∙) 𝑢𝑗
𝐷( 𝑎𝑗𝑡, 𝑐𝑗𝑡;  𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝑗𝑡 , 𝑅i∈~𝑖)) 𝑑𝑡    (17) 
The above function will likely remain unsolvable in analytical form, due the complexity 
of the optimal control problem of choosing harvest rates on multiple grid-cells over 
continuous time with potential for rival consumption, but it can be approximated with an 
iterative algorithmic approach (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
I define the response function between i and j as the ratio of potential utility  
𝑅𝑖𝑗(∙) =
𝐿𝑖(𝐴𝑗𝑡) 
𝐿𝑗(𝐴𝑖𝑡)
 
Where 𝐿𝑖 represents a “potential lost” function that calculates the potential utility that 
could have been gained by agent 𝑖 if agent 𝑗 had not clear-cut the forest in a given cell, 
and where 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = {𝑎𝑖𝑘}𝑘=0
𝑡 , the cumulative choices of agent 𝑖 up until the current time 𝑡. 
This response function is much simpler in words than in math; agent 𝑖 responds 
positively if 𝑗 has made them lose less potential utility than they have made 𝑗 lose. So, 
agent 𝑖 will regard agent 𝑗 positively if 𝑗 has not caused them more harm than 𝑖 has done 
themselves. Note that this example also incorporates time more than the climate change 
example whereby the response changes with the cumulative actions of the other player(s). 
It may be best to discount actions that happened in the more distant past when calculating 
the cumulative potential lost, but for now I assume that all losses are treated equally. 
With a response function defined like this, agents will gain utility by seeing those agents 
who have helped them in the past do well and by seeing those agents who harmed them 
do poorly. This affects the agent’s choice of 𝑐𝑖𝑡 and 𝑎𝑖𝑡 because each agent knows their 
actions can have negative impacts on neighbors, and thus the agent can reward 
cooperators by not clear-cutting near their location and can punish defectors by the 
opposite. I summarize the notation presented so far (excluding only behavior rules) in 
Fig. A3.1. In the upper left of this figure, there is one example grid-cell, but this is 
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defined for every location in the 15 by 15 landscape. I define 4 agents on this landscape, 
denoted by numbered squares. 
 
The second key extension from chapter 3 is deriving behavior rules from this relatively 
more complex maximization problem defined in the commons reciprocity utility model. 
The basic approach remains the same: agents will analyze every grid-cell within their 
zero-profit boundary an choose to do whichever action(s) yield the maximum marginal 
gain, as defined in equation 17. I make the simplifying assumption that agents respond 
only to past actions of other players and do not strategically anticipate future actions 
(however, they will consider the future value. This assumption means that all of the 
complexity that arises from including reciprocity is fully accounted for in equation 17. 
The only additional complexity we must consider is that the agent is now choosing 
Figure A3.1: Definition of Agent Based Simulation for Forestry Management 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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between two potential actions with a long horizon of regrowth. This is an example 
optimization that is ideal for the use of genetic algorithms to find the best decision rule 
(see Deb et al. 2002 for discussion of genetic algorithms and their application to difficult 
optimizations like this). I have not yet implemented these algorithms due to time 
constraints, so instead I present preliminary results from a simplified version of this 
model and discuss how it can be extended.  
The main simplification I make is to assume clear-cutting is the only source of wood and 
that sustainable forestry is defined as just letting the forest regrow (thus reframing the 
maximization as a choice between cutting now or waiting to cut). I use a basic allometric 
regrowth function using parameters chosen arbitrarily from dipterocarp forests present on 
the island of Borneo (see Kohyama et al. 2003 for figures and functions). Finally, I 
simplify the model so that each agent only considers the harm from other agents in the 
previous time period and assume that agents are completely myopic to the dynamic 
optimization elements of this problem. Fig. A3.2 shows results from this simplified 
version of this model. The image in the upper left represents the utility gained by each 
agent from firewood cut (assuming a simple direct utility function similar to that used in 
the climate example). In the upper right I present the average travel time expended by 
each agent per time period. Finally, the image in the bottom row shows the supply of 
forest that remains uncut in equilibrium. These results are very preliminary and intended 
only to be illustrative of the possibility of combing the work in chapters 3 and 5. 
Nonetheless, the results seem quite intuitive insofar as the agent located in the middle 
travels farther and gains less utility than the other agents. 
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Although these results are very preliminary, they suggest future progress can be made 
through pursuing this approach. 
 
Figure A3.2: Application of Agent Based Simulation to Forest Management with 
Reciprocal Utility 
